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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores issues of legitimacy in the theory and practice of deliberative 
democracy. The starting point is two problems which arise in classical accounts of 
deliberation. First, if legitimacy depends on the give and take of reasons between free 
and equal citizens, how can the results of a deliberative moment be legitimate for 
those who did not take part, when in complex societies there will always be many 
more outsiders than insiders? Second, there are problems to do with motivations 
which mean that people may choose not to deliberate even if they can. 
The thesis begins by criticising the standard deliberative conception of legitimacy as 
being too narrow, then expands on it to include two different means of establishing 
links between participants and non-participants: representation and the publicity 
principle. The former helps by allowing a legitimate basis for including relatively few 
participants; the latter helps by greatly expanding the institutional possibilities of 
deliberative democracy, moving away from a reliance on small, self-contained forums 
and towards a "deliberative system". 
Having established a set of ideals, I then examine how three key features of the 
theoretical solution play out in real deliberations, using four deliberative experiments 
in the UK's National Health Service. One of the reasons why legitimacy is 
problematic in that context is a conflict between bureaucratic and deliberative 
imperatives, and so it should not be surprising that legitimacy problems plague some 
attempts to use deliberation in a liberal state. 
In chapter four I show how competing representation claims are used as strategic 
weapons in real policy conflicts, but argue that different claims have strengths and 
weaknesses depending on context. This has implications for the kind of process used 
at different points of a policy debate, particularly with regards to participant selection. 
In chapter five I argue that publicity lessens our reliance on problematic 
representative solutions, but presents difficulties of its own, largely because there are 
fundamental, structural barriers to the free exchange of communication such that the 
media can only transmit quite a narrow range of arguments. In chapter six, I show 
how disagreements over who and what counts as reasonable adds further 
complications, highlighting both the positive and negative contributions made by 
rhetoric and publicity and the varying ability of different deliberative models to 
handle the tensions. 
I conclude that while we may have to give up on the idea of a perfectly legitimate 
deliberative institution, it may be possible to connect several different types of 
institution, operating at different stages of a decision making process, to create 
legitimate agreements. I sketch what such a deliberative system might look like, 
before closing with recommendations for further research. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND LEGITIMACY 
In March 2000, a group of 16 randomly selected citizens sat down in a 
conference room at the Leicester City Football Club to hear arguments from 
witnesses about whether or not hospital services in their English Midlands city 
should be reorganised; and if so, how? Over the next four days, this "citizens' 
jury" would hear from doctors, health authority managers, patients' support 
group advocates, city council managers and many others. Their job would be to 
sort through the often conflicting claims and come up with recommendations for 
the health authority to implement. At the same time, however, patients' groups 
had organised one of Leicester's largest ever petitions against any reorganisation, 
and some of their members were picketing outside the stadium. After months of 
lobbying, protests, petitions and media campaigning against any change, it 
seemed they were not going to take "yes" for an answer. 
What reasons did the protesters have for agreeing with the jury's decisions? On 
what grounds could they be persuaded to accept the outcome without being 
inside the room themselves and participating in the debate directly? Why should 
they think, after months of hard work, that this group of 16 people chosen by a 
market research firm should have the decisive voice? 
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The Leicester citizens' jury illustrates a central issue in an approach to 
democratic theory and practice which has become very significant over the last 
decade or so. Citizens' juries and a number of similar processes have been 
linked with, or directly inspired by, deliberative democracy. The term was 
coined by Bessette (1980) to refer to the deliberations of elected members of the 
US Congress, but has come to mean much more. Deliberative democracy is a 
way of thinking about politics which emphasises the give and take of public 
reasoning between equal citizens rather than the counting of votes or the 
authority of representatives. For some, it is a response to the apparent 
irrationality of mass politics, which is illegitimate because it is too dominated by 
powerful interests and an uninformed or misinformed public (Gutmann and 
Thompson 1996). For others it is a response to the limited and limiting 
rationality of "system" and "technique", which are illegitimate because they fail 
to engage with the most meaningful aspects of human experience (Habermas 
1984). Both the term and its principles have been taken up with so much fervour 
by so many theorists that, to paraphrase Fukuyama (1989) and with apologies to 
Weale (1999, 1), it sometimes seems as though we're all deliberative democrats 
now. 
However, it has only recently been noticed that deliberative democracy faces 
significant legitimacy challenges of its own (Dryzek 2001; Parkinson 2003), and 
not just in the particular form it took in the Leicester case. This thesis explores 
these legitimacy challenges. My starting point is two problems which arise in the 
classic formulations of deliberative theory: they offer no account of why 
outsiders should confer legitimacy on the agreements reached inside a 
deliberative forum, and seem to be so procedurally demanding that not many 
people would choose to be inside anyway. 
I tackle the questions neither purely in theory, nor purely through empirical 
study, but through a combination of the two. I start by reconsidering the theory 
of legitimacy and deliberative democracy, but deepen the account by mining 
deliberative practice for further insights and solutions, focusing on one particular 
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policy setting, health policy in the United Kingdom. Those insights are used to 
make institutional recommendations at the end of the thesis. Thus, while my 
starting point is to consider two quite specific theoretical problems, the search for 
a solution is a fairly wide ranging one that leads to a fundamental reconsideration 
of deliberative democracy and its institutional possibilities. This approach can be 
very fruitful: the theoretical analysis gives one a normative frame against which 
to challenge implicit or explicit normative claims made for particular political 
practices, while the practices can bring to light new answers to theoretical 
questions at the same time as providing a reality check on theorists' wilder 
claims. Such an approach is not without its problems, and I will discuss some of 
those shortly. What I want to do first is to describe the "deliberative tum" in 
democratic theory (Dryzek 2000, v) in a little more detail, setting out the nature 
of the starting questions in a little more detail. I then discuss the empirical 
methodology, as well as outlining the cases. I conclude with an overview of the 
argument before setting out the theoretical issues in more detail in chapter two. 
Deliberative democracy and its account of legitimacy 
Like a lot of political concepts, deliberative democracy means many things to 
many people, a plurality which may be useful if it is to have any vitality (Dryzek 
1996a, 4-5). Theorists and practitioners from starkly contrasting traditions have 
applied the deliberative label to everything from radical democracy in the public 
sphere, to consultative forums engaged with the state, to representative 
assemblies, to the determination of public reason by small groups of jurists, even 
to the internal processes of making others "present" in an individual's own 
internal deliberations. 1 
1 For a more radical participatory account of deliberative democracy see Benhabib 
(1996), Dryzek (1990) and Schlosberg (1999). Cohen and Rogers (1992), Renn, Wehler 
and Wiedemann (1995) and Fung (forthcoming) discuss examples of mediating 
institutions between state and civil society (see also Habermas 1996, 229). The 
parliamentary example comes from Bessette (1994) and Uhr (1998), while the last two 
are discussed by (Rawls 1996, 231-40) and Goodin (2000). 
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And yet, despite the bewildering variety of perspectives and prescriptions, 
deliberative democracy does have a core set of propositions which distinguish it 
from its rivals. In its normative version, deliberative democracy is based on two 
principles: it insists on reasoning between people as the guiding political 
procedure, rather than bargaining between competing interests or the aggregation 
of private preferences; and the essential political act- the giving, weighing, 
acceptance or rejection of reasons -is a public act, as opposed to the purely 
private act of voting. Thus democracy is conceived of less as a market for the 
exchange of private preferences, more as a forum for the creation of public 
agreements (Elster 1997), a forum in which, ideally, "no force except that of the 
better argument is exercised" (Habermas 1975, 108). To ensure that public 
reason and not private power dominates public discussion, deliberative 
democracy requires equality between participants, as do other versions of 
democracy (Beetharn 1994, 28; Dahl 1989, 1). This means that the franchise 
should be inclusive, that their agreements be decisive, that participants agree to 
reciprocity in their discussions (Gutmann and Thompson 1996), giving each 
other equal speaking time, and equality of enforcement power. 
It is also worth stressing that it is democratic deliberation, not deliberation 
without modifier, despite some undemocratic usages of the term (Dryzek 2001, 
makes this criticism of Rawls). Democratic deliberation is therefore about 
making binding collective decisions, covering all the stages of the decision 
making process from problem definition and agenda setting , discussion of 
solutions, decision making and implementation (Catt 1999, 16); it should not be 
disconnected from questions of agendas, decisions and actions (Eckersley 2002 
makes a similar point). It should also embody the essential democratic principles 
of responsiveness to reflective public wishes and the political equality of every 
member of that public (Beetham 1994, 26-31; May 1978). Otherwise we are 
talking about deliberation, not deliberative democracy. 
Under such conditions, people's arguments for and against certain views must be 
made in public if they are to persuade others, and so can be examined and 
4 
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challenged by those others; preferences which may be more or less vague, 
unreflective, ill-informed and private, are transformed into more firm, reflective, 
informed and other-regarding ones through the deliberative encounter (Cohen 
1989). Two prerequisites for such transformation are: that the participants are 
communicatively competent, which means that they can understand and critically 
assess the arguments of others and make sound arguments of their own 
(Outhwaite 1994, 38; Renn, Webler, and Wiedemann 1995, 44); and that 
participants are willing to be persuaded, to have their preferences transformed in 
the face of a better argument, and thus to set aside strategic concerns and 
behaviour in the pursuit of those preferences (Dryzek 2000, 2; Miller 1992). 
Thus, deliberative democracy is a highly rationalist ideal of democracy, a 
reaction to the apparent irrationality of processes based on bargaining and 
strategy. 
These procedural features make deliberation much more than mere talk: it is a 
very particular kind of public talk. This point is often missed by writers who 
label as deliberative practices which exhibit none of the procedural conditions of 
genuine deliberation (Button and Mattson 1999, for example). Often this is a 
function of scale: beyond a very small number of participants deliberation 
breaks down, "with speech-making replacing conversation and rhetorical appeals 
replacing reasoned arguments" (Goodin 2000, 83n). Thus there is very little in 
mass public communication, including a great deal of media debate, large-scale 
referendum processes, or even public meetings, which merits the label 
"deliberative" in its own right (Parkinson 2001). 
There is a further feature of deliberative democracy which is common to those 
formulations which take the "democracy" modifier seriously. Deliberative 
democracy is also an account of legitimacy, "that outcomes are legitimate to the 
extent they receive reflective assent through participation in authentic 
deliberation by all those subject to the decision in question" (Dryzek 2001, 651).2 
2 Summarising Benhabib (1996, 68), Cohen (1989, 145-6), and Manin (1987, 360). See 
also Bessette (1994) and Bohman and Rehg (1997, ix). 
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While some authors emphasise the legitimacy of specific decisions, and others 
the legitimacy of the broad terms of association within which those decisions are 
made, the deliberative ideal is that all those subject to collective action should 
consent to that action. But if we accept that classic formulation, then there is a 
contradiction at the heart of deliberative democracy. Because the deliberation of 
all those subject to a decision or regime is impossible (Goodin 2000, 82), 
deliberative democratic practices cannot deliver legitimate outcomes as the 
theory defines them. 
The problem is not just one of getting everyone together in one place at one time 
to deliberate: while we might be able to get many more people virtually present 
through information technology or the media, they could not deliberate together, 
at least not in the technical sense given above (Walzer 1999)- most of the 
people will simply listen to others' arguments without having the opportunity to 
challenge them directly. Beyond that, however, is the fact that in a complex 
society characterised by rapid change and fluid boundaries, and given the 
limitations of reason (Forester 1984; Rawls 1996, 56-7), identifying "those 
affected" is an imprecise art at best, entirely arbitrary at worst. 
This is deliberative democracy's scale problem: deliberative decisions appear to 
be illegitimate for those left outside the forum, while bringing more than a few 
people in would seem to tum the event into speech-making, not deliberation. It 
also has legitimacy problems to do with motivations. The major issue concerns 
the deliberative requirement that participants be willing to have their preferences 
transformed, to go into the forum with an open mind. And yet, people's pre-
formed preferences, interests and goals are an essential part of what motivates 
them to enter political arenas in the first place (Rawls 1996, 82). If deliberative 
democracy rules those things out of court, it may seem to people that deliberative 
democracy is procedurally unfair, and thus illegitimate (Shapiro 1999). Even if 
we can solve the scale problem and uncover reasons why people should operate 
according to deliberative principles, there may be few reasons why they would. 
Other issues to do with motivations will emerge in the theoretical discussion in 
chapter two. 
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The institutions of deliberative democracy 
Because different institutions activate different behaviour (Norris 1997, 11-2; 
Peters 1999), the legitimacy problems can be more or less severe depending on 
the various ways in which deliberative democratic principles have been given 
institutional form. 
From many of the more abstract discussions of deliberative principles, readers 
could be forgiven for thinking that deliberative democracy is only applicable in 
small sites. Many theorists imply that deliberation occurs in one room at one 
moment, with a relatively small number of participants applying the somewhat 
stringent procedures of public reason, all held together by a mediator. This 
impression is certainly conveyed by the metaphor of "the forum" (Elster 1997), 
and strengthened by Cohen (1989) and Gutmann and Thompson (1996) in their 
theoretical discussions. Many other authors have taken the hint and applied 
deliberative principles to relatively small-scale decision making sites like 
citizens' juries (Stewart, Kendall, and Coote 1994; Smith and Wales 2000), 
deliberative polls (Fishkin 1997), consensus conferences (Joss and Durant 1995) 
and parliaments (Bessette 1994). Sometimes this has a constructive agenda, 
attempting to design institutions which embody deliberative principles; 
sometimes it has a critical agenda, using the principles as a yardstick against 
which to measure the claims made on behalf of real institutions. 
It is at this level that the problem of scale is most sharp, and yet it is sometimes 
hard to see how it might be otherwise. It is difficult to see how hundreds, let 
alone millions, of people can "plausibly 'reason together"' (Walzer 1999, 68) 
given the need for all participants to have equal time to raise proposals and to 
have those subjected to critical exploration in any depth (Dahl1989, 225-31, 
makes a similar point). Indeed, the literature on small groups suggests that the 
actual deliberative limit is very much smaller than Walzer's most pessimistic 
number. While the limit may depend on the purpose of the group (Rudestam 
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1982), the optimum for active decision making is generally agreed to be between 
five and seven (Goodall 1990). This is because the group must "be small enough 
that each member knows, and is able to react to, every other member" (Fisher 
and Ellis 1990). This is not just so from an external point of view: it is also 
reported to be the most satisfactory size by group members themselves 
(Ridgeway 1983). 
However, deliberative democracy is thought of another way. As well as the 
"micro" deliberative processes mentioned above, deliberative democracy also 
comes in "macro" forms (Hendriks 2002). One version of this conceives of 
deliberation as conversations carried on across time and space, the threads of 
which are picked up by people at different times, in different places, and with 
different interlocutors (Benhabib 1996, 75; Dryzek 1990; Young 2000, 167). At 
any one moment, people will be engaged in many such threads which change and 
interact over time. Thus the conversation threads are said to have, to some 
extent, a life of their own; they are subjectless, decentred (Habermas 1984). 
Rationality, on this view, is not necessarily a feature of each individual 
conversation, because each has only a part of the picture. Rationality is a feature 
of all the discourses on a topic to the extent that such conversations are openly 
accessible to communicatively competent publics (Rehg and Bohman 1996, 87-
8). It is democratic to the extent that government action is determined by the 
provisional outcome of the contestation of discourses, discourses which are 
controlled by communicatively competent people in decentred, flat-structured 
networks (Dryzek 2000, 74-5; Schlosberg 1999). 
Another version is more tied to familiar institutions. Mansbridge (1999) talks 
about a "deliberative system" which includes formal representative structures but 
extends well beyond them to include the informal public sphere and private talk 
that is recognisably political (1999, 215). It is a spectrum along which outcomes 
become progressively less binding on participants, and demanding less 
accountability to non-participants, the closer the forum is to the informal end. In 
his more recent work, Habermas ( 1996, ch. 7) makes a similar move. Instead of 
insisting that civil society alone is the arena for democratisation, he now offers a 
8 
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"two-track model" of deliberation which distinguishes the roles of the informal 
public sphere of civil society and the formal public sphere of representative 
institutions? Opinions are transmitted to the formal public sphere for action by 
virtue of a number of mechanisms, all of which can be more or less inclusive, 
deliberative, democratic in practice. These include the tools which reach out 
from the informal public sphere, such as direct protest, representations to 
government, and commissioned reports; those which reach out from the formal 
public sphere, like commissions of inquiry, select committee hearings, 
consultative processes, even government-commissioned opinion research; and 
many other techniques which inhabit that area called "middle democracy" 
(Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 12) including the micro deliberative processes 
like deliberative polls and citizens' juries. At the same time, decision makers are 
themselves participants in discourses, and the results of discursive contests are 
said to be "transmitted to the state" quite automatically, simply by virtue of the 
fact that governments are made up of people in society. They participate by 
means of the news media, through dramatisations on stage and screen, in books, 
in conversations and so on. 
While a particular deliberative moment might have as its focal point a relatively 
small group of people in one room- whether it be parliament or a group of 
citizens' jurors- thousands, even millions, of people can engage with it in other 
ways, such as if various news media pick it up; if it is the subject of 
conversations at work, over a drink, at home; if interest groups engage with it; if 
3 For Habermas the informal public sphere is the site of opinion formation only, while 
the formal public sphere is the site of decision making; Fennema and Maussen (2000) 
make a similar distinction. This view has drawn sharp criticism from other critical 
theorists. Dryzek (2000), appealing to egalitarian democratic values, argues that 
Habermas has given away too much ground to liberals, especially elite-minded liberals, 
by theorising the informal public sphere as subservient to the state rather than as a 
critical and powerful master (Eckersley 2002, makes a similar attack). Dryzek insists on 
a more "insurgent" model of discursive democracy in which networks in the informal 
public sphere make strategic calculations about when to engage constructively, and 
when to do battle, with the state. 
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people are mobilised by protests or petitions; if various elected representatives 
pick up the issue and run with it; if other micro deliberative forums are set up to 
grapple with the issue. Each element in such a system may not be perfectly 
deliberative or democratic in its own right, but may still perform a useful 
function in the system as a whole. However, it would be a strange deliberative 
system indeed if none of its elements met deliberative democratic criteria. 
Deliberative institutions, macro and micro, are affected by the legitimacy 
problems in different ways. For example, the scale problem is particularly acute 
for the micro version of deliberative democracy simply because it is the one in 
which the insider I outsider distinction is most sharp; at first glance, macro 
deliberation avoids the scale problem because everyone is "inside" the 
deliberative system to some extent. However, in that "to some extent" is a great 
deal of room for slippage: not everyone can be attentive to every issue which 
affects them, let alone actively participate in their resolution, even to a modest 
extent. I will discuss the details of how the different models are affected by the 
legitimacy problems in the next chapter, and as the thesis progresses. 
Approach and methods 
I address these issues first by reconsidering the nature of legitimacy and 
deliberative democracy in chapter two, then by using some empirical research to 
cover two main issues: whether the theoretical problems have been solved in 
practice, or at least how they have been managed; and whether new problems 
arise in practice and how they are dealt with. The empirical element is what 
gives the later institutional discussion its breadth. In this I follow the advice of 
Machiavelli (1984 (1513), ch.15) who argued that "there is such a gap between 
how one lives and how one ought to live that anyone who abandons what is done 
for what ought to be done learns his ruin rather than his preservation" (see also 
Gunnell1986). My aim, however, is not to conduct a thorough evaluation of 
particular processes; it is to use practical experience with deliberative principles 
10 
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to develop further our theoretical account of legitimacy, deliberative democracy 
and its institutional possibilities. 
The key difficulty I faced connecting theory with practice was that it is hard to 
ask empirical questions about fully deliberative institutions that do not in fact 
exist. While some authors like Bessette (1994) treat deliberative democracy as a 
description of some actual practice, I tend more to a position which treats the 
theory as a counterfactual ideal (Dryzek 1990, 36), an ideal which real 
institutions can approximate more or less closely. Furthermore, real practices are 
embedded in a liberal system, and are fundamentally affected by the 
assumptions, motivations, discourses and power structures of that system- so-
called deliberative processes like citizens' juries, deliberative polls and 
consensus conferences have not arisen pure from deliberative theory or popular 
imagination like Venus from the waves. Therefore, the conclusions I draw about 
legitimacy in practice need to be treated with some caution: I cannot say what 
results would have been found from an investigation of the same processes 
embedded in a different, more fully deliberative institutional setting. What I can 
say instead, and with some confidence, is that certain issues will be faced in 
moving from our current institutional starting point towards a more deliberative 
system. For that reason I will not use the results to put forward a model of an 
ideal, fully legitimate deliberative democracy. Rather, the proposals I make in 
chapter seven concern the next steps which move current institutions in a more 
deliberative democratic direction. 
Case studies have advantages and disadvantages. By contrast with large-n 
methods, they allow the researcher to gather detailed information with rich 
descriptive and explanatory power, but at the cost of some generalisability (Berg 
2001, 229). However, not all generalisability is lost if the cases are chosen to be 
representative not in a statistical sense but in an analytic sense (Yin 1984, 21); 
that is, if a case is "representative in terms of an initial ... theory, which presents 
it as the selected observation point for an object of study" (Hamel, Dufour, and 
Fortin 1993, 44). 
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My cases were chosen partly for such analytic reasons, and partly because of the 
availability of key interviewees and other material within tight time and resource 
limitations. In order to limit other institutional variables as much as possible, I 
chose to look for cases in one broad policy area in one country: health and 
disability services in the United Kingdom. The location and topic are logical for 
a number of reasons. Health politics is instructive because it is one of the fields 
in which the tension between technocratic and democratic control is most acute. 
As I discuss in chapter three, health politics is characterised by multi-lateral 
tensions between a highly professionalised guild, a demanding public, and 
managers and governments trying to meet demand while controlling costs 
(Moran 1999). This makes democratic deliberation on health policy fraught with 
conflict, and thus a tough test of the ability of any process to deliver legitimate 
agreements. The United Kingdom is an interesting location for such a study 
because, since the Blair government took office in 1997, it has seen a significant, 
state-driven programme of experimentation with "public and patient 
involvement" initiatives, a few of which have had a deliberative democratic 
character. This meant that my choice of cases, while still small, was better than 
it might have been elsewhere. Nonetheless, the literature on the use of 
deliberative techniques in Britain is quite limited, concentrating on how a given 
practice embodies deliberative democratic principles, or on relatively limited 
instrumental criticism of a few techniques.4 This meant that I was unable to do 
much in the way of case selection from secondary sources before arriving in the 
UK. 
The selection was eventually made thanks to recommendations from initial 
interviewees, academics who had written on the use of deliberative processes or 
4 This is a feature of much of the deliberative democracy literature, not just that focused 
on health. There is a growing literature on public involvement initiatives in health 
generally - see, for example, Bowie, Richardson and Sykes ( 1995), Klein (2000), 
Milewa, Valentine and Calnan (1999), Mullen (2000), Rowe and Shepherd (2002), and 
Shackley and Ryan (1994). For discussions of specifically deliberative processes in UK 
health policy, see Barnes (1999), Dolan, Cookson and Ferguson (1999), Lenaghan, New 
and Mitchell (1996), Lenaghan (1999) and Mciver (1997). 
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patient and public involvement initiatives in UK health settings. As a result, I 
ended up focusing on four cases of deliberation which had occurred in the three 
years preceding my fieldwork in May-August 2001. The cases were a citizens' 
jury on health services and public involvement in Belfast in July 1998; a 
deliberative poll on the future of the National Health Service (NHS), held in 
Manchester but broadcast nationally, also in July 1998; the debate in Leicester 
surrounding hospital service reorganisation, which resulted in a citizen's jury in 
March 2000; and the development, between January and July 2001, of The NHS 
Plan (Secretary of State for Health 2000b ), a policy template for the NHS for the 
years 2001-2010. In the first two, macro features were limited or entirely 
absent, while the last two had some macro deliberative elements. As an example 
of more grass-roots approaches, I will also refer occasionally to the UK disability 
rights movement which acts to challenge not only the kinds of services which are 
provided by the state and large charities, but the very categorisation of disability 
as a "health" issue. I give some more detail of the cases in the next section. 
The cases have other analytic justifications, differing on a number of important 
dimensions. First, they occupy different points on Mansbridge's (1999) 
spectrum, noted on page 8 above, which features formal institutions making 
binding collective decisions at one end, to the informal, non-binding institutions 
of civil society at the other. The NHS Plan process is closest to the formal I 
binding end, the activist network at the civil society I non-binding end, and the 
other three in between. As will be seen in the next chapter, I theorise that 
processes at different points of this spectrum have different advantages and 
disadvantages in terms of legitimacy. Second, they privilege different 
conceptions of representation which turn out to be important for establishing the 
legitimacy of a particular deliberative moment. And third, they differ according 
to scale, from the very small-scale to the fairly inclusive which, analytically, 
should have an influence on their legitimacy. These differences allow me to find 
out under what conditions legitimacy problems are most acute, and what kinds of 
processes deal with those problems more successfully than others. 
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The interviews themselves were as non-directive as possible, allowing 
participants to steer the discussion (Berg 2001; Jorgenson 1991, 211) and using 
their own words to construct the codes I used in subsequent analysis of the 
interviews and secondary material (Coffey and Atkinson 1996). I conducted 30 
interviews between May and July 2001 in England and Northern Ireland, 
gathering documentary material on the cases as I went. The interviewees broke 
down into groups as shown in Table 1.1: 
Table 1.1: Interviewees by role5 
Leicester debate II II I I I I 
Deliberative Poll I I I 
NHSPlan III I I II n/a 
Other 
Time pressures and the lack of published material surveying deliberative practice 
in Britain meant that I was not able to interview people in every role in every 
process. I did not interview any lay participants. 
Given all this, what follows cannot be taken as applying to all recent deliberative 
experiments, and this is not meant to be a comprehensive evaluation of the cases, 
least of all the British government's programme. Nonetheless, I can be confident 
that certain patterns of discourse, certain dominant ideas, certain perceptions of 
events were present. Specifying exactly how prevalent these attitudes and issues 
were will have to wait for another study. 
5 Note that n=34, not 30, because some interviewees had multiple roles in the processes. 
"Observer" includes health policy academics conducting evaluations. The "other" 
process category includes academics interested in general public and patient 
involvement initiatives. "Event manager" includes NHS staff and external consultants 
who facilitated the deliberations, as opposed to those on whose behalf the event was 
commissioned. 
14 
I 
III 
IIII 
Deliberative democracy and legitimacy 
The cases 
The thesis is organised thematically rather than on a case-by-case basis, because 
it is the theoretical questions which drive it, not the details of the cases. This 
helps with drawing out the key contrasts between different institutional forms, 
but can do so at the expense of narrative flow, and so it is worth outlining the 
cases now to provide a reference point for later discussion. 
The Belfast citizens' jury 
The first case I use is a citizens' jury held in Belfast in July 1998 and 
commissioned jointly by the Eastern Health & Social Services Board (EHSSB), 
roughly the Northern Irish equivalent of an English health authority but with 
broader welfare responsibilities, and the Eastern Health & Social Services 
Council (EHSSC), its patient watchdog, roughly equivalent to an English 
Community Health Council. 
The citizens' jury process is said to fit the deliberative democratic ideal well 
(Hendriks 2002; Lenaghan, New, and Mitchell1996; Smith and Wales 2000), 
although, being developed in the 1970s, it predates the deliberative tum in 
democratic theory, and has had the deliberative label applied to it post hoc. 
Developed independently in the United States and Germany (where, taking a 
slightly different form, they are known as planning cells),6 the citizens' jury is 
designed to address policy problems. Evidence from "witnesses" from various 
sides of the issue is presented to a jury of lay people who deliberate and make 
6 In the US, the originator was Ned Crosby who registered the name "citizens' jury" to 
protect both the intellectual property and to ensure consistency of process. The planning 
cell was developed by Peter Dienel, and is generally an iterative process, five or more 
cells running concurrently in different locations, each of which sends representatives to a 
final cell which puts together the final recommendations. See Crosby (1998) and Dienel 
and Renn (1995). 
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recommendations based on the evidence.7 The jury selection is not strictly 
random: it is usually a quota sample of anywhere between 12 and 24 (16 seems 
to be common), with the quotas determined by age, gender, ethnicity and 
whatever other demographic variables might be important on a given issue. 
Interviewees estimated that around 200 citizens' juries had been run in the UK 
by mid-2001 (although there is no definitive list), most commissioned by health 
and local authorities, facilitated by professional facilitators, and overseen by 
steering groups made up of the commissioning body and key stakeholders 
including, sometimes, a media representative. Citizens' juries were introduced to 
the UK health policy community in mid-1996 when the Institute of Public Policy 
Research (IPPR) and the King's Fund, a London-based health foundation, ran six 
pilots with five health authorities in England (Mciver 1997). This followed a 
trial earlier in 1996 with five local authorities, sponsored by the Local 
Government Management Board and managed by the IPPR and the Institute of 
Local Government Research at the University of Birmingham (Hall and Stewart 
1996). 
The Belfast jury's aim was to help develop a response to a white paper entitled 
The New NHS: Modem, Dependable (Secretary of State for Health 1997) which 
set out the government's "modernisation" agenda for the NHS. Rather than go 
through the whole document, the organisers selected just one area of it, the 
establishment of Primary Care Groups, 8 and asked, "What are the advantages and 
disadvantages of a move to primary care groups, how can our concerns be met?" 
(sic). In addition, they asked two general questions to elicit people's values 
7 Robin Clarke, formerly of the Institute of Public Policy Research (IPPR), suggests that 
the analogy with the legal jury should not be taken too far: for example, there are no 
lawyers or judge, but a facilitator who directs proceedings; and juries can make many 
recommendations, not just binary choices. 
8 Primary Care Groups were the precursors of free-standing Primary Care Trusts, groups 
of GP surgeries, district nurses, dentists and other health services which took over some 
of the health service commissioning role of health authorities. Their role, and the staged 
process of their creation, is described in the white paper (Secretary of State for Health 
1997) and by Wright (1998, 5). 
16 
Deliberative democracy and legitimacy 
surrounding health and social services generally, as well as public involvement in 
health decision making. Thus a key feature of the Belfast jury was that, while it 
did have an external focus in the shape of the government's white paper, the 
decision to run it was made, and the agenda set, by the commissioning bodies, 
not by any central organisation in Belfast or Westminster, nor driven by demand 
from local people (see Barnes 1999 for a comprehensive evaluation). It was a 
case of micro deliberation largely in isolation from more macro processes. 
The NHS deliberative poll 
The deliberative poll on the NHS was even more the creature of its 
commissioners, being timed to coincide with the 50th anniversary of the NHS 
rather than being triggered by any particular policy event. 
By contrast with the citizens' jury, the deliberative poll was consciously created 
with deliberative principles in mind. Its developer, James Fishkin, is a political 
theorist at the University of Texas at Austin, and his inspiration was flaws in 
ordinary opinion polls preceding elections, particularly the flaw that people are 
required to offer opinions on topics whether they know anything about them or 
not. To correct this, the deliberative poll first puts standard survey questions 
about a topic to a random sample of the relevant population, brings them together 
to a conference venue where they are systematically informed about the topic and 
get the chance to debate it with panels of experts, then polls them again to see 
how their opinions have changed. Thus, the deliberative poll is really a pre-test I 
post-test quantitative research design with some limited deliberation in between. 
It is claimed to bridge "the gap between actual public opinion and well informed 
public opinion" (Park, Jowell, and McPherson 1998, 2, original emphasis); it 
"models what the electorate would think if, hypothetically, it could be immersed 
in intensive deliberative processes" (Fishkin 1991, 81). The gap between the 
informed participants and the uninformed audience is bridged by televising 
proceedings. 
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The NHS Deliberative Poll was the last of five run in Britain, the first being held 
in 1994. Like the others, it was organised by Fishkin and Robert Luskin of the 
Center for Deliberative Polling at the University of Texas, with their UK partners 
Social & Community Planning Research (SCPR),9 a London-based not-for-profit 
social research organisation, and their broadcast partner, Channel4. Following a 
household survey and questionnaire, a random stratified sample of people were 
invited to attend a three-day event from Friday 3 July to Sunday 5 July 1998, 
held partly at Manchester Metropolitan University, partly at the studios of 
Granada Television, one of Channel4's funders. 10 Of an unknown number of 
people approached, 228 people accepted the invitation. 
The deliberations included three short sessions in discussion groups on the 
Saturday totalling 4:05 hours, run by SCPR facilitators. Each small group 
session was followed by a plenary session chaired by Sheena Macdonald, a high-
profile political journalist working for Channel 4. In the plenary sessions, the 
groups submitted questions to be asked of two different panels of health policy 
"experts", plus another three question-and-answer sessions with health 
spokespeople from the three main parties. The whole event, including some of 
the small-group discussions, was broadcast in three, one-hour programmes called 
"The Prescription" on 4-5 July (Channel 4 1998). 
The deliberative poll is supposed to have "recommending force", allowing "a 
microcosm of the country to make recommendations to us all after it has had the 
chance to think through the issues" (Fishkin 1997, 162). However, in this case 
there was no broader macro deliberation going on about the topic, nor did it 
connect with any particular debate in government, so it is unclear what effect the 
commissioners thought they would have. Furthermore, there are tensions 
between Fishkin's policy aspirations for the technique, his interest in deliberative 
9 SCPR is now called the National Centre for Social Research (www.natcen.org.uk), 
having changed its name in 1999. To avoid temporal problems in the narrative and 
references, I will refer to it by the older name throughout. 
10 Relevant detail about the nature and structure of Channel4 appears in chapter five. 
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democracy, his application of survey methods and the needs of television which 
cause further complications, as will be seen in later chapters. 
The Leicester hospitals debate 
The case with which I introduced the thesis contrasts starkly with the first two, 
featuring another citizens' jury which this time was the focal point of a high-
profile, intense public debate: a case of a micro deliberative event being used to 
give a sharp point to a more diffuse macro deliberative process. 
The issue was a Leicestershire Health Authority proposal to reconfigure services 
at Leicester's three main hospitals, the Leicester Royal Infirmary (LRI), 
Leicester General, and Glenfield. The health authority felt that "planned care" 
services were suffering because acute care was taking up too many resources. 
Following four years of consultation and planning with hospital-based specialists 
and other medical interests, they proposed concentrating accident and emergency 
(A&E) services at the LRI and the General, moving most acute services from 
Glenfield, and devoting Glenfield to planned care services. When the 
announcement was made in November 1999, however, a storm of protest 
erupted: the authority's planning approach had not taken into account the large 
investment people had in Glenfield hospital. This was for several reasons, 
among them the fact that it was a relatively new facility, unlike the Victorian-era 
General, and because of widespread public fear about the closure of A&E units 
around the country. The key, however, was the fact that a heart unit and breast 
care services had recently been set up at Glenfield largely thanks to major public 
appeals for donations rather than direct government spending. 
In response, a petition was organised by the fundraisers which gathered at least 
150,000 signatures; the media were mobilised; members of parliament and local 
councillors weighed in. In the face of the storm, the health authority tried to find 
some means of resolving the situation. The means chosen, thanks to prompting 
from Patricia Hewitt- government minister, MP for Leicester West, and former 
deputy director of the IPPR- was a citizens' jury, which met in March 2000, 
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managed and facilitated by consultants from the non-profit Office for Public 
Management (OPM). After four days of hearing witnesses and deliberating, the 
jury accepted the case for a planned care site, but recommended that it be the 
General, not Glenfield, to the delight of the protestors. 11 
The key features of this case to keep in mind are that the jury was not the only 
element, but just the end point of a much bigger, Leicester-wide debate; and that 
it was chosen not simply by decision makers in the health authority, as in the 
Belfast case, but under great pressure from numerous others. 
TheNHSPlan 
My next case is the development of The NHS Plan (Secretary of State for Health 
2000b ), a white paper setting out institutional and regulatory reforms for the 
NHS for the following decade. It is interesting for two reasons: its emphasis on 
putting public and patient involvement at the heart of the NHS, drawing 
specifically on deliberative principles in the design of the institutions it 
recommended; and the use of deliberative principles to create the Plan in the first 
place. As I stressed earlier, this is not an evaluation of the government's 
programme, and I will be focusing on the Plan's creation process rather than the 
institutions it recommended. 
The NHS Plan process was created by the Department of Health's Strategy Unit, 
led by health policy academic Chris Ham of the University of Birmingham (see 
Ham 1999), which advised the then-Secretary of State, Alan Milburn. 
Particularly important was unit member Jo Lenaghan, a former analyst at the 
IPPR who ran some of the UK's first citizens' juries in 1996. It was Lenaghan 
11 The 150,000 figure is the lowest estimate I was given; the highest was 190,000. To 
put those figures in context, the population of the County of Leicestershire at the 2001 
census was 610,300, of which 279,923 were in Leicester City, and 458,856 were of 
voting age (statistics available from http://www.leics.gov.uk). Thus, even the low figure 
represents just under a quarter of the total, and a third of the voting age population. 
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who largely designed and ran the consultation process that informed The NHS 
Plan. 12 
The process had four main elements. The first was a series of age-based focus 
groups with patients to identify health needs for the next ten years. The second 
was two day-long public meetings with about 200 participants each who were 
given presentations on the key policy problems facing the health service and 
asked to prioritise those problems. The third element was not obviously 
deliberative in itself but had the broadest reach. In a highly publicised release, a 
postcard was sent to hospitals, GP surgeries, supermarkets and other retail outlets 
that asked, "What are the top three things which you think would make the NHS 
better for you and your family?", with space inviting further comment "on any 
aspect of NHS care" (Secretary of State for Health 2000a). The department 
received 151,999 replies from the public and 48,961 from staff. This a low 
response rate given the salience of the issue in Britain at the time, despite 
assertions to the contrary by the Department (DoH 2000). The responses were 
sorted into broad categories by department staff, with the public overwhelmingly 
wanting shorter waiting times and staff wanting improved facilities. All three of 
the public elements were then used as inputs into the fourth, a series of working 
groups made up of stakeholders from the various medical and nursing colleges, 
branches of the NHS, and patient advocacy groups. These groups worked on the 
detail of the plan and, as Modernisation Action Teams, continued to work on 
implementation issues well after the plan's launch. 
Thus the process as a whole was deliberation in the macro sense, made up of a 
number of different micro processes, but driven from the formal end of 
Mansbridge's deliberative spectrum. Of the four elements, three had clearly 
deliberative features in their own right. While the postcard was not deliberative 
in the micro sense, it nonetheless fulfilled a useful macro deliberative function, 
12 The Strategy Unit and Milburn were directly credited by current or past NHS 
Executive members and those health policy academics closely involved with the Plan's 
development and implementation. Milburn resigned from cabinet, citing family reasons, 
in June 2003. 
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informing a much wider audience that the detailed deliberation was going on and 
giving them at least some input into that process. 
Disability activist networks 
Finally, I occasionally draw on material about macro deliberative engagement 
driven from the opposite end of Mansbridge's spectrum, the informal public 
sphere. My example is the disability movement which is characterised by strong 
participatory norms, modelled as it is on other civil rights and new social 
movements (Driedger 1989; Shakespeare 1993)- these norms are an essential 
part of deliberative models which draw on radical, participatory democracy for 
inspiration (Schlosberg 1995). Thus, organisations like the British Council Of 
Disabled People, the Long-Term Medical Conditions Alliance, Choices and 
Rights, and the Disabled People's Direct Action Network are all multi-noded 
networks with loose structures. They de-emphasise hierarchy and emphasise 
collective decision making and collective action, although their decision making 
processes do have majoritarian features thanks to the UK's legal requirements for 
registration as a charity which impose certain rules of governance. 
When engaging in external deliberations, things are quite different. For one, 
disability activists are deeply suspicious of formal deliberative processes like 
citizens' juries, rejecting them as a "top-down" model of citizen engagement 
which constructs disability as a medical problem, incompatible both with their 
"bottom up" stress on self-determination and their model of disability as being 
socially constructed (Marian Barnes, interview- see also Barnes 1991; Oliver 
1990). Further, they see many consultation processes, deliberative or otherwise, 
as loaded in favour of the interests of those with financial interest in the 
outcomes, such as bus companies who do not want to have to make their vehicles 
accessible, or large charities which are disability "industries" in their own right 
(DAN 1998). 
Instead the movement engages with the rest of public sphere in ways which try to 
ensure that it does not get co-opted by such powerful interests (Barnes and Oliver 
22 
Deliberative democracy and legitimacy 
1995). Like the environmental movement in Germany, described by Dryzek 
(2000), the movement has both "insurgent" and "collaborative" wings, using 
both direct action to generate publicity for its messages and, within strict limits, 
collaborative work with government agencies and charities. The movement also 
supports research by disabled people themselves; indeed, many movement 
members are actively hostile to non-disabled academics "muscling in" on their 
territory. I felt the effect of this suspicion directly, and was unable to get an 
interview with any of the movement leaders I approached given the limited time 
frame. Therefore my account of their activities is based on secondary sources, 
including internet sites of disabled people's networks and the journal Disability 
and Society which is run and publishes work almost entirely by disabled 
academics. This lack of primary research is the reason why I concentrate on the 
other four cases. 
Outline of the argument 
I have asked the key questions, explained my approach and introduced the cases. 
I want to conclude by giving a brief outline of the argument to come before 
launching into the detailed discussion. 
I have noted that the classic deliberative conception of legitimacy leads to the 
scale and motivations problems. But what if that conception is wrong? Can we 
avoid the problems simply by reconsidering the nature of legitimacy, or of 
deliberative democracy itself? Chapter two tackles this question. Drawing on 
Beetham's (1991) sociological account of legitimacy, I build a more complete 
theoretical picture, expanding the deliberative account to include two different 
means of establishing links between participants and non-participants: 
representation and the publicity principle. The former helps take the sting out of 
the scale problem by allowing a legitimate basis for including relatively few 
participants; the latter helps both issues by greatly expanding the institutional 
possibilities of deliberative democracy, moving away from a reliance on small, 
micro deliberative forums towards a more discursive, macro conception of 
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democracy in which a variety of institutions at various points of the public sphere 
are connected together in a deliberative system. Along the way I consider how 
other authors have dealt with the problems, drawing on them where that is 
fruitful. Neither solution is perfect, however: they both contain elements which 
buttress some aspects of legitimacy while undermining others. 
Having established a new set of ideals, I then examine how three key features of 
my theoretical solution play out in real deliberations, using the NHS cases. 
These chapters address the questions posed in the "Approach" section above: 
have the theoretical problems been solved, or at least managed, in practice; and 
what new problems arise in practice and how are they dealt with? 
Before getting into the detail, however, I ask "why deliberation?" in chapter 
three. The history and discourse surrounding deliberative experiments in the 
NHS is instructive because it reveals points of contact and conflict between 
deliberative and bureaucratic norms, which helps explain both why deliberative 
techniques have been taken up with such enthusiasm by some policy actors and 
why legitimacy problems have plagued some of those attempts. This then 
provides me with some valuable insights into the challenges and opportunities to 
be faced when recommending institutional intervention in chapter seven. One of 
the challenges is to make sure that deliberation happens not just on small, local 
problems but on the big issues which frame them- otherwise we may end up 
with sophisticated deliberation on things which do not matter very much, a state 
of affairs which would not have much motivational power. This may mean, 
however, that we need to move away from some of the micro deliberative 
approaches which have attracted a lot of theoretical and experimental attention 
recently. I contend that these processes are best suited to small, local, self-
contained issues rather than the big, complex, and ill-defined ones, but that our 
democratic need in health policy, as perhaps in other fields, is for more 
democratic deliberation on the latter kind of issues, less on the former. 
The next three chapters then dive into the case material in more detail. Chapter 
four looks at how competing representation claims are managed in practice, 
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arguing that different claims have strengths and weaknesses depending on 
context. This has implications for the kind of process used at different points of 
a policy debate, with particular implications for participant selection - for 
example, random selection has been the preferred means for the designers of 
micro deliberative processes, but its benefits come with significant costs when it 
comes to making legitimately binding collective decisions, since such 
representatives lack any accountability to non-participants. Similarly, I look at 
the advantages and disadvantages of elected representation and what a few 
interviewees called "championing" to see what they add to, and subtract from, 
legitimate outcomes. An important conclusion from this chapter is that no one 
micro process can be fully legitimate because no one representative can claim 
fully legitimate authority to speak on behalf of others. Once again the analysis 
drives us away from a reliance on micro deliberation and towards thinking about 
the contribution that many different micro moments can make to a deliberative 
system. 
The second major form of establishing links between insiders and outsiders, 
publicity, seems to lessen our reliance on problematic representative solutions. 
However, it presents difficulties of its own to do with salience and the 
dramatisation of communication, issues which I consider in chapter five. I pay 
particular attention here to the structure of the media as the primary means by 
which messages are exchanged between deliberative sites, between insiders and 
outsiders, drawing on some interesting contrasts between the deliberative poll as 
experienced by its participants and the poll as presented to its television 
audience. The major issue that emerges here is that the media is a necessary but 
unreliable transmitter of arguments around a deliberative system, but for 
fundamental reasons to do with the political economy of news, not so much 
because of the individual failings of journalists. These features make it easier to 
transmit narratives which are simplified, personalised and polarised, and not so 
good at transmitting complexities, abstractions, or information about impersonal 
forces. This in tum creates serious risks that the deliberative system is weighted 
in favour of those whose arguments can be dramatised and against those whose 
arguments cannot. 
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In chapter six, I develop some earlier concerns further by looking at how battles 
over what counts as rational are crucial for establishing legitimacy. The agenda 
setting issue turns up again, the discussion reinforcing the earlier point that 
tightly focused agendas are best for micro deliberation but undermine the 
legitimacy of the outcome if the issue is inherently ill-defined and features battles 
over problem definitions, although some processes handle this better than others. 
Picking up on the rhetoric concerns in chapter five, it turns out that narration is 
one of the ways people reason together, having a positive role in forming 
communicative bridges, reaching across difference, and helping people 
understand what it is like to be in another's shoes. Nonetheless, the worry 
remains that such narrative privileges certain viewpoints over others, giving too 
much deliberative power to those skilled in public rhetoric and with a 
sympathetic story to tell. 
As the discussion progresses, a somewhat pessimistic conclusion emerges, which 
is that one can only have good deliberation on things which do not matter all that 
much. Once something is important to a lot of people - that is, if one solves the 
motivational problem- the participation and publicity needed for legitimacy go 
up significantly; but so do the incentives to use rhetoric manipulatively and act 
strategically, undermining the deliberative quality that is also necessary for 
legitimacy. This implies that, at least given the present uneven distribution of 
power, state regulation will be necessary to enforce compliance with deliberative 
procedures, enforcement which some argue is counter-productive. Nonetheless, 
the cases show that these conflicts are manageable. At the start of chapter seven 
I restate the principles of a legitimate deliberative democracy, and argue that 
while we may have to give up on the idea of a perfectly legitimate deliberative 
institution, it may be possible to connect several different types of institution, 
operating at different points in time and space in the deliberative system, to 
create legitimate agreements. After going through the pros and cons for 
legitimacy of each of the deliberative models under study here, drawing out the 
major contrasts between micro and macro deliberation, I then sketch how current 
institutions might be applied best at different stages of the decision making 
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process. My model does not solve the legitimacy problems completely, but it 
makes positive progress on all the legitimacy criteria while managing the 
negative consequences. I close by making some suggestions for further research, 
and answering the question with which I opened the thesis: what reasons did the 
protestors in Leicester have for conferring legitimacy on a process which seemed 
to hand decisive power to a group of 16 strangers? 
There are two final caveats before starting to answer that in detail. First, I 
reiterate that this is not a comprehensive analysis of the pros and cons of 
particular processes, least of all the British government's policy prescriptions for 
the NHS, although I do offer a limited comparative assessment in chapter seven. 
It needs to be remembered that I am looking at the cases primarily to explore 
theoretical issues. Where I do move into institutional design, my defence for the 
sharp focus on legitimacy, rather than other values like efficiency and 
effectiveness, is that it is not just a necessary ingredient in any set of institutions, 
but one that should weigh more heavily than it has done so far when deliberative 
democrats and their critics have come to consider deliberative institutions. 
Second, this is not a comprehensive critique of deliberative democracy, but an 
attempt to throw light on one set of little remarked but still significant problems. 
I stay away from questions of whether deliberative democracy is a "good thing" 
or not because the range of evaluative criteria I bring to bear is far from complete 
(for some discussion of this, see Macedo 1999). What I do hope to achieve is to 
give deliberative democrats, both theorists and practitioners, a richer 
understanding of legitimacy than the classic model provides, a richer 
understanding of how the inevitable legitimacy tensions can be managed, and 
provide some ideas on how we can take the next step from current political 
institutions towards a more legitimate deliberative democracy. 
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LEGITIMACY RECONSIDERED: THEORETICAL SOLUTIONS 
My exploration of legitimacy issues in deliberative democracy starts by looking 
for theoretical solutions to the scale and motivations problems. The first task is 
to re-examine the concept of legitimacy itself, and in so doing I come across 
some interesting tensions between the demands of deliberation on the one hand, 
and democracy on the other. This reconsideration leads me away from the 
possibility of achieving legitimacy in any one micro deliberative process, and 
towards thinking about legitimacy created within macro deliberative systems, 
with different micro moments making different kinds of contribution. However, 
while I conclude by summarising the key legitimacy criteria which emerge from 
the theoretical discussion, the criteria stand in tension with one another. One of 
the aims of the empirical chapters will be to see how real policy actors manage 
those tensions, given their own constructions of legitimacy and deliberation. 
The argument will remain at a fairly abstract level for the moment, avoiding 
much discussion of specific institutions. There are two reasons for this. One is 
that I want to resist the tendency, noted in the introduction, to equate deliberative 
democracy with specific micro institutions like citizens' juries, consensus 
conferences or deliberative polls. Instead, I want to establish some normative 
principles which allow us to be insistently critical of institutions. If we take the 
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opposite approach and discuss deliberative democracy only in terms of practice, 
we have no means of criticising those practices chosen, somewhat arbitrarily, as 
paradigms- Saward (1998, 8) makes the same point about liberal democratic 
principles and institutions. The second reason is that the normative picture 
which emerges from the theoretical discussion is incomplete in a number of 
ways, and I fill the gaps when considering deliberation in practice in the 
following four chapters. Nonetheless, I will indicate the major institutional 
implications as I go along to provide some pointers as to where the argument is 
heading. 
The concept of legitimacy 
It is remarkable that while the term legitimacy crops up often in the democratic 
literature, it is rarely defined except by implication. In this section, I draw on a 
conceptual map of legitimacy offered by Beetham (1991) to highlight those 
aspects which are not captured by the deliberative conception, aspects which 
offer us one step out of deliberation's theoretical contradictions. While there is a 
great deal to Beetham's scheme, for the purposes of this chapter I want to draw 
out a few essential features. 
At its most abstract level, legitimacy is "the moralization of authority" (Crook 
1987, 553), the moral grounds for obedience to power, as opposed to grounds of 
self-interest or coercion (Poggi 1978, 101-2). It is only when decisions or 
regimes are legitimate that those who refuse to accept them should be coerced 
into following them, on the grounds that their refusal is illegitimate. As well as 
value which springs from our moral convictions, legitimacy also has instrumental 
value: legitimacy makes political processes more efficient by reducing the costs 
of enforcing compliance. Regimes, institutions or decisions with low legitimacy 
face higher costs associated with uncooperative, strategic behaviour. 
This, it must be noted, is quite a different kind of account of legitimacy from that 
implicit in a lot of political science. Particularly in 1960s in the United States, 
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but evident elsewhere and to this day (for example, Thompson 2002, 2-4), 
scholars have drawn not on a moral account of legitimacy but a sociological 
account, starting with Max Weber and his familiar categorisation of legitimation 
claims into traditional, charismatic, and legal-rational (Weber, Roth, and Wittich 
1978, 215). Following Weber's view that authority systems are the result of 
psychological phenomena, scholars looked for evidence that such claims were 
accepted; in other words, they thought that the belief in legitimacy was all there 
was to legitimacy, and that acts like voting were indicative of widespread belief 
in the legitimacy of regimes (Grafstein 1981). The classic formulation of this 
view comes from Lipset (1984, 88) who writes, "Legitimacy involves the 
capacity of its political system to engender and maintain the belief that the 
existing political institutions are the most appropriate for the society." Thus, 
legitimacy is equated with "stable and effective political power, reducing it to a 
routine submission to authority" (Grafstein 1981, 456). 
However, as Habermas (1975, 97-102) argues, given the fact that we have a 
rational capacity to question truth by appeal to normative and empirical claims, 
such submissive belief cannot be all there is to legitimacy. Clearly belief is 
important: regimes and, as will be seen, various actors in the public sphere, 
expend a great deal of effort making various Weberian legitimation claims by 
means of symbolic and verbal communication. But these claims can be tested 
against normative standards. The point is further clarified by Barker (2001, 22-
3) who offers a useful working distinction "between legitimacy as an ascribed 
attribute" of objects and their properties, used in normative enquiry, and 
legitimation as "the action of ascribing" such properties to an object, used "for 
the discussion of observable human activity." Legitimacy is the grounds, 
legitimation the social, symbolic and political process by which those grounds 
are claimed. 
Beetham (1991) makes a further distinction between legality and the other two 
concepts. Legality is 'the rules of the game', and is fairly uncontroversially 
subordinate to legitimacy, because the rules themselves may be just or unjust 
according to some external standard. Legality includes not just the law of the 
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land, but other rules as well, be they non-legislative regulations or social 
conventions. The rules of the game, whether they are individual decisions or the 
decision making procedures themselves, need to have a certain amount of 
stability because people need to be able to learn the rules and use them if they are 
to be equally effective members of the polity; if the rules change all the time, 
only those who can bear the cost of re-learning the rules will be enfranchised. 
Thus legitimacy includes what Flathman (1972) calls a stability requirement. 
Legitimacy involves a balance between the deliberative ideal in which the rules 
themselves must be redeemable in discourse and the need to ensure that the rules 
are not up for grabs every single time. 
Beetham divides legitimacy-proper into source norms and content norms. The 
source norms of legitimacy concern the rightful source of authoritative decisions, 
which Beetham further divides into sources which are external and internal to 
society. External sources include appeals to divine command, natural law, even 
scientific doctrine; internal sources are society-as-it-was- tradition- and 
society-as-it-is- the people for whom the decisions are being taken. Given the 
democratic concern with the moral equality of persons, the most legitimate 
source of authoritative decisions in a democracy is considered to be all those 
people affected, rather than tradition or external sources (Saward 1998, 21-46), 
though of course "those affected" may themselves be adherents of a particular 
tradition which defines them and their goals in particular ways (Bell1993, 93). 13 
What Beetham calls "content norms" are in part about the legitimacy of the rules 
for dividing deciders and followers; thus, Beetham takes the fact of scale into 
account by including division rules in his account of legitimacy, since in any one 
collective decision making moment there will always be relatively few deciders 
and a great number of followers. While for Beetham this concerns the legitimate 
13 Beetham' s scheme does not include future generations or non-human subjects for 
whom present humans are the only spokespeople, but this is not essential to my 
argument. For a discussion of the representation of non-human subjects, see Goodin 
(1996a), as well as Eckersley (2000) and ONeill (2001) who deal with specifically 
deliberative solutions. 
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rule of a distinct class of people which persists over multiple decision making 
moments -that is, a political elite -there is nothing in this construction which 
suggests that deciders and followers always have to be the same from one 
decision moment to the next: one day's deciders could be the next day's 
followers. Rather, these content norms boil down to identifying substantive 
grounds of common interest between deciders and followers at any one moment. 
The grounds are of two kinds: the degree to which policy outcomes match the 
substantive goals of the people in question; and the degree to which they achieve 
normatively justifiable or desirable ends. The important point here is that 
legitimacy includes a concern about the ends of political life, not just its 
procedures- Estlund (1997) provides a strong defence of a similar point. 
Beetham only goes so far as to give labels to these ends: freedom, equality, 
justice, as well as the meeting of basic physical and emotional needs of life. He 
argues that in a fully legitimate polity the meanings of those terms will 
themselves be determined by the people in whose names they are invoked, 
although experts such as technical specialists, managers, or even philosophers 
have a role in informing the decision making process, and criticising and 
challenging the results. In liberal democracies we tend to demand that those 
most able to serve the common good get leadership positions, and judge that 
ability partly in terms of expertise and experience; that is, we apply a 
meritocratic principle (Beetham 1991, 80-1). However, in liberal democracies 
we also tend to differentiate between the legitimate decision making power of 
representatives and the more limited advisory power of experts on the basis that 
representatives derive their authority from, and are accountable to, the people; 
while experts derive their authority from an external source which we regard as 
less legitimate, given the foundational respect for the equality of persons referred 
to above. In terms of deliberative ethics, this means that experts' opinions have 
weight, but only in as much as they are offered in a process of public 
deliberation, and are found persuasive by those to whom they are offered, in a 
context in which the substantive goals of society are plural and essentially 
contested- see Dryzek (1990, 126-32) for a similar discussion. The legitimacy 
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of expertise is derived from the discursively determined ends of the people at 
large, and is not internal to expertise itself. 
One important implication of Beetham' s discussion of the source and content of 
legitimacy claims is that appeals to rationality should have less force. As an 
appeal to an external source, the rationality claim is an important factor in the 
decision making process, but it should not predetermine the outcome- it is one 
input among several. This goes beyond just rationality claims: as Walzer (1981, 
386) puts it, moral "rightness" too may be a reason for promoting an answer, for 
hoping it will be; it is not necessarily so that because something is right, it is 
legitimate that it be imposed. 
This leads to the final element in Beetham's scheme of legitimacy, the 
procedures of legitimation. There are two possible angles of approach here, one 
which focuses on the bottom-up processes of granting consent, the other which 
focuses on the top-down exercise of authority and persuasion. From a 
democratic starting point, Beetham emphasises the former in his normative 
scheme, arguing that deciders should be both authorised to exercise decision 
making power by those who are led through specific acts of consent, and made 
accountable to them by a variety of mechanisms (see also O'Nei112001; Weale 
1999, 112). Procedurally, political scientists have traditionally concentrated on 
acts of consent like voting (which is also the primary accountability mechanism), 
party membership, interactions with elected representatives and interest group 
participation. Now one would include a much wider range of participation in 
civil society, either directly oppositional or more collaborative (Jones and 
O'Toole 2001), and it these procedures for the creation of public agreements that 
practical experiments with deliberative democracy have been particularly 
concerned with (Stewart, Kendall, and Coote 1994, iii). 
But there is also a communicative dimension to legitimation which seems to 
come from the opposite direction: legitimation depends not just on consent 
processes, but on having claims made in public speech acts or on the unspoken, 
symbolic acts which leaders use to establish their legitimacy (Barker 2001). It is 
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in this context that the Weberian, social-scientific approach to legitimation is still 
useful. Implicitly and explicitly, actors in the public sphere make various kinds 
of legitimacy appeals, some of which are normatively justified in Beetham's 
scheme, some of which are not, and others which do not appear in it at all. As I 
turn to empirical material in later chapters I will ask what kinds of legitimacy 
claims are made by different actors, which ones are accepted or rejected, and for 
what reasons, using the answers to add further depth to our understanding of 
legitimacy in deliberative democracy. 
Because of the three-fold nature of legitimacy, it is important to emphasise that 
there is no magic line to draw between decisions or regimes that are clearly 
legitimate or illegitimate, even without taking the communicative nature of 
legitimation claims into account. Citizens may, for instance, institutionalise 
procedures which they agree to be fair, but still retain the right to challenge 
specific substantive outcomes of those procedures. That is, the granting of 
consent, either to decision making procedures or to decisions themselves, is not 
enough -legitimacy is built over time through the critical examination of 
political action such that "people actually consider institutional arrangements to 
be in their interest" and such that "institutional arrangements actually are in 
everyone's interest" (Chambers 1996, 194). Real institutions and decisions will 
rarely feature such perfect congruence between perceptions and reality, not least 
because what is "really" in people's interests can be a matter for intense debate, 
but this simply reinforces the point: legitimacy is a regulative ideal, not a fixed 
point on a scale. 
Putting all this in the context of deliberative democracy then, the conception of 
legitimacy set out in chapter one- that outcomes are legitimate to the extent 
they receive reflective assent through participation in authentic deliberation by 
all those subject to the decision in question - accounts for one set of procedural 
conditions for granting consent and one source norm, albeit the most important 
one. It does not take into account the derivative legitimacy of expertise; content 
norms, including substantive standards and the bonds of authorisation and 
accountability; or the contribution of legality broadly conceived. Neither does it 
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take into account the Weberian insight into the communicative nature of 
legitimacy claims. I suggest that sensitivity to these other aspects of legitimacy 
will partly lift deliberative theory out of its legitimacy contradictions- but only 
partly, of which more later. 
Current solutions to the scale problem 
Let's now tum to the problems raised in chapter one and to see if this expanded 
idea of legitimacy helps overcome them. In this section I survey the available 
solutions to the scale problem, constructing my own solution in the section 
following, before moving on to the motivations issue. 
The first solution is to ask, what if bringing more than a few people into the 
forum could still constitute deliberation in some way, allowing speech-making a 
legitimate role? This would allow us to relax deliberative theory's strictures on 
the exchange of reasons between all participants, allowing many more people to 
take part in deliberation as listeners, rather than insisting, impossibly, that each 
of them take an active part as speakers (Urbinati 2000, 762). 
Some critical theorists argue that democratic communication and rhetoric are 
polar opposites (Habermas 1996, 318; Wehler 1995, 43-5). For them, 
"communication" is used to designate the exchange of, and critical reflection on, 
validity claims which have their basis in a range of experiences, values, beliefs 
and norms, while "rhetoric" is used to denote speech which conceals or 
misrepresents its basis or coerces people by tugging at the emotions for strategic 
ends (Chambers 1996, 206). Even Remer (2000, 88), who examines the role that 
rhetoric played in classical Greek conceptions of deliberation and admires its 
persuasive power, is nonetheless resigned to the idea that its moral basis is 
"murky". Others disagree with the contrast. John O'Neill (1998), for one, 
argues that there is no incompatibility between rhetoric and reason because 
rhetorical claims can be subjected to rational analysis, and that rhetoric is 
necessary for persuading and coming to decisions. From another angle, Young 
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(1999) and Gutmann and Thompson (1996, 135-6) point out that the pursuit of 
reasoned consensus and the "civilising" norms of deliberative democracy 
submerge the genuine injustices suffered by "other voices", and that rhetorical 
acts are often required to make those voices heard: protests, resistance, and 
emotional speech-making designed to shock dominant groups into perceiving 
what they have been blind to. Indeed, such appeals may sometimes be the only 
things that can reach across difference, "to reach a particular audience by 
framing points in a language that will move the audience in question" (Dryzek 
2000, 52). 
This is not to say that rhetoric should replace reasoned debate, but only that it has 
a legitimate role in prising open the doors of deliberative moments, and building 
communicative bridges between participants. However, (Goodin 2000, 83n) 
argues that, beyond a certain scale, replacement of reason with manipulation 
does in fact occur: that reasoned communication in the deliberative sense is only 
possible at the small scale. If Goodin is right, rhetoric is redeemed only in so far 
as it is an accessory to a still small-scale deliberative process, leaving us with the 
scale problem. That accessory value may still be valuable, however, and I will 
have more to say about this in chapter six when I consider how participants in 
deliberative moments actually do reason together. 
Dryzek (2001) summarises three other solutions: to restrict the number of 
deliberative occasions to major constitutional moments (Ackerman 1991) or 
where the basic structure of society is at stake (Rawls 1996); to restrict the 
number of people who deliberate and ensure they are representative of those who 
do not (the option pursued by most real deliberative institutions); or partially to 
substitute internal-individual deliberation for social-interactive deliberation, 
making others "present" in one's own thoughts and words (Eckersley 2000; 
Goodin 2000; O'Neill2001). As Dryzek points out, the first solution is no 
solution at all, since restricting the number of times that genuine deliberation can 
occur society-wide simply restricts the number of times the scale problem 
emerges rather than dealing with it. The second, representative solution, strikes 
problems if we select our representatives by mass, competitive-elitist elections, 
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since such elections themselves are hardly deliberative, failing as they do to 
involve all those affected, or to meet the conditions of communicative rationality; 
thus, the representative solution simply recreates the problem of creating genuine 
deliberation at the large scale in a new location (Dryzek 2001, 652-7). Solution 
three may be inevitable in any given deliberative forum because not every 
relevant difference can be made physically present without the scale problem 
rapidly becoming unmanageable (Goodin 2003). Nonetheless, it is problematic 
if some groups of people are regularly more 'spoken for' than 'speakers': in 
their absence, minority people's views or interests are not either transmitted 
accurately or taken as seriously as those of the dominant groups (Kymlicka 1995, 
138-9; Williams 1998, 75-82). 
Dryzek's own suggestion is much more creative and intriguing, drawing on a 
discursive idea of democracy. What he proposes is "detaching the idea of 
legitimacy from a head count of ... reflectively consenting individuals" and 
instead conferring legitimacy on provisional agreements which are consistent 
with the constellation of discourses in the public sphere, "in the degree to which 
this constellation is subject to the reflective control of competent actors" 
participating in particular kinds of networks in civil society (Dryzek 2001, 660-
5). In such a situation, Dryzek argues, reflective citizens will perceive the 
provisional outcome of the contest of discourses in the public sphere, a contest 
which results in transmitting the outcome to the state for policy action. They will 
either approve of it, thus conferring legitimacy, or will contest it where 
distortions have emerged, rebuilding legitimacy through such insurgent activity. 
Thus, for Dryzek, legitimacy occurs in the interface between the public sphere 
and the state, not in individual, micro deliberations. 
I am not convinced that legitimacy can be so easily disconnected from head 
counts. First of all, discourses are not themselves disconnected from people; 
they are partially constitutive of identities on the one hand, and are tools which 
reflective people use to achieve their goals. For any given public conversation, 
real people have a stake in seeing a given discourse victorious in the contest in 
the public sphere and, although they may not think of it in these terms, may 
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undertake strategic action (which is by definition not deliberative action) to 
achieve those goals. Thus, victory in the contestation of discourses may not 
depend on the reasonableness of the discourse- rather, it may depend on the 
existing power structure within which the discourses are embedded, and the way 
that structure changes either through direct human challenge or by more indirect 
or impersonal activities such as technological and cultural changes. This idea 
receives some support from Fraser (1992), who argues that certain discourses are 
systematically dominated in "the" public sphere, and that to be heard, their 
adherents create "counter publics", parallel public spheres, in which they can 
engage in contestation. Even in their ideal form, however, provisional outcomes 
in the public sphere will be challenged precisely in terms of the numbers of 
people who subscribe to, owe allegiance to, or co-author the contending 
discourses: a discourse that commands the reflective assent of only some of the 
people, or only of those people in powerful positions, should not be decisive. In 
trying to detach legitimacy from head-counts, therefore, we still encounter 
standard problems in political theory about majority rule and minority rights, 
inclusion and exclusion, power and interests (Shapiro 1999, makes a similar 
point with regard to Gutmann and Thompson's version of deliberative 
democracy). 
Having raised those concerns, however, I think there is something worthwhile in 
the idea that legitimacy is created in the intersection between the public sphere 
and the state; and value in thinking about deliberative democracy as much more 
than a series of small-scale, self-enclosed deliberative moments, valuable though 
they may be at that intersection. Before taking up those ideas, however, I want to 
return to a closer examination of one of the solutions that Dryzek rejected, the 
representative solution, because this raises some key questions that will be 
important when I examine the cases. I then move on to the motivations problem 
and some possible solutions, before closing with some implications for 
legitimacy in different institutional forms. 
39 
Chapter Two 
The legitimacy of representation 
The idea of representation is useful because it offers a way out of the scale 
problem: it may be that people who are not physically present in a given 
deliberative forum may nonetheless feel they have had their voices heard because 
their representatives have spoken for them. However, I have also argued above 
that representatives can only legitimately act for others if they are authorised by 
and accountable to followers. This insistence on accountability and authorisation 
creates some real problems for policy actors trying to use deliberative techniques, 
and in this section I explore those tensions, along with issues connected with 
other ways of thinking about representation. 
There are, of course, other ways of holding decision makers accountable without 
elections: there are various internal audit mechanisms, which Uhr (1998) 
describes in some detail, while government agencies are themselves held 
accountable to their elected masters in various ways (Day and Klein 1987), and 
thus indirectly accountable to the people themselves (see also March and Olsen 
1995, 59; Mulgan and Uhr 2001). I am not going to look at these methods, 
however: they do not help very much with solving the particular legitimacy 
problems at hand because they are not quite "public" enough, focusing on intra-
mural accountability between representatives and agencies rather than 
accountability to the people themselves. The two I do focus on are the activities 
of the media, which both serve an accountability function and help transmit 
communication well beyond the confines of particular micro deliberative events; 
and accountability over representatives conferred by elections, without which 
citizens not in power at any given moment have little real control. For now, 
however, the question is whether representation can help solve the scale problem. 
Beyond its potential to help with issues of scale, there are other reasons why we 
might choose representation, not all of which fit with deliberative theory. I reject 
reasons to do with elite theorists' views about the deliberative capacities of 
ordinary people (Dye and Zeigler 1987, 446; Schumpeter 1962, 256-64), 
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preferring an institutionalist view that it is not that ordinary people cannot 
deliberate, but that existing structures do not allow them the chance to develop 
those deliberative capacities, a point that goes back to J.S. Mill (Pateman 1970, 
28-30). Where deliberative structures are in place, the limited evidence suggests 
that people can and do rise to the challenge (Barnes 1999, 70; Lenaghan 1999, 
53; Smith and Wales 2000, 58-60). That leaves three other reasons. First, it may 
be efficient from the non-participant's own point of view: some people may not 
want to deliberate on a given issue, or feel strongly enough about it to gain the 
required competencies, but still have an interest in the outcome. Second, it may 
be one's self-assessment, rather than that of elite theorists, that one's point of 
view or interests may be better advanced by a communicatively competent 
representative than by doing it oneself- this is why most of us choose to be 
represented in court by lawyers familiar with legal intricacies. Third, it is often 
the case that a representation is better than "the thing itself' because, by 
trimming away the inessential, it focuses attention on specific features (Pitkin 
1967, 86-7)- a map is useful precisely because it is not the land itself, but a 
representation of a few salient aspects. What is salient and what is not will differ 
from issue to issue and over time and place, which means that a thing can be 
represented in many different ways, some more or less good according to 
context. 
There is a vast literature on representation, a literature in which descriptive, 
conceptual and normative issues intertwine (Frankena 1968). I do not have space 
here to go through every conception of representation and every institutional 
permutation- that would be quite a different thesis (or several). 14 So, in what 
follows I by no means exhaust the possibilities. However, one useful starting 
point is Birch (1971, 15), who offers three main usages of the term 
"representation": 
14 The classic exposition of the way in which the concept of representation has been used 
in political theory is Pitkin (1967), while Catt (1999) summarises the diverse practice. 
Both Kateb (1992) and Manin (1997) argue for the moral superiority of representation, 
while Phillips (1995) offers an important feminist response. 
41 
Chapter Two 
1. to denote an agent or spokesman who acts on behalf of his principal 
2. to indicate that a person shares some of the characteristics of a class of persons 
3. to indicate that a person symbolizes the identity or qualities of a class of persons. 
(Birch 1971, 15) 
Starting at the end of this list and working back, symbolic representation occurs 
where something or someone comes to symbolise a group of people in the way 
that, say, Queen Elizabeth symbolises Britons in some circumstances or Nelson 
Mandela symbolises the idea of a hopeful and united South Africa. Such 
symbols can be extremely important for legitimation because people feel they 
have had an impact on a decision or a regime if they see the symbols they 
identify with having an impact (Pitkin 1967). Obvious examples include the way 
people feel a sense of validation and identification when their soldiers perform 
various missions, peaceful or otherwise; or if a person they feel symbolises them 
- a local sport star, a well-loved civic leader- is seen to have had an impact on 
issues which matter to them. Despite its usefulness for legitimation, however, 
symbolic representation does not helps us with making legitimacy claims, 
because there are no direct ties of accountability between such representatives 
and the people they represent. 
Descriptive representation occurs when a representative embodies some relevant 
characteristics of the people he or she represents: that a woman represents other 
women, a Mexican other Mexicans, and so forth. Descriptive representation 
emphasises identities, because those identities are politically and normatively 
significant (Phillips 1995)- it matters whether specific groups of people speak 
for themselves or are spoken for. On this account, fair representation is about 
mirroring - to what extent are the relevant cleavages in society replicated in the 
deliberating group? This is contrasted with representation which focuses on 
beliefs and interests, where the identity of the representative is irrelevant, and 
fairness consists in responsiveness and accountability (Squires 1999). 
One major advantage of descriptive representation is that, when the channels of 
public communication are clear, it allows those who are outside a decision 
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making forum to see that "people like me" are in there having an impact- thus, 
descriptive representation includes aspects of the symbolic. However, there are 
two major problems associated with descriptive representation. The first is that it 
essentialises identities, which is the mistake of assuming that all women are the 
same, all workers vote Labour, or all members of any identifiable group think the 
same way, feel the same way, and have the same hopes and dreams. This 
essentialising can add to marginalisation: "the claim that whites cannot 
understand the needs of blacks, or that men cannot understand the needs of 
women, can become an excuse for white men not to try to understand or 
represent the needs of others" (Kymlicka 1995, 139). The second problem is 
that, as with symbolic representation, pure description does not come with clear 
bonds of authorisation or accountability. So, in forums chosen with descriptive 
imperatives in mind, representatives may experience conflicting expectations by 
virtue of their group identity on the one hand, and the deliberative dynamics on 
the other (Squires 1999, 14); managing these conflicts becomes a fundamental 
challenge for representatives chosen descriptively. We can overcome the first 
problem to some extent if assembly memberships are not fixed but gathered on a 
more ad hoc basis. Recalling Pitkin's remark on the value of maps on page 41 
above, the salient differences which require representation can vary from issue to 
issue, and so people will find themselves representing different descriptive 
characteristics at different deliberative moments: on one topic I may speak as a 
man, on another as an academic, on another as a taxpayer, and so on. However, 
it is also true that for many marginalised groups the experience of 
marginalisation transcends policy issues - they are powerless no matter what 
the issue is - and to that extent there will always need to be some groups who 
require a seat in any deliberative forum, and to have those who gain a seat be 
accountable in some way to those they descriptively represent (Williams 1998, 6, 
16). 
The final category concerns the direct relationship between one or more 
principals and an agent who acts for them. We encounter authorisation and 
accountability again at this point: not only are they necessary for building 
legitimate bonds between deciders and followers, they also refer to distinct 
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models of principal-agent representation (Pitkin 1967), often known as the 
trustee and delegate models respectively. In cases where there are clear 
principal-agent links between representatives and the people they represent, 
principals can either bind their representative to follow instructions to the letter 
-the delegate model of representation- or give the representative free rein to 
make decisions and strike agreements as he or she sees fit- the trustee model 
(Catt 1999, 77). On the delegate view, representatives are held to account by 
their principals, having to be responsive to their wishes; on the trustee model, the 
representative is authorised by the principal to act as they see fit within a 
specified field, and within that field his or her actions bind the principal, not the 
other way around (Pitkin 1967, 38-9, 57). The argument over which should have 
more weight has raged for centuries but cannot be resolved in such general terms, 
the weight depending on the functions expected of representatives at a given 
decision making moment: where epistemic considerations dominate, trusteeship 
tends to be favoured; where "right answers" are considered to be a function of 
procedures which guarantee inclusion and a range of views, delegation is 
favoured (Birch 1971, 15; Catt 1999, 88). 
A key tension in deliberative democracy is highlighted by the trustee I delegate 
distinction. For authentic deliberation to take place, participants must be open to 
persuasion, and so we should favour the trustee model and stress acts of 
authorisation. Indeed, the idea that preferences are transformed as they confront 
others is one of deliberation's major strengths. However, legitimacy also 
demands bonds of accountability between agents and principals, and so we 
should favour the delegate model and stress accountability mechanisms. This 
causes real conflict for deliberators, because the communicative process of the 
exchange and critical evaluation of reasons means that the eventual decision 
reached by a deliberative body may resemble none of the ideas taken into the 
forum; or may match an idea held by a minority group, and is in no way 
"representative" of the views of the majority (perhaps even the overwhelming 
majority) of non-participants. So in what sense can non-participants be present 
in the deliberations of trustees, pure delegation having been ruled out? 
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Part of the solution is that there is, of course, no such thing as pure trusteeship or 
pure delegation: every representative performs a mixed role, wielding authority 
but being required to account for it (March and Olsen 1995, 59-60; Pennock 
1968, 18). Even in liberal democracy, representatives are transmitters of 
information and instructions in two directions, not just one: ideally, they convey 
the views of their principals, and convey the arguments of other delegates back to 
those principals for further consideration, performing what Young (2000, 125) 
calls "representation as relationship". If that is the case, then it may be that the 
"better arguments" that persuade representatives within a micro deliberative 
forum will also convince those people outside it once they have been exposed to 
those arguments by their representatives in their own, separate deliberations. 
This solves the scale problem by turning deliberation into an iterative, macro 
process in which everyone participates in the argument, just not in one room at 
one time. 
Alas, things are not that simple. Political representatives are not like lawyers: 
they have more than one "client", and thus more than one set of obligations to 
multiple principals (Catt 1999, 80, 88; Pennock 1968, 16-8), as well as 
sometimes conflicting obligations to act in people's best interests versus 
following people's express wishes (Goodin 1995; Wilkinson 1996). To take the 
example of representatives in a legislature, should they put more weight on those 
who actually voted for them; or all those living in their electorate; or their party 
caucus; or cabinet; or the "national interest" (however that might be defined); or 
their ethnic group; or their gender; or some universal rights perspective? The 
answer to such questions will depend on the institutional setting in which the 
representative works as well as the dynamics of particular situations (Squires 
1999). This complexity means that we cannot take the politics out of politics: a 
legitimate deliberative democracy will be one in which communication flies 
thick and fast between decision makers and followers, speakers and audience, in 
processes which feature multiple micro deliberative sites offering ideas and 
scrutiny. 
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In such an environment, the opportunity for representatives to manipulate their 
citizens is greatly enhanced (Mansbridge 1998). Given that, if citizens are going 
to have effective power over their representatives, they need to be autonomous in 
the sense that they have reasonably full information about the performance of 
incumbents and the likely actions of competitors; that they are presented with a 
range of options which reflects the diversity of opinions and interests, and not 
restricted to trivial qualities only; and that their choices have not been 
manipulated in any way (criteria adapted from Raz 1986, 369-78). To this, 
Mansbridge (1998) adds the requirement that communication induce reflection 
on preferences and proposals on the part of both representatives and citizens. 
But note that the trustee I delegate tension is not just a problem when 
representatives have direct agent-principal bonds- it is perhaps more serious 
where they are selected by lot, or by stratified random sample (Broome 1984; 
Carson and Martin 1999; Goodwin 1992), or some other means of generating a 
deliberative body that is descriptively representative. I will cover arguments for 
and against lottery and randomness in more detail in chapter four, but for now I 
want to consider briefly the legitimate status of such representatives. It would 
appear that direct election is the more legitimate way of choosing representatives 
because the lines of accountability and authorisation are clear, although election 
would have to be by means which are more deliberative than at present to avoid 
Dryzek's objection to this solution, something which Fishkin's (1991) 
deliberative poll was designed to do. However, nascent deliberative practice is 
heading in the opposite direction, with forum organisers choosing participants by 
stratified random sampling. Participants in deliberative polls and citizens' juries, 
for example, are chosen by sampling a national telephone directory, postal 
districts or electoral rolls, often by market research firms. What is missing from 
such selection processes is the legitimating bonds of authorisation and 
accountability between participants and non-participants. This problem, 
highlighted but not dealt with by Fishkin (1997, 1-3), was clearly an issue for 
decision makers in the Leicester case, confronted as they were by the results of a 
micro deliberative process recommending one course of action, and a petition of 
a hundred and fifty thousand signatories demanding another. 
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The question of methods of choice is bound up with the question of whether 
different relevant groups should be represented proportionately or not. The 
argument for proportionality is similar to the argument for descriptive 
representation: that the deliberative body should mirror the wider population, a 
proposal whose problems I noted on page 43 above. However, proportionality 
can conflict with equality of voice, a fundamental procedural requirement of 
deliberation. So long as group representatives are present in proportion to their 
numerical strength, identities and views which command the allegiance of the 
many will always dominate those of the few, regardless of the reasonableness of 
those views -on this principle, indigenous Australians, for example, would 
rarely get a seat at forums that involve fewer than 50 people. On these grounds, 
some democracy theorists recommend a "threshold" level of representation 
which ensures that relevant groups get an effective voice in deliberation 
regardless of their actual numerical strength in the population (Kymlicka 1995, 
147; Phillips 1994, 89n), although precisely at what level the threshold should be 
set is a matter for debate (Grey 1999). 
Based on these considerations alone, it seems that representation by random 
selection is only legitimate when the aim is information-gathering, when it is part 
of a wider deliberative decision making process that involves the people more 
generally. Just as experts have a legitimate, derivative role in informing 
democratic deliberation, so do statistically chosen representatives have a role in 
informing the deliberations of representatives with formal bonds of 
accountability and authorisation. But only the latter should have collective 
decision making power on behalf of everyone else. 
The distinction between selected representation and elected representation is 
often blurred in the literature on deliberative practices, the second either being 
ignored or being taken as equivalent to the first. Process designers make much 
of the effort that goes into recruiting a statistically representative sample of 
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participants but rarely consider accountability and authorisation. 15 This is often 
because many deliberative processes seem to be driven by information-gathering 
imperatives rather than decision making ones, simply because research is itself a 
"currency of institutional power" (Schratz and Walker 1995, 122-4 ), the 
authority to which technocrats and other "opinion leaders" appeal to legitimate 
their programmes (Beetham and Lord 1998, 16-22). There are dangers in such 
an approach. The relationship between organisers and participants is often a 
hierarchical one in which the organiser holds the power and manages the agenda, 
while the participants are subordinate, providing information rather than being 
active citizens involved in self-government- although there are ways of 
relaxing such control by handing over some agenda setting power to participants, 
while there are cases of participants in real deliberation resisting what they see as 
limited agendas. This research approach to deliberation can be, I suggest, 
inimical to the democratic spirit because it conducts debate as if it were an 
"inquisition of objects" rather than a "dialogue between subjects" (Gergen and 
Gergen 1991). I will discuss how this became problematic in my cases in the 
next chapter. 
What I have tried to do so far is identify the rules which make exclusion 
legitimate, to avoid what I see as the impossibility of full inclusion. Let me 
briefly summarise what has been discovered in this discussion of accountability 
and representation before moving on to the motivations problem. 
First, good representation varies according to context. The memberships that 
individuals consider relevant, the representatives' roles vis-a-vis their principals, 
the selection process, and the issue of proportionality all depend on the topic at 
hand and the aims of the representative body. So, what is legitimate in one 
context will be illegitimate in another. Legitimacy also depends on the people 
themselves deciding what is relevant and what it not at any given decision 
making moment, not on pre-determined divisions set in constitutional stone or 
15 Fishkin (1997, 3-4), Lenaghan (1996, 1591), Mciver(l997, 36-7), Smith (2000, 56), 
Threkeld (1998. 5). 
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bureaucrats making that call. How exactly that would work in practice is up for 
grabs at this stage, but in general it argues in favour of a degree of "ad-hockery" 
in decision making institutions- in the case of a legislative body, for example, 
this principle might speak in favour of ad hoc committees with members 
appointed to capture the range of opinion and experience on an issue, rather than 
standing committees with membership set by party proportionality. It also 
argues against setting particular group distinctions and proportions in 
constitutional stone, as has happened in Switzerland whose institutions reflect the 
major cleavages current in 1848 and 1959 (when the federal council seat 
allocation formula was decided) and thus fail to capture significant economic, 
political and social changes since then (Kobach 1997). 
Second, deliberative representation should either be based on election, or it 
should have just "recommending power" not decisive power (Fishkin 1997, 162). 
There is a role for selection-without-accountability in information gathering, but 
only as an input into a wider democratic deliberative process in which 
representatives are directly accountable to the people affected, not as a substitute 
for such accountable deliberation. Equally, deliberative bodies should only be 
proportional when their purpose is information gathering, not when it is decision 
making. This is to protect minorities from being dominated by majorities, a 
fundamental condition of genuine democratic deliberation. 
Third, legitimacy demands that representatives act in a dual role. They must be 
free to be persuaded by better arguments, thus acting as trustees; but they must 
also communicate with their principals as delegates, meeting the condition of 
accountability as well as authorisation. Thus legitimate representatives have a 
delicate balancing act to perform - in chapter four I discuss how real 
representatives in the cases dealt with the conflicts and what solutions present 
themselves. 
Recalling the warning I made at the start of this chapter about the incompleteness 
of the principles emerging from the theoretical discussion, all these points would 
seem to require a broader, macro conception of deliberative democracy rather 
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than putting all one's deliberative hopes in the micro deliberative basket. The 
legitimacy criteria push us towards thinking about the different contributions a 
variety of (imperfect) institutions can make to legitimate deliberative democracy, 
rather than continuing to hope for perfection in one ideal micro deliberative 
moment. 
The motivation to deliberate 
It is now time to turn to the motivations issue. Followers of Habermas would be 
familiar with his criticism of the motivational difficulties presented by basing 
democratic institutions on instrumental rationality: it undermines the values 
which push people into wanting to debate issues and come to agreements in the 
first place (Habermas 1995, 116; Dryzek 1990, 4-6). However, the idea that 
deliberative democracy also presents motivational problems has only recently 
been noticed. The fact that it does should not be too surprising: different 
institutions provide "opportunity structures" for different kinds of motivation and 
behaviour (Norris 1997, 11-2; Tilly 1978), and so are likely to present 
motivational barriers just as much as they are motivational opportunities. 
Deliberation's motivational problems can be defined in three main ways. The 
first issue is that deliberative procedures are said to exclude women and ethnic 
minorities because they privilege formal, general, dispassionate styles in an 
agonistic confrontation. 16 This style is said not to allow the experiences of other 
"speech cultures" to be expressed adequately, particularly those of women and 
ethnic minorities within Western settings, and so their claims cannot get a proper 
hearing in deliberation. This presents motivational difficulties because certain 
groups of people may come to perceive that they have little chance of being 
heard in a deliberative forum simply because what they want to say cannot be 
expressed in such a setting, leading them to stay out of such processes, after a 
16 Young (1996, 123-4). This is quite a distinct view from that ofMouffe (1999) who 
contrasts deliberative democracy and "agonistic" approaches rather than equating them. 
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possible initial experiment or two. The obvious solution is to welcome a variety 
of forms of communication in deliberative settings (Dryzek 2000, 62-72), and I 
present some limited evidence from my cases on this point in chapter six. 
The second concern is a variant of the first, and has been raised by disability 
activists in Britain. One of their complaints against micro deliberative processes 
is that they are unable to give disabled people's concerns due weight because of 
the narrow agendas and motivations of those who set up a deliberative forum 
(see chapter one, page 22). Clearly, agendas and problem definitions matter a 
great deal: they limit the kinds of solutions which can be considered (Kingdon 
1984), and hence the claims and experiences which go with them. Thus, many 
disability activists are of the view that proposals which flow from their social 
model of disability will not get a fair hearing at events commissioned and run by 
people who have an interest in maintaining the primacy of the medical model, 
such as health authorities and charities. This is not an in-principle objection to 
micro deliberative processes: it is an objection to the way they have been used, 
and I will go into the detail of this problem in the next chapter. But note that 
limited agendas can be equally problematic for macro deliberation, because of 
the way in which problems are socially constructed, and the limited ability of the 
channels of public communication to transmit certain kinds of information. I 
will take up these problems in detail in chapter five. 
The third issue is one of pre-deliberative commitments, and it is raised in several 
forms. Shapiro (1999) criticises the ideal that deliberative procedures require 
people to give up some fixed attachments and act impartially- Clery (2000) 
raises similar concerns. Shapiro argues that this is to wish away the fact that 
these attachments to specific goals or to other persons are large factors in 
motivating some people to take up political activity in the first place, and to 
ignore the fact that partiality may be quite justified, particularly when it comes to 
commitments to projects which are more than simply personal but are, in various 
ways, "public" without being "universal", such as commitments to family, 
friends, to colleagues, and to causes (see also Larmore 1987, 141; Nagel1991). 
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This problem is made more complicated by the social-psychological facts of 
public commitments. Mackie (2002) argues that once we have publicly 
committed ourselves to a view or position, it can be very difficult to admit a 
mistake of fact or interpretation, to admit contrary evidence or contrary premises. 
Instead, Mackie argues, many people tend to advocate positions even more 
forcefully in order to maintain consistency, a consistency which is an important 
ingredient in maintaining credibility, esteem and social status. We may not care 
much about angering "others", but care very deeply about appearing consistent to 
those people with whom we share bonds of allegiance. This is particularly 
problematic for representatives who have bonds of accountability back to 
principals, as these bonds mean they cannot easily let go of commitments they 
have made even in the face of "the better argument". It is on these grounds that 
Kuran believes that deliberative democracy is unlikely to deliver the results it 
promises, because the "motivation to retain social approval can easily overwhelm 
the courage to stand alone" even among deliberators within a micro deliberative 
setting, let alone between representatives and principals (Kuran 1998, 542). 
Only two authors have offered a solution to the commitments problem 
specifically in the context of deliberative democracy, although O'Neill (2000) 
spends more time diagnosing the ailment than recommending a course of 
treatment. Chowcat (2000) goes further and argues that the simple fact of 
holding a political view means one has not only a commitment to seeing that 
view acted on, but also defended against those who hold alternative views -
failure to do so, for Chowcat, undermines any claim that one's own views are 
best justified (2000, 751). That commitment entails a further commitment to 
supporting processes in which one's own view may not win- not to do so 
would undermine any claim to have a right to try to persuade others. Thus, 
Chowcat argues, to hold a view about political life is to be committed in advance 
to deliberative procedures regardless of whether one wins or loses. 
This, I think, is a plausible account of what people's first reaction to a challenge 
might be in the early stages of a debate, but it is not at all clear that, perceiving 
they are losing a debate, people will not simply retreat into silence, to disengage 
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from the wider community, or to pursue their substantive goals by other, non-
deliberative means- "I refuse to dignify that with a response" is an old and 
highly effective strategy. 17 The key weakness is in Chowcat's claim that views 
must be defended publicly if they are to count as valid views for the holder of 
those views. People can just as easily get validation within limited social circles 
without having to go "public" at all, and it is to these fellow-members of groups 
that we feel the strongest bonds of commitment, and who place on us the 
strongest burdens of consistency. The result is that people can easily, perhaps 
more easily, reinforce their prejudices than engage constructively with difference 
(Cox and Putnam 2002; Sunstein 2001). 
Interestingly, Moscovici (1985) notes that where prior commitments do not 
present such a problem is in private interactions, away from the scrutiny of one's 
peers- that people will privately express a wish to come to an amicable 
agreement but publicly be unable to because of the fact that they are being 
watched and held accountable by those they represent. Therefore, it may be 
motivationally easier to get people with pre-deliberative commitments to engage 
in discussions and negotiation which is not public, and thus not "deliberative" in 
the technical sense of the word. However, deliberative democracy requires 
publicity in order for its results to be binding on others. We seem to be are left 
with a paradox: for deliberations to have motivational force for at least some of 
those who we want to include it may be necessary to conduct them in small, 
private settings where the demands of prior commitments do not intrude; but to 
do so is to remove the legitimating power of publicity, and to reintroduce the 
scale problem. 
Because deliberative democrats have given so little attention to the motivational 
issues, we need to look further afield for possible solutions. Drawing on 
Schultze (1977), Goodin (1982, 95) notes three broad ways of motivating people 
to perform desirable behaviour: coercion, "self-interest-incentives" and 
"emotional forces" which include moral incentives and social benefits. I leave 
17 With thanks to Robert Goodin for reminding me of this. 
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aside the first one, as coercion has been definitionally excluded from the 
discussion of legitimacy (see page 30). That leaves self-interest incentives, 
moral incentives and social benefits. 
The social benefits I can cover quite quickly. While not everyone is motivated 
this way, what social psychologists call "affiliative benefits" (Bandura 1982) 
rank quite highly with many- that is, lots of people enjoy participating in 
collective decision making simply because they enjoy talking and sorting through 
problems with each other on an equal footing, regardless of substantive outcomes 
(see also Baumgartner and Leech 1998, 69-71; Little 1985). In principle, 
deliberative processes offer just such an opportunity, and so would be attractive 
to many, the more so if the processes are welcoming of other forms of 
communication than dry committee styles (Ward et al. 2003). However, this 
does not help much with the problem of motivating those whose pre-deliberative 
commitments override such affiliative benefits. 
The self-interest incentive is the least attractive of the three because it is the least 
effective and efficient means. Goodin (1992, 9) puts it this way: "Suppose that 
what makes the act right is one thing, and what makes people do it is quite 
another. If so, then there will inevitably be some room for slippage between the 
two," which means that people will sometimes fail to do the right thing if the 
payoff to them is greater. We therefore need to consider the fact that some 
people will base their decision to participate on the basis of a rational calculation 
of expected effectiveness given their power relative to other actors in a given 
political setting; the "probability of winning" given the economic, rhetorical or 
charismatic power of oneself and others (Goodin and Dryzek 1980)18 - the 
frequency of such occurrences is an empirical question on which I present some 
limited evidence in later chapters. Normatively, of course, deliberative 
18 Note that this is quite a different conception of "efficacy" from the political 
psychology view (Almond and Verba 1963; Verba and Nie 1972). According to the 
latter, efficacy is simply a positive psychological state of general competence which 
comes with socio-economic status, having little relationship to the actual likelihood of 
achieving one's goals in the political realm, which seems implausible (Pateman 1971). 
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democrats would prefer that the outcomes of decision making processes came 
down to the better argument rather than economic power or charisma, and so 
deliberative institutions would have to be organised both so that people's chances 
of winning depended only on the power of their arguments, and so that the 
attempt to flex one's muscle in other ways would be unsuccessful. This would 
mean that other avenues of political influence were closed off, perhaps by rules 
restricting and publicising lobbying activity- Hendriks (2002) presents some 
pessimistic conclusions about interest group behaviour in situations where such 
conditions do not apply. Deliberation would also need to be as inclusive as 
possible: if one sees that one's social class is never invited, is never questioned, 
is never listened to, is never decisive, then one's calculation of one's own likely 
efficacy, and thus one's motivation, will be dragged down (Bandura 1982, 143; 
Koch 1995, 69). 
It may be more effective if people engage in deliberation not because they have 
to but because they want to, although there certainly are cases of reasonably 
effective deliberation that started as a last resort, including the Leicester debate. 
If that general claim is true, we need to come back to moral motivations, which 
involve appealing to a sense that deliberative processes are the right way of 
going about things. Deliberative procedures may be a right way of doing things 
because the publicity principle, as Goodin (1992, 132-3) puts it, "works to ensure 
Golden Rule style outcomes", outcomes which respect the more fundamental 
moral value of reciprocity, because "you cannot expect others to buy an 
argument from you that you would not buy from them" (see also Elster 1997, 
132; Gutmann and Thompson 1996, ch.2). Having to act in this way may make 
one intemalise the reciprocity norm: "What motivates you, on this model, is not 
the fear of losing support of others but rather sheer embarrassment at the utter 
inappropriateness of certain styles of arguments in the public forum," (Goodin 
1992, 135) as well as, presumably, the embarrassment caused when one refuses 
to engage and has that refusal publicly paraded. The implication is that the 
simple practice of deliberative democracy, in which norms of reciprocity and 
publicity feature strongly, may be enough to motivate participation by those who 
are most eager to see their proposals for public action taken seriously, and for 
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whom the problems associated with pre-deliberative commitments are the most 
severe. 
Summing up this section, deliberative democracy faces three main motivational 
problems to do with its alleged speech culture; limited agendas resulting either 
from the specific motivations of an event's commissioners or the more general 
social and political forces which construct "problems"; and people's pre-
deliberative commitments to pursue substantive goals. The first issue may be 
solvable in a fairly straightforward way- simply broaden the definition of 
deliberation to include a variety of communicative styles- and in chapter six I 
show that real deliberators can do precisely that. The second is more obviously a 
problem in micro deliberative processes because most macro ones have no 
"commissioner" as such. This means that the demands of legitimacy may once 
again point in the direction of relying more on macro deliberation than micro, as 
did the requirements of representation. 
The commitments problem has resulted in three somewhat conflicting 
recommendations: close off, or subject to public scrutiny, non-deliberative 
channels of influencing decision makers; institutionalise public deliberation on a 
broad scale in order to encourage people to intemalise norms of reciprocity; but 
at the same time, encourage some in camera deliberation where the commitments 
make it difficult for people to deliberate in good faith. This is hardly a 
satisfactory solution in micro deliberative processes because it undermines the 
legitimating power of publicity. Again, however, there may be more hope if we 
tum away from trying to achieve perfect legitimacy in a single micro deliberative 
moment and think more about macro deliberation in which such in camera 
discussions are simply one input into a larger, society-wide debate. That is, it 
may be perfectly ok to close the doors to thrash out a knotty problem, if the doors 
are subsequently thrown open once more and publicity is given to the reasons for 
and against a decision and its alternatives rather than the minutiae of what each 
individual or group brought into the room. 
56 
Legitimacy reconsidered 
Conclusion: the shape of a legitimate deliberative democracy 
What has been discovered in this closer analysis of deliberative democracy's 
legitimacy problems, and in what institutional direction is all this pointing? 
First, legitimacy has three aspects to it: legality, legitimacy-proper, and 
legitimation. Much political science, including the classic deliberative 
conception, conflates legitimacy and legitimation, but I have clearly 
distinguished them to emphasise that legitimacy includes norms which "ground" 
the concept: that is, it includes norms about the sources of authority and the 
substantive ideals and goals of a society. This threefold nature of legitimacy 
means that there is no "magic line" which, once crossed, a decision or regime 
becomes legitimate- they might be considered excellent on one level and poor 
on another. 
Second, the facts of complexity in a large-scale society mean that some 
specialisation and division of labour is inevitable, even in the discursive 
conception of democracy, and so we require some way of assessing the 
legitimacy of representation claims made by insiders on behalf of outsiders. This 
will vary somewhat according to context, but a minimum requirement for 
legitimate decision makers is that they can be held accountable, preferably by 
electoral means, to their principals. If they are also descriptively representative 
then so much the better, but descriptive representation alone, like expertise, is 
insufficient grounds for conferring legitimate decision making authority- such 
representatives should only have advisory roles. Still, elected representatives 
have a very difficult balancing act to maintain, having to deal with cross-cutting 
lines of accountability, and accountability clashing with the requirement that 
deliberators be free to change their minds. 
Third, deliberative democracy may not be legitimate if it fails to treat people and 
their points of view fairly- this is deliberative democracy's motivations 
problem. At least in part, the problems are about the transition from one set of 
institutions to another, and may vanish if fully deliberative institutions are the 
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only game in town. This is because deliberative institutions may help 
participants intemalise the requisite norm of reciprocity and de-activate the 
strategic ones -these are empirical questions on which I will present some 
limited evidence in coming chapters. One of my aims, however, is to think about 
how we shift current institutions in a more deliberative direction, so the pre-
deliberative commitments cannot be wished away. This re-introduces strategic 
calculations of relative power which can both undermine the deliberative spirit 
and overwhelm affiliative motivations. This may be overcome by holding 
discussions in private, but that undermines the solution to the scale problem: so, 
for some participants at least, solving the motivations problem may make the 
scale problem worse, and vice versa. One aim of chapter three is to get more 
clarity on exactly how difficult this constructive agenda will be. 
All of this points strongly to the idea that legitimacy is a process, not a 
destination, created iteratively between many different participants and 
processes. It cannot be the property of any one individual or deliberative site. 
While it would be an odd deliberative system if none of its components exhibited 
any deliberative features, they may each focus on a different kind of 
representation, a different kind of accountability, different motivational 
imperatives, different status for experts and lay persons, different levels of 
formality. There may be some permanent institutions which consider all 
collective decisions, but other elements of the system would form and engage on 
an issue and then move on or dissolve; and there is a clear legitimacy advantage 
to some degree of ad-hockery because good descriptive representation varies 
according to context. While legitimacy is enhanced the more democratic the 
components are in their internal workings, it to is the degree that those 
components are open to one another that overall legitimacy is created on a given 
.topic. 
Even then, however, the legitimacy problems do not vanish in a puff of smoke. 
The competing representation claims can be extremely difficult to sort through, 
and I go into more detail about the nature of the problem and potential solutions 
in chapter four. There are also questions about how deliberative and democratic 
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the "sum of deliberation" on a given topic would be. On the one hand, if the 
mass media are used as the means by which conversational threads are 
transmitted between citizens in different deliberative spaces, we need to be aware 
that key features of the media may distort communication, thus undermining 
communicative rationality- this is the main focus of chapter five. On the other 
hnad, because some sites in the deliberative system are less powerful than others, 
they will be less attractive to some participants, who may then seek to participate 
only in those institutions which seem to them to be "worth the effort", especially 
where pre-deliberative commitments come into play. Thus a competitive 
element is introduced into macro deliberation, one of the manifestations of which 
is a competition to define what counts as rational, the subject of chapter six. 
It seems, then, that to pursue perfect legitimacy is to pursue a chimera: there is 
no such beast as a perfectly legitimate decision, a perfectly legitimate institution, 
or a perfectly legitimate regime, because legitimacy's elements cannot all be 
present at once. Does this mean we should abandon legitimacy as a critical 
standard, or abandon all hope of institution building? I don't think so. It may 
simply be a fact of life that all our categories, all our standards, have such 
tensions within them- that all utopias are contradictory (Hood 1998, 47). 
Nonetheless, simply because existing institutions cannot be perfect does not 
mean they cannot be improved, and utopias provide useful critical standards for 
measuring the improvements. In that spirit I use the critical standard established 
here to explore the real worlds of deliberative democracy, suggesting reforms in 
the concluding chapter to move current deliberative institutions in a more 
legitimate, democratic direction. 
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HEALTH POLITICS AND DELIBERATIVE TECHNIQUES 
When setting out my approach in chapter one, I remarked that health politics 
makes for a tough testing ground of the ability of any deliberative process to 
handle legitimacy conflicts. In this chapter I set out the relevant features of that 
context, revealing a great deal about the opportunities and challenges to be faced 
if we want to move current institutions in a more legitimate, deliberative 
direction. 
My approach to this descriptive task is to explore the impact of ideas, setting out 
the major points of contact and conflict between deliberative ideals and some of 
the key motivations behind the deliberative experiments. For this kind of task an 
historical analysis works best rather than applying a supposedly generalisable 
theory of the policy process (Parsons 1995, 175), and I do so in two stages. In 
the next two sections I sketch the history of central government initiatives 
driving the use of deliberative processes, tracing the impact of key ideas and 
public doctrines (Hall 1989; Hood and Jackson 1991). I also consider the 
influence of "policy entrepreneurs" in pushing those ideas (Kingdon 1984), and 
the features of health care institutions which have provided those ideas with 
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fertile ground (Parsons 1995, 171), although it needs to be kept in mind that 
deliberative techniques have only been a relatively small part of a much larger 
public involvement "tool kit". Step two drops down one level of abstraction to 
examine the motivations which drove the various commissioning bodies in my 
cases to use deliberative processes, the discussion of which will speak to the 
agenda setting problem raised in the last chapter. 
One of the reasons for doing such an analysis is that it is not at all likely that 
deliberative processes have been taken up "pure". We know from policy studies 
over the last two decades that political practices constitute solutions to problems, 
problems which are rhetorically constructed (Fischer and Forester 1993, 6; 
Kingdon 1984, 115); particular solutions are successful only to the degree that 
they are - or can be made to be - consonant with dominant discourses, 
consonant with the particular values and understandings of the world which are 
embodied in those discourses (Hajer 1993, 46; Schon and Rein 1994). So, one of 
the outcomes of this chapter will be to identify what gets added to, what gets 
subtracted from, and what gets left alone in deliberative processes when they are 
picked up and used by government agencies. The answers to those questions will 
have significant bearing on the institutional recommendations I make later on. 
Central initiatives 1: Public involvement to 1997 
One of the problems with describing the health policy context in the UK is that it 
is highly complex: what counts as a "health" issue is socially constructed and 
framed by technical expertise (Moran 1999); the policy community is large and 
complex; and the institutions vary between members of the Union and are 
constantly changing. In what follows, therefore, I have been extremely selective, 
pulling out a few key features which have a direct bearing on the kind of citizen 
participation practised primarily in England and Northern Ireland at the time of 
my study, and leaving Wales and Scotland to one side. More comprehensive 
descriptions are given by Ham (1999) and Klein (2000), although only Klein 
covers the specifics of the initial Blair government reforms. 
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From the founding of the National Health Service in 1948 until 1974, the only 
real means of channelling public input into the NHS was via general practitioners 
(GPs), but that was fairly limited given the awe in which medical professionals 
generally were held. Health was "professionalised" in the sense that doctors 
mystified and controlled access to medical knowledge so that people had nothing 
to contribute but their ailments (Harrison and Pollitt 1994; Wilensky 1964)-
legitimate authority over health matters rested entirely with the medical 
profession. While the governing boards of NHS institutions had some lay 
members, they "represented the elite of available voluntary effort" rather than 
having any demographic commonality with the public at large (Hunter and 
Harrison 1997, 127, quoting Charles Webster). 
Furthermore, GPs were expected to act as the gatekeepers of the whole system, 
responsible for referrals to hospital-based specialists, a bargain reached with 
government in return for maintaining their private contractor status. This was 
done to distance government from the rationing decisions that were becoming 
increasingly necessary: it could claim they were legitimate on the basis of 
medical judgement rather than political calculation. It was a Faustian bargain, 
however, as the government effectively handed over budgetary control to a group 
of people who had little interest in exercising restraint (Klein 1990; Moran 1999, 
32, 67). 
The first major change to this limited public role was the creation of the 
Community Health Councils (CHCs) in 1974. Governed by a board made up of 
nominees of the relevant local authority, local voluntary associations and the 
Secretary of State for Health, the 186 CHCs were to act as watchdogs over the 
Health Authorities. However, the CHCs seem to have been created "almost by 
accident" (Klein and Lewis 1976, 1)- Phillips (1980) argues they were simply 
created in the image of the now-defunct nationalised industry watchdogs which, 
even then, were regarded as ineffective by most observers. Interviewees 
suggested that few people were aware of their existence. As with many other 
British quangos, they had no formal bonds of accountability to the public (Barker 
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1982); and, like the NHS boards, were not descriptively representative of the 
wider community; although they did attract some supporters (Hallas 1976). 
Furthermore, they were created at the same time as medical professionals were 
given more and more avenues of influence on NHS boards, health authorities, 
and effective veto power on District Management Teams (Klein 2000, 73), 
further enhancing their authority while giving citizens only a weak voice. At the 
time of writing, the CHCs were to be abolished in December 2003; their scrutiny 
functions were being handed over to local government, while their advocacy and 
complaint handling functions were being redistributed a variety of new local and 
central bodies. 
It was under the Conservative governments of Margaret Thatcher and John 
Major that public involvement received a boost, but under quite a different model 
in which groups like the CHCs and their member organisations were no longer 
lauded as essential to broadening participation in democracy (Barker 1982, 21, 
quoting Clive Jenkins), but damned as "vested interests" who diverted public 
resources for their own private ends. 
The key features of neoliberal government in the UK and its administrative 
offshoot, the New Public Management (NPM), are fairly familiar. 19 At their core 
is a view of human activity as the individual pursuit of competitive advantage; 
but that pursuit can be made to serve the needs of others by encouraging markets 
which supply people with goods and services (Pollitt 1993, 183). Thus 
individual advantage and collective benefits are believed happily to coincide, so 
19 For overviews and analysis of the Conservative reforms, see Gamble (1994), 
Kavanagh (1987) and Kerr and Marsh (1999). The term "new public management" gets 
used for one, or several, or all of a not-always-compatible set of ideas including 
contractualism (Lane 1987), other public choice or agency theory inspired prescriptions 
(Hood 1991), and managerialism which draws on (idealised) private sector management 
(Pollitt 1993). I use the term in its broadest, catch-all sense to designate a range of 
administrative doctrines (Dunsire 1973), which I recognise glosses over many 
distinctions of intent and content. For critical discussion of NPM in many of its 
varieties, see Ferlie et al (1996) and Hood (1998). 
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long as markets are not "captured" for private gain by strategic misrepresentation 
of supply and demand. The purpose of government, on this view, is not to 
supply goods and services, but to ensure that markets for those goods and 
services are created where they do not exist, and are not distorted where they do. 
In the public policy arena, this view problematised what earlier models of 
government had considered the normal provision of services, and normal 
working relationships between civil servants, organised interests and elected 
representatives. Inspired by transaction cost economics and agency theory 
(Boston et al. 1996; Hood 1991), the government asked what institutional 
arrangements would minimise diversion of public resources by supposedly self-
interested actors. Concerned about such problems - evidence for which was 
often more anecdotal than systematic - governments in several countries 
developed a remarkable range of tools of control. The preferred mechanism was 
the market: subject public services to competition and this will empower 
"consumers" who will flock to the best supplier, forcing the inefficient and 
ineffective to shape up or ship out (Pollitt 1993, 5). Thus "purchasers" were split 
from "providers": the government purchased services for delivery to consumers, 
but it could choose from a range of competing suppliers, both public and 
privately-owned, who were then bound by contracts (another key element in the 
new regime) to provide specific services to particular quality and cost standards. 
Market forces were introduced into the NHS most dramatically in 1990 when an 
"internal market" was created such that health service providers were forced to 
compete with each other and private sector providers for contracts to provide 
services commissioned by the health authorities -thus creating what was 
strictly a quasi-market, "involving choice by the purchasing agency rather than 
by the patient" (Harrison and Mort 1998, 62; see alsoLe Grand and Bartlett 
1993; Bartlett et al. 1994). 
These ideas were combined with managerialism, a view with a long history that 
management is a neutral, "scientific", and hence more noble function which 
should be kept quite separate from the messiness of politics, and that its methods, 
developed in business settings, were universally applicable (Dunsire 1973, 87-
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94; Pollitt 1993, 15). Managerialism includes the doctrine that "managers should 
be free to manage", to achieve results without direct interference from their 
ministers. Rather than accounting for inputs into public services (from personnel 
to pencils), or outputs of departments (numbers of operations, brochures, etc), 
government agencies were asked to account for outcomes: that is, the effects 
they were having on people's lives. Given specified outcomes and budgets, 
managers should be free to develop whatever programmes and services they felt 
would meet those objectives (Pollitt 1993, 2-3). These ideas were first 
introduced to the health sector following the publication in 1983 of a cabinet-
commissioned report by Roy Griffiths, managing director of the Sainsbury's 
supermarket chain, who recommended the creation of a general management 
function which would plan, implement and control services, leading to a 
dramatic increase in the number and cost of managers in the NHS (DHSS 1983; 
Milewa, Valentine, and Calnan 1998, 509).20 
In order to deliver a high quality product, one must be aware of the needs and 
tastes of consumers (Besterfield et al. 1995). One also needs to know whether 
one has delivered a contractually required target or not. This meant that 
customer research became crucial, the institutionalisation of which was another 
key Griffiths recommendation. Thus, the NHS invested heavily in developing 
new needs assessment tools, conducting customer satisfaction surveys, designing 
standards and performance criteria, ranking providers according to how they met 
those criteria and publishing those rankings. 
By the 1990's the focus was not purely on "consumers": the key 1992 document 
on involvement matters, Local Voices (NHS Management Executive 1992), 
recognised that citizens more generally had a legitimate interest in the way their 
health services operated, regardless of whether they were "users" of those 
services. Although it did not mention any of the techniques under study here, 
Local Voices has been credited with sparking the interest in deliberative methods 
2° For an analysis of the impact of the Griffiths reforms on management in the NHS, see 
Pollitt et al (1991). 
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in the health sector (Mciver 1997, 3), leading directly to the six experiments with 
citizens' juries conducted by the Kings' Fund and the IPPR between June 1996 
and March 1997. However, the purpose of this involvement was quite different 
from that advocated by the IPPR and Kings' Fund: it was very much focused on 
research (NHS Management Executive 1992, 5, 9) rather than decision making 
(Stewart, Kendall, and Coote 1994, iii). It was to research opinions, not to 
enhance collective decision making (Pollitt 1993, 183-4). This is because, at 
root, public involvement initiatives were extensions of tools by which central 
government controlled local agencies, not tools for local people to control central 
government. Local Voices makes this explicit: involvement was to help health 
authorities build strength based on better information, making them more 
powerful in their negotiations with service providers (NHS Management 
Executive 1992, 3), a topic to which I will return at the end of the next section. 
Why is this problematic? In one respect, the problem is not that the processes 
were purely advisory- they should not be anything else, recalling the legitimate 
role of randomly selected representatives discussed earlier. Rather, one problem 
is that deliberative techniques are used to advise the wrong level of the hierarchy, 
using citizens to answer quite limited questions on behalf of relatively powerless 
agencies (Pickard 1998, 237). This became an issue in the Leicester jury when it 
became clear that one of the reasons why the health authority was pushing for 
changes was because of a lack of trained medical staff: the jurors recognised that 
staff increases were very important, but training, employing, and paying for extra 
staff was not within the authority's capabilities, and therefore not on the agenda, 
which undermined the process's legitimacy in the jurors' eyes (Journalist, 
Leicester). In such processes, citizens make recommendations within boundaries 
that are quite narrow, and determined at levels of power to which they do not 
have access. Of course, the higher the body is in the bureaucratic hierarchy, the 
less this is a problem; but central bodies hold fewer deliberative processes, and 
almost none that are rigorously deliberative, for reasons to be explored in the 
third section. 
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In another respect, however, I wonder whether part of the issue might not be a 
fundamental contradiction in the design of citizens' juries and other deliberative 
processes: that they combine incompatible selection methods with deliberation. 
These processes go to enormous lengths to inform lay participants and give them 
power to question experts and come to their own conclusions. This has a 
powerful effect on the participants: once they too have become "experts", 
exposed to an even broader range of arguments than many specialists, they may 
come to feel that they should have the only legitimate voice, that their voice 
should be decisive, not merely advisory, as one of the journalists covering the 
Leicester case pointed out to me: 
One of the good things about after the jury, some of these jurors got a little 
power hungry! I'm mean this is my personal opinion, I found it quite amusing, 
because I spoke to them afterwards, and some of them were like, "Well I think 
we should asked about this next time it comes up." They wanted to follow the 
process all the way to the first building being built, they wanted to be the ones 
that were asked and decided almost, so they got a bit power hungry, I think, by 
the end of it. But I suppose you would, wouldn't you? You'd get so into it, 
spending a week {deliberating} ... "Right, we've got a right to know now, we 
should be asked, at every step, which way they should go." 
Putting aside the question of why the journalist should frame this as "power 
hunger", the more important issue here is an apparent selection I deliberation 
conflict. Participants are chosen according to research imperatives, the urge to 
generate a representative sample, but then are put through a process which 
empowers them as one would decision makers, without having the legitimating 
principal-agent bonds required to make any decisions binding- and the classic 
way to create frustration, undermining the motivation to participate, is to confer 
responsibility without authority (Czikszentmihalyi and LeFevre 1989). Like the 
Black Knight in Monty Python's The Holy Grail, they are motivated and well 
armed but lack legs. I will come back to this point in the next chapter when I 
address representation issues in more detail. 
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The research orientation was most explicit in the Belfast citizens' jury, which 
was conducted as a learning experience for the organisers themselves; to learn 
about "ordinary" citizens' capacities; and to elicit values and recommendations 
which would form part of the Board and Councils' submission to the government 
on Northern Ireland's version of the 1998 white paper. 
It was to see if there were other ways other than we had been using to talk to 
people, and so it was just one in many of the different approaches that would 
have been used at the time, because we were operating in other ways, like 
various focus groups or public meetings or questionnaire type things, or 
whatever. So this was, what were the pros and cons of a citizens' jury approach. 
And particularly because this was a policy which was going to restructure the 
whole of the health and social care, and we were trying to get a way of looking 
at the citizen without representative groups representing the citizen. You know, 
what could you do with "the citizen" rather than some proxy for citizen about 
policy areas in the health field . 
... We were wanting to see to what extent people taken off the street would have 
knowledge, interest, structured information, how one would have to present, 
how one would have to deal with presenting technical material to people who 
were not experienced in the field ... It was a case of trying to find ways of 
talking to people about what their values were about these things in a situation 
where we weren't corning to threaten, so that we could develop the agenda 
along with them. 
NHS manager, Belfast 
Interestingly, the research orientation was connected with a key aspect of the jury 
design, namely the question setting. The topic was deliberately chosen to be a 
"low stakes" one, because the Board feared that in an atmosphere of extreme 
financial pressure the jury would come up with recommendations that were 
beyond the Board's resources; but, because the jury would be seen to carry a 
great deal of weight, it would put pressure on the Board to deliver something 
they could not. Essentially, the Board used the question to ensure that the 
citizens' jury had only advisory, not decisive, power. One Board member 
described it as an accountability issue: because the jury was not formally 
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accountable to anyone else, they would "leave us to carry the can for a decision 
they made" (NHS board member, Belfast). As an aside, it is worth noting that 
the "low stakes" nature of the question meant that it would not normally be 
considered a "good" one for a citizens' jury to consider: it was too broad, 
unfocused, and not directed towards a particular decision that needed to be taken 
(Jury manager, London)- I will take this issue up again in when examining the 
publicity function in chapter five. 
In summary, then, the push to improve participation in health policy making until 
1997 was strongly influenced by the rhetoric of the Conservative government 
and its new public managers about controlling supposedly wayward public 
service providers, especially local agencies, by using a limited range of research 
tools, applied to a limited range of questions, to find out some of what people 
wanted and needed, and to make sure that providers gave it to them. As for 
doctors, the reforms left their power relatively untouched- the agency problem 
addressed by the Conservatives was more how to control local NHS 
organisations, less the medical profression, although Cairney (2002) argues that 
the doctors hardly emerged unscathed. While deliberative techniques like 
citizens' juries were first used late in this period, only six were run in the health 
sector before the 1997 general election, and all of them by a think tank and an 
NGO on behalf of fairly low level agencies- central government's involvement 
was minimal. Even where deliberative techniques were mentioned, they were 
simply lumped in with research tools like focus groups, surveys and interviews 
(NHS Management Executive 1992, 9-11). Thus, while the techniques were 
being promoted as a solution to one problem- the lack of responsiveness of 
central government (Stewart, Kendall, and Coote 1994, iii)- they were picked 
up by public managers to address problems of responsiveness of local 
government to central commands. 
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Central initiatives II: the Blair government and public involvement 
While experimentation with deliberative techniques began at the local level 
under the Conservatives, a degree of institutionalisation was encouraged only 
once the Labour government came to power. Senior Labour figures, including 
Prime Minister Tony Blair, were well aware of the citizens' jury model: the 
Trade and Industry Secretary, Patricia Hewitt, is a former IPPR deputy director 
who would have been familiar not just with the model but with deliberative 
ideals; and they were promoted by Labour before the 1997 election when they 
made a promise (as yet unfulfilled) to use citizens' juries to examine the 
provision of electricity, water and gas services (Elliott 1996). Thus, deliberative 
democratic ideals certainly had "traction" with senior members of the 
government right from the start (DoH manager, London). 
The change was partly due to the influence in the Labour Party of a new set of 
public ideas known as "The Third Way" (Giddens 1998). Broadly, the Third 
Way is about the social justice goals of social democracy, but is "flexible, 
innovative and forward-looking in the means to achieve them" (Blair 1998, 2). It 
combines this with a somewhat conservative brand of communitarianism which 
stresses reciprocal duties to the state in exchange for welfare, and group 
membership above individualism. Thus, the Third Way has both egalitarian and 
collectivist tendencies - adherents believe both in decentralisation of power to 
local communities and the encouragement of individual drive and ambition; but 
also in duty, cohesion and norm-reinforcing institutions like the family and the 
nation, with which individual ambition does not necessarily sit comfortably 
(Driver and Martell2000, 157).21 
21 I have been told by contacts in the Cabinet Office that while the term "Third Way" 
had dropped out of favour in government circles by 2002, to be replaced by "social 
democracy", the features outlined here continue to exert an influence on government 
thinking. 
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Therefore, despite some claims of a clear break with the past (Gray 1996), the 
Third Way shared some features with managerialism and with the strong 
government of Thatcherism. Third Way adherents still believed in "efficiency" 
and "value for money" while adding "modernisation". Like managerialists, they 
were more concerned about outcomes than the means of achieving them; they 
claimed to have a more pragmatic view about public versus private provision of 
services, but nonetheless admired "entrepreneurial zeal" (Blair 1998, 4). They 
were interested in devolving power and working in "partnership" with local 
communities, but still expected uniform quality across the nation, enforced using 
performance measurement tools even more sophisticated than those developed in 
the days of "distrust" (Klein 2000, 208). 
These ideas were first applied to health in the government's white paper, The 
New NHS: Modern, Dependable (Secretary of State for Health 1997). Reflecting 
the mix of old and new in the government's approach, it became clear that some 
things had changed while others had not. The internal market was abolished in 
name, to be replaced by initiatives which aimed to devolve power and work in 
"partnership" with local communities, but GPs still effectively act as purchasers 
choosing among competing providers, just not on the basis of price (Stephen 
Harrison, personal communication). The purchaser I provider split was still in 
effect in other ways: the Department of Health in London managed policy 
advice and target setting, while the NHS Executive in Leeds managed service 
planning and delivery to meet those objectives through its nine regional offices, 
health authorities, and hundreds of NHS Trusts running hospitals and a variety of 
primary and specialist services. While the government abolished an unpopular 
Conservative policy known as "GP fundholding" by which some purchasing 
power passed to some GPs, it still aimed to devolve up to 75% of the health 
budget to Primary Care Trusts and, in October 2002, consolidated the 95 health 
authorities into 28 "Strategic Health Authorities", responsible for needs 
assessment and planning for an average of 1.5 million people each. There is still 
much uncertainty about precisely what differentiates "strategic planning" from 
trust-level planning; how the new health authorities' role will differ from the 
regional offices; or how conflicts with local trusts will be managed (NHS 
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manager, Leeds)(NHS Magazine 2002). Thus the tensions between forces of 
centralisation and forces of decentralisation, always inherent in the NHS, 
continue under the new regime (Klein 2000, 96). 
While continuing experimentation was encouraged, neither patient participation 
nor specifically deliberative techniques were key features of the 1997 reforms, 
which were about re-empowering GPs and nurses as the patients' proxies 
(Secretary of State for Health 1997), strengthening rather than challenging 
medical professionals' authority. What put direct public participation in the 
spotlight was the publication in July 2000 of The NHS Plan (Secretary of State 
for Health 2000b ). The plan was the government's response to a growing sense 
of crisis after the 1997 reforms, reforms which were supposed to "fix" the NHS. 
This was partly of the government's own making: it made waiting lists the key 
measure of performance, but the length of those lists was neither entirely under 
its control, nor an unambiguous measure (Klein 2000, 213). When the lists 
continued to grow, the government was blamed. The sense of crisis was 
exacerbated by several well-publicised cases of medical mismanagement, the 
Harold Shipman murders, 22 and the failure of "lean" hospitals to cope with a 
major outbreak of influenza in early 2000. 
For my purposes, The NHS Plan is interesting for two reasons: because of the 
conscious use of deliberative principles to create it; and because, in Chapter 10, 
Changes for Patients, it promised a dramatic increase in patient and general 
citizen involvement throughout the health service. The creation process, and the 
importance of key policy entrepreneurs advancing deliberative ideas, has already 
been outlined in the introduction (page 20), so here I just describe the 
involvement initiatives themselves. Chapter 10 had eight sections which dealt 
with both new and familiar initiatives like improving informed consent and new 
complaint handling procedures. It also proposed a series of measures which 
were aimed at creating "a system whereby the patient voice is stitched right 
22 Harold Shipman was a Greater Manchester GP who was convicted in January 2000 of 
the murders of 15 patients; in July 2002 an inquiry found him responsible for 215 
deaths. 
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throughout the healthcare system",23 including patient satisfaction surveys, but 
also bodies designed on the citizens' jury model attached to every NHS Trust, 
every health authority, and several central organisations including the National 
Institute for Clinical Excellence, whose Citizens' Council is a modified jury writ 
large (DoH manager, London). All this was to be complemented by having local 
authorities take over CHC scrutiny powers. 
In the context of the previous Conservative initiatives, these proposals were 
evolutionary more than revolutionary. First, they did not so much create new 
functions as redistribute the functions of the CHCs, although not without a fight, 
as I discuss further in chapter five. Second, survey research still featured 
strongly, becoming a significant means of performance measurement, 
standardisation and centralised control. Third, just as in 1974, the increase in the 
public's voice went hand in hand with further strengthening of medical authority 
- again, this was all about controlling local agencies, not so much the front-line 
doctors. Fourth, there was very little detail which left much room for the reforms 
to become a new way of doing old things. For example, there was little 
specification of what "lay" meant or in what sense they would represent others, 
which left open the possibility that the new forums would simply be made up of 
the same people who staffed the CHCs, people who were thought 
unrepresentative (NHS manager, Leeds; Interest group manager, London). This 
was deliberate: the aim was not to impose a single model on localities but to 
allow those local practices which were working to flourish (DoH, 
London)(Milburn 2001). The risk associated with this approach is, of course, 
that the vision is implemented patchily, with key elements given inadequate 
attention or left out altogether, although the Modernisation Action Teams set up 
following the Chapter 10 consultation process were supposed to share ideas and 
to ensure some consistency across the country (NHS manager, Leeds). 
Nonetheless, anecdotal evidence from interviewees suggested wide variation in 
the kind of person appointed as a lay member on NHS bodies, ranging from 
genuine attempts to involve a variety of non-specialist opinion to a continuation 
23 DoH manager, London. A similar phrase was used by two other interviewees. 
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of involving only the "great and the good" (Interest group manager and Health 
policy academic, London). 
While "deliberation" was not specifically mentioned in Chapter 10, 
experimentation with variants on the citizens' jury and panel theme was 
encouraged by the department, by some managers inside the NHS, and by an 
increasing number of consultation entrepreneurs in the private and public sectors. 
At the time of my research, it was estimated by one IPPR interviewee that around 
200 citizens' juries had been run in the UK, of which around half were in the 
health sector (although there is no definitive list- I was unable to confirm either 
the number or the relative frequency). However, all were conducted by health 
authorities, at a relatively low level of the hierarchy, and the numbers were 
steadily tailing off: authorities seemed to have begun experimenting with 
shorter, cheaper, and less complex variants rather than take the large amount of 
time and expense required to run a jury (Health policy academic, London). 
In part, this situation was allowed to develop thanks to a model of deliberation 
held by health policy actors which is simpler than the full deliberative democratic 
model I advanced in chapter one. As Jo Lenaghan of the DoH Strategy Unit 
explained it, the criteria for a deliberative event were that it include information 
for participants, discussion between them, and adequate time for points to be 
raised, questioned and agreed on. Even health policy academics have set forth a 
stripped down account of deliberation: Harrison and Mort (1998, 63) write that 
deliberation only "occurs where members of the panel have the opportunity to 
discuss I interact with others about the question(s) under consideration", criteria 
which can be met by processes much simpler than the citizens' jury model. 
Harrison and Mort include focus groups, but such groups have fundamentally 
different purposes: they are not oriented towards making decisions but towards 
uncovering the attitudes and beliefs of participants; the time frame is short and 
participants homogenous to facilitate easy discussion rather than lengthy and 
stratified to facilitate the confrontation of difference; they are ideal for 
brainstorming, less for the critical analysis of facts and values (Berg 2001, 112-
3); and they include none of the democratic elements, such as prescriptions for 
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who the participants are (that is, how inclusive the process is), whether the 
deliberations are decisive or not, what the scope of deliberation should be, and so 
on. 
Thus, it is important that I do not overstate the impact of deliberative ideals in the 
British health policy context even under the Labour government. The word 
"deliberative" is used in a stripped-down sense excluding key democratic 
elements, despite the democratic rhetoric used to promote the processes; even 
that limited model has not been imposed by central government, which has 
preferred to allow local agencies to choose their own methods; and the processes 
have been run almost entirely by local organisations well down the hierarchy, not 
by the large central agencies with the real decision making power. They 
continue to be categorised as part of a "research" tool kit, not as part of an 
agenda to hand over authentic decision making power; and they continue to 
stress involvement of "patients" and "service users" rather than citizens. Given 
those facts, the Blair government may said to be encouraging some deliberation, 
but it is not implementing deliberative democracy. 
* * * * * 
What does all this history mean for our questions about legitimacy in deliberative 
democracy? Beyond the specifics of a given case, any democratic deliberation 
on health policy happens in the context of a three-way tussle for legitimate 
authority over health decisions between medical professionals, local managers 
and central government. At the micro level, this means that it is likely that 
citizens will need to fight to have their voice accepted as a legitimate source of 
authority in health cases rather than merely "contributors of ailments". There are 
other implications at the macro level. Historically, public and patient 
involvement has been used by the UK central government as a stick with which 
to beat local agencies, not so much to give citizens control over central 
government and certainly not to empower patients over medical professionals, let 
alone healthcare industries like large pharmaceutical or insurance companies. 
And yet some of the most pressing problems of health policy are related to the 
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political economy of health care, particularly the fact that the demand for and 
cost of health services is driven ever upwards by technical advances which are 
largely in private hands, and the fact that the users of health services pay almost 
none of the cost directly. As medicine's technical capacity to intervene in a 
range of conditions has dramatically increased, so people have begun to demand 
those interventions as a matter of right- as more can be done, demand has 
grown that it should be done (Davis 1992; Marmor 1994; Moran 1999). These 
costs are born by governments, and thus by citizens generally, yet people-as-
citizens rarely get to deliberate on such matters- all the deliberative voice is 
given to people-as-users who have no incentive to exercise restraint. 
Thus, deliberative experiments in UK health policy are generally taking place at 
the wrong level of government, addressing relatively small issues for agencies 
which have little power to change things. Furthermore, the control motivation 
has allowed a kind of deliberative experiment from which many of the 
democratic elements have been stripped away, and some of the deliberative ones 
too. As for what this means for instituting deliberative democracy, it seems clear 
that legitimacy will require citizens retaking control of agenda setting and 
deliberating on things which matter. But this would mean battling enormously 
powerful private interests, governmental, professional and industrial, who have 
an interest in keeping citizens deliberating on the little stuff. I will have more to 
say about this in the conclusion. 
Local motivations for deliberating 
In the previous two sections I have concentrated on some of the broad ideas 
driving central government's increased promotion of public and patient 
involvement generally. But why have lower-level managers chosen specifically 
deliberative methods of involving the public? The answers my interviewees 
gave to that question come in two broad categories: rationalisation and 
legitimation. 
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Rationalisation and "the usual suspects" 
The new public management continues a long-standing tradition of "deep-seated 
animosity towards politics-particularly democratic politics" (Fischer 1990, 21; 
Stone 1988, 4), seen as open to strategic manipulation for private gain and thus 
irrational in the sense that it leads to suboptimal results (Forester 1984; Miller 
2000). This view of politics is based on the assumption that persons are 
motivated by self-interest, and thus are subject to the pre-deliberative 
commitments problem (chapter two, page 51). But this concern is shared with 
deliberative democracy, which is also concerned with eliminating manipulation 
of political processes for private or sectional gain: that, after all, is the point of 
the "authenticity" criterion in Dryzek's account of democracy (1996a, 5). As 
noted above, the NPM way of dealing with such distortions has generally been 
through centralised controls like contracts, markets, and central agency preview 
and review. For local agencies following the introduction of Third Way rhetoric, 
however, deliberative techniques promise both some input from "local 
communities" while still meeting the bureaucratic demand for rationalisation of 
that public voice- that is, "the informed view" of the public (NHS manager, 
Leicester)(Dolan, Cookson, and Ferguson 1999, 916). 
This is not rationalisation of critical theory, the inherently democratic 
communicative rationalisation which results from free, inclusive debate oriented 
towards understanding between communicatively competent and reflective 
equals (Dryzek 1990, 14; Habermas 1996, 27). Rather, it is means-ends 
rationality which lacks an inherent democratic component, a rationality which is 
more about providing inputs which serve the needs of an "active management" 
than facilitating the creation of an "active citizenship" (Milewa, Valentine, and 
Calnan 1999, 463). Thus, while many advocates of deliberative techniques stress 
the promise of democratic legitimation, it is the promise of rationalisation of both 
participants (Stewart, Kendall, and Coote 1994, iii, v) and outcomes (Renn, 
Webler, and Wiedemann 1995) that has resonated more clearly with public 
managers using the processes. 
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Several interviewees repeated the NPM line that the main obstacle to 
rationalisation was the tendency of usual political processes to be dominated by 
particular patient and medical interests which would then degenerate into 
polarised "shouting"- which is ironic, given that the rise of health consumer 
groups is directly attributable to the neoliberal revolution (Hunter and Harrison 
1997). One phrase cropped up often when interviewees described the ideal 
participants in deliberation: "Not the usual suspects".24 The phrase means, "Not 
the same members of the same charities and pressure groups we always have to 
deal with," and it is often said with a tone of exasperation and a wry smile which 
suggests that public servants and others are most grateful not to have to deal with 
these people in deliberation. While the remarks apply equally to professional 
societies and commercial lobby groups as consumer groups, it was the consumer 
groups which interviewees discussed the most. 
Someone came to my surgery and her husband had died of cancer, and she had 
this recent experience of what she regarded as absolutely excellent clinical care, 
but the way it was being delivered, the way she was told about radiotherapy 
{was poor}. And she quite consciously knew that trying to feed that back would 
be part of her grieving process, so she would only want to be involved in this for 
say, six months, and then there would come an end, and then she would want to 
move on. Now her experience ... was the kind of experience which was 
extremely valuable because it's current, it's extremely relevant, it doesn't have a 
hidden agenda, and it moves on. So it's those kind of recent users of the 
system .... The proposal we've put in for replacing {the CHCs} will give that 
kind of turnover of membership, and will bring that continuously. You know, 
people who ... wouldn't be professional patients. 
Politician, Birmingham 
This contrast between "professional patient" and some kind of "real" person was 
made over and over again in my interviews -indeed, only two of the 30 
interviewees questioned the dichotomy or offered a more positive view of the 
role of activists. What is interesting from a legitimacy point of view is that it 
24 The precise phrase was used by five interviewees, with variants on that theme being 
used by six others. 
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implies that managers using deliberative processes assumed that the motivations 
problem of pre-deliberative commitments was a serious one. Hence the appeal 
of processes which confine those with such problems to secondary roles, either 
sitting on the steering groups which oversee the process and I or as witnesses and 
panellists. In citizens' juries, those with expertise in a policy field do not get the 
chance to interact, to change each others' preferences in light of the better 
argument. They only get to offer those arguments to an audience of "innocent" 
lay people who then go away and do the deliberating behind closed doors- and 
I discuss the nature of the "lay participant" category in more detail in the 
following chapter on representation and representativeness. This separation of 
lay participants and interest groups is seen to be crucial in cutting through 
polarised debate and reaching rational outcomes: 
You could look at it as being a way out for us in a particular messy 
situation .... We almost got the point where there was an impasse .... It was the 
single biggest factor that freed up the next steps in the service review. I don't 
think, if we hadn't done that jury, we would not have got through. Well, we 
could have got through, we'd have got through, but with losing huge public 
confidence because it may have been in the end that we would have bowed to 
particular stakeholders, in other words those clinicians who shout the most. 
NHS manager, Leicester 
Despite its benefits, the role separation can be frustrating for some of the expert 
participants in deliberative moments. One of the organisers of the Belfast jury 
felt this particularly keenly: 
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You are a witness, you make a statement, to some extent you get cross-
examined a bit, but you don't get an opinion as it were from the jury .... And 
therefore I found it a bit frustrating, like, "Am I making the point here, is this a 
point that has been understood, am I misunderstanding them?" And I found it 
was a case of- I mean not disparaging it, I found it a very positive process -
but it was a bit like giving blood- you go, you give, and you don't know where 
it goes after that, it just goes (laughs). 
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They're doing the deliberation and they're doing among themselves and that is 
fine, but it's not the most normal human interaction because I would normally 
have an opportunity to say, "But I didn't actually mean that", or, "Where are 
you coming from on that?" In the normal course of events I would expect to 
transact with you for a bit longer until we came to some understanding, or I said, 
"Well, you can think that if you like and I think this". 
The lack of dialogue between the active is also a feature of the deliberative poll 
process: panellists are questioned by the chair and by a few members of the 
audience, and give short answers before moving on to the next question. In the 
NHS poll, none of the five plenary sessions involved dialogue between the 
panellists; in only one plenary, that with then-Opposition Health Spokesman 
Anne Widdecombe, were people able to ask follow-up questions; and only once, 
during the session with then-Health Secretary Frank Dobson, did anyone other 
than the chair make a statement back to the panellists rather than asking a 
question of them. While I lack evidence on how they felt in the NHS poll, one 
panellist in an Australian example clearly felt the same frustration that troubled 
the Belfast witness, calling the process a "quiz show format" in which genuine 
dialogue did not get the chance to develop outside the fairly restricted confines of 
the small-group sessions. 
This is quite a different kind of deliberation from that put forward by most 
deliberative theorists: deliberative democracy has been advanced as a model in 
which people who disagree can debate with each other, either directly or through 
representatives- it is explicitly thus for Gutmann and Thompson (1996, 346) 
and implicitly thus for Bohman and Rehg (1997, ix), Cohen (1989, 146), Elster 
(1998, 1) and Habermas (1996). The great disadvantage of this strategy is that 
the active do not necessarily have their motivations or preferences transformed 
by such processes because they do not get to test their arguments against the 
counter-arguments of their opponents, nor have to face the motive-transforming 
power of the reciprocity norm. In addition, undermining the active may in some 
cases, be undermining the legitimate representatives of the inactive citizenry who 
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do not have the time or inclination to participate directly, a topic I will take up in 
more detail in the next chapter. 
Legitimation up and down 
The other key motivation for running a deliberative process which came up in the 
cases is legitimation (Harrison and Mort 1998), but legitimation aimed both up 
and down. The first kind is to legitimate the actions of the organising agency 
with those to whom it is accountable, usually their political masters or 
supervisory bodies in the bureaucracy. The second kind is directed at those 
subject to a decision of, or action by, the organising agency- it involves 
legitimation to the public, users of services, their activist representatives, or 
subordinate organisations within the public service, such as service providers like 
NHS trusts. It is also possible that organisations aim to legitimate actions to 
peer groups or those with equal status in the hierarchy, such as fellow managers 
in the NHS, in local government, or other members of one's own policy 
community, but I mention this only as a logical possibility: I found no direct 
evidence of this kind of legitimation taking place in the cases I examined. 
The use of public involvement to legitimate downwards is specifically mentioned 
in Local Voices (NHS Management Executive 1992, 3), which advises, " ... as 
health authorities seek to bring about changes in services and make explicit 
decisions about priorities they are likely to be more persuasive and successful in 
their negotiations with providers if they secure public support." In the case of 
the NHS Plan deliberations, the Department of Health designed them to achieve 
not only high quality, rationalised inputs, but also to make sure that potential 
critics were "inside the tent pissing out", to use the words of Lyndon Johnson. It 
was what Jo Lenaghan of the Department of Health Strategy Unit called an 
exercise in "big tent politics" in which the legitimating effects on participants 
were at least as important as the quality of information and decision making. It 
was designed to bind people to the process and to the outcomes, simply by 
making them feel part of something significant, something with power and the 
attention of the Secretary. 
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Of the four elements of the NHS Plan process (chapter one, page 21), the 
postcard technique was clearly more symbolic than substantive. The primary 
aim wasn't to get information from a sample of British households, although 
Lenaghan expressed surprise at how useful they actually turned out to be in that 
regard. That job was done better by the focus groups and public meetings, 
information which was then dealt with by the stakeholder working groups. The 
primary purpose of the postcards was legitimation: to show the British people 
that something was being done. So, even though the million households which 
received the cards were just a fraction of the 21 million households in England, 
Scotland and Wales, the publicity surrounding the cards ensured that the message 
"we're listening" was transmitted loud and clear. 
The stakeholder groups were both better informed and more substantive, 
although some felt that there was no clear link between their inputs and the final 
product; while some felt that they weren't being involved in decision making so 
much as being the objects of a research exercise themselves. For example, one 
NHS manager made this comment: 
There's an academic approach to involvement that's ... the gold standard in 
terms of a process, you have to be clear about what your expectations are, 
what you're involving people in, what you're asking them to do, give them 
sufficient information and sufficient support to be able to do that, 
effectively take on board what they say even if it perhaps challenges your 
own perceptions of the way things ought to be, your own model of the way 
things ought to be, and then you need to feed back to people how you've 
actually arrived at your decision. Now in terms of the NHS Plan it was 
very crude as a process, I think. Very quick and dirty, there was no 
feedback mechanism necessarily. The man in the street, I don't think they 
really care, but if you were to take your more informed lay membership, 
people who feel they have a stake in the NHS, I don't know that it 
altogether satisfies their need to feel involved and listened to. 
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This made for an interesting change from the usual power relationships, in which 
the technical experts make the decisions and the public simply provide input, a 
role reversal some were not comfortable with. But even then the process had the 
desired effect: one of the remarkable things I noted during my interviews was 
that there was no criticism of the aims or ideals of The NHS Plan. People in the 
health service were busy trying to figure out exactly how they were going to 
implement the changes; and while they felt some discomfort about the process, 
they were not spending their time criticising the vision. The same goes for the 
wider public: while there may have been criticism about the pace of change or 
the specific way things were being done, there was almost no criticism of the 
plan itself. It was agreed to be a good thing. 
The Leicester case also featured downwards legitimation. Clearly the original 
decision to devote Glenfield Hospital to planned care services lacked legitimacy 
with the people subject to it both on substantive and procedural grounds - it did 
not accord with their views on Glenfield and was reached using a process which 
excluded their voices - and the jury was part of an effort to correct that initial 
mistake both because it involved citizens more directly, meeting the legitimate 
source criterion at least in part, and because the process met the rational 
deliberation criteria by hearing all sides of the argument, giving equal time to 
opposing voices and reaching a consensus decision. The fact that a subsequent 
effort to mount a defence of the General Hospital failed dismally was cited as 
evidence of consensus by two interviewees, although that could have been 
simply because it came second, after the issue had ceased to be salient for most 
people. 
Legitimation upwards was clearly a feature of the Belfast jury. While one of the 
motivations was to research citizen capabilities, another aim was to strengthen 
the persuasive force of the Eastern Health & Social Services Board and Council's 
joint submission to the Northern Ireland department (Jury manager, Belfast), 
using the citizens' jury as a "technology of legitimation" (Harrison and Mort 
1998). Upwards legitimation was also a feature of the Leicester jury, but only as 
a pleasant, unintended consequence, not as a result of intentional planning. 
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According to one of the journalists covering the jury, their decision allowed the 
health authority to put in a stronger, and eventually successful, bid for Private 
Finance Initiative (PFI) funding since changes to Glenfield would not have been 
as likely to attract PFI money; upgrading the old and somewhat dilapidated 
General was a stronger proposition?5 While this was speculation, the journalist 
wondered whether it was not just the outcome, however, which made the bid 
stronger, but the process as well, since it allowed the health authority to go to the 
Department of Health and say, effectively, "This is the will of people, and we 
know that because we've used a good process, a process you recommend." 
The remark "we've used a good process" suggests another possible angle on the 
legitimation imperative: that battles over public policy and political influence 
are in part a matter of whether or not one used a good decision technology or not. 
This is more than "playing the user card" (Mort, Harrison, and Wistow 1996): 
different user cards can be stronger or weaker. This seems to have been the case 
in the Leicester example, in which the battle to have a decisive voice was at least 
in part a battle between different methods of getting at public opinion. I have 
already mentioned the key elements: the initial stake-holder consultations, the 
variously-appointed spokespeople for different interests in the debate, the 
petition, the research conducted by the CHC, and the citizens' jury itself. The 
stakeholder consultations were flawed simply because they were exclusive: they 
only included key medical interests and not the service users or wider public. 
The interest group representatives, on their own, could not claim to speak for the 
wider public and, given the views about "the usual suspects", were not seen by 
decision makers, or even other interest groups as representative in any sense 
(CHC officer, Leicester). By launching the petition, they increased their 
legitimacy by securing acts of consent from 150,000 or more citizens, but the 
petition was attacked by the CHC on the grounds that it represented only the 
unreflective, uninformed views of the public. The CHC's own strategy was to 
commission survey and focus group research from De Montfort University 
25 For details of the Private Finance Initiative, including its rules, procedures, and a list 
of projects, see http://www.doh.gov.uk/pfi/summary.htm 
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(Wilcox 2000), appealing to the "science" of the method to legitimate its claims, 
but the research once again drew on the uninformed voice of the public, not the 
informed view wanted by the health authority (NHS manager, Leicester). All 
these technologies were trumped, in media discourse, for the campaigners and 
for the health authority, by the citizens' jury for which more legitimation claims 
could be made: the scientific rigour of its design, the multi-level political 
support, the fact that it used ordinary citizens who became informed about the 
issues, and the attempt to include all sides of the argument (Bums 2000d; g, 
quoting Leicestershire CHC chairman Greg Drozdz). While I have no direct 
evidence that this is generally true, the fact that such a technology contest 
occurred in this case suggests it may be possible that public officials, when 
presented with competing claims in a policy argument, take more seriously those 
whose claims are based on a more sophisticated technology than a lesser one, 
regardless of the substance or justice of the claims. 
The advocates of other deliberative processes make similar claims, especially 
focusing on the science of the method. This is most clearly the case with the 
deliberative poll: the NHS poll presenter did five segments in which the 
academic credentials were stressed, including interviewing the process's 
inventor, James Fishkin, and focusing especially on the selection and resulting 
"representativeness" of the deliberative group. It is the science of the process 
which is the basis for claiming legitimate "recommending force" (Fishkin 1997, 
162). 
Beyond the specifics of the individual cases, however, there are legitimation 
imperatives to do with the nature of the organisation doing the consultation. It 
has already been remarked that the vast majority of deliberative processes in 
health have been run by health authorities. Along with other quangos, health 
authorities have been repeatedly criticised for their lack of accountability either 
directly to the people or, in many cases, to elected representatives (Barker 1982, 
7; see also Flinders 1999, 9). Harrison and Mort (1998, 67) suggest that it is this 
unauthorised, unaccountable status which has led health authorities to use 
citizens' juries and other tools to increase the degree to which they can claim 
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responsiveness to the public. To that I would add that the motivation to do so is 
not just an internal recognition by health authorities of a lack of accountability, 
but is a reaction to pressure applied by central agencies and ministers over the 
last two decades to demonstrate responsiveness to customers. 
* * * * * 
This discussion of the motivations behind specific deliberative cases has added to 
our understanding of the legitimacy challenges in two ways. First of all, the 
rationalisation concern has meant that public managers have been particularly 
attracted to processes which put in quarantine those who are most likely to face 
motivational problems to do with pre-deliberative commitments, commitments 
which undermine the deliberative quality of a decision making process. Thus, in 
practice, and contrary to the expectations of deliberative democracy theorists, 
those who are actively engaged in advancing political views do not get to 
deliberate together; deliberation is reserved for the inactive. While this may have 
rationalising benefits for a given micro deliberative process, it is not clear that it 
rationalises the macro deliberative environment, because those who are most 
active in that environment do not necessarily have their preferences or 
motivations transformed by participation. Second, the legitimation drivers have 
added another reason why we should think of some cases of actual deliberation 
as things which help empower not lay participants, but government agencies 
themselves -in the Belfast case, local agencies "played the user card" in order 
to win resources from their political masters, as well as to gain support for their 
actions from the public. 
Conclusions 
The analysis leads to four conclusions regarding my goal of taking the next steps 
towards a legitimate deliberative democracy. 
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First of all, the motivations of those who commission micro deliberation matters 
a great deal. They can affect not just the agenda of a specific deliberative event 
-which is a serious enough problem, given the frustration caused to the 
Leicester jurors- but also the very procedures themselves. Recall that the 
initial pressure to experiment with deliberative processes came from central 
government in the form of imperatives to conduct needs assessments and 
customer satisfaction research, in the name of providing better services to the 
consumers of those services. Specifically deliberative techniques had some 
appeal for central government because of their fit with rhetoric of devolving 
power to local communities, although this clashed somewhat with the continuing 
emphasis on consistent national standards and quality control. For health 
authority managers, the appeal was the rationalising and legitimating promise of 
such techniques. Combined with a limited conception of deliberation and a 
certain laissez-faire approach to how the techniques were to be applied, these 
motivations meant that when deliberative democracy was picked up by the 
bureaucracy it was not picked up whole: some of the democratic elements were 
left behind, while in some cases the deliberative elements survived in only a 
minimalist version. Where they are used at all - and remember that deliberation 
has been very much a side-issue - they are seen as another tool of research, 
albeit a sophisticated one which could be useful when one wants to claim greater 
legitimacy for one's views. 
Second, it matters a great deal at what level of the hierarchy micro deliberative 
techniques are used. The more rigorously deliberative processes are used lower 
down the hierarchy because their legitimation needs are stronger and because of 
the pressure on them to be responsive. Deliberation at this level tends to be 
about relatively small problems and does not address the big issues which frame 
those local problems. The rigorous techniques are not used further up the 
hierarchy, where the bigger issues can at least be addressed, if not solved. This 
could have serious consequences on the motivation of citizens to participate in 
deliberation: if they feel that they are spending a lot of time on things which do 
not matter very much, the incentive to tum up diminishes rapidly. This problem 
may actually be exacerbated by a feature of many micro deliberative techniques, 
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namely the random selection methods which rob the participants of legitimate, 
binding decision making power. 
One exception is the case of the NHS Plan, although only a few elements could 
be described as deliberative, even given the minimalist definition of deliberation 
used by the Department of Health. This was because legitimation concerns were 
at least as important as the substantive inputs. This led to a need to involve large 
numbers of people which came at the cost of less rigour, there being an implied 
trade-off between quality and quantity. The other exception is the deliberative 
poll which also confronted large questions at the national level. As I shall 
discuss at length in chapter five, the problem is that it was not connected to any 
particular decision making moment or attended to by any of the key policy 
makers, and thus had no effect. 
It is for these reasons that one should treat with caution claims like those 
emerging from the IPPR that deliberative democracy was being trialled in UK 
health policy (see Pickard 1998): some partially deliberative techniques, yes; but 
not deliberative democracy. The key questions confronting the health system 
were still in the hands of senior politicians and policy makers; the people only 
got to deliberate on little details, or in forums like the deliberative poll which was 
disconnected from real policy making. Even those micro deliberations result in 
recommendations or research inputs into other decision making forums; they are 
not decisive, and therefore show little of the popular control necessary to make a 
process democratic. 
Third, and despite the worries expressed so far, even micro deliberative 
techniques can have clear legitimation benefits: the NHS Plan vision has been 
accepted almost without question despite some confusion about implementation, 
while the Leicester case showed that a citizens' jury can cut through a bitter 
public debate to help managers, interest groups and citizens reach a legitimate 
public agreement. However, this is achieved in part by assigning active citizens 
to a role in which they are quarantined from the deliberations, the deliberation 
itself being done by "pure", uninvolved, lay persons, leaving the views of the 
89 
Chapter Three 
active relatively untouched by the exchange of reasons, something which 
contrasts starkly with the expectations of many deliberative theorists. The 
advantage is that it helps deal with the motivations problem to do with pre-
deliberative commitments; the disadvantage is that it might transform the 
character of activist engagement in public discourse less than theorists would 
think desirable. 
Finally, it seems we are presented with an instance of an old joke, for which I 
credit Irish comedian Dave Allen: 
Stranger: Tell me, how do I get to Dublin? 
Local: Well now, I wouldn't start from here. 
Just like the stranger, if one was trying to build a deliberative democracy, one 
might think twice about starting from here. There are serious difficulties to be 
overcome if one wants to establish a political regime based on free public 
reasoning between equals if one starts from a position in which the political 
agenda is dominated by enormously powerful private interests like the medical 
profession, the health care industry in all its guises, central government trying to 
exert its control over local government, and local government using the public to 
extract resources from the centre. Certainly it seems that one should not just 
recommend the general implementation of thousands of citizens' juries, although 
that might be an advance on the present phase of limited experimentation. If one 
relied solely on that method, one would simply perpetuate the situation of having 
citizens deliberate on small matters, constrained by forces over which they have 
no control - making the citizen "a creature of great means devoted to small 
ends", as Barber (1984, 22) bewailed. 
Instead, perhaps we should look to two other sources. First, the state can have a 
role in counteracting private power, and it should use that power to open up the 
deliberative agenda so that people get to discuss the big issues as well as the 
small, and in more than just micro deliberative processes but in macro 
deliberation throughout the public sphere. For instance, rather than concentrating 
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on letting people discuss which therapies should be funded in the Citizens' 
Council of the National Institute for Clinical Excellence, perhaps it would be 
more democratic, more useful, and motivationally easier, to organise a series of 
deliberative events on how best to control demand for health services so that 
money is not simply transferred from taxpayers into the hands of doctors, 
insurers and pharmaceutical companies, as the authorities in the US state of 
Oregon attempted in one well-known but often misunderstood case (Jacobs, 
Marmor, and Oberlander 1999). I will offer some further ideas on how to do that 
in chapter seven. Second, however, it may be that the liberal state as currently 
constituted is simply not up to the task alone- Dryzek (2000) certainly thinks 
so- in which case the role of activists like the disabled people's movement 
would be essential, challenging state and private action by means of "insurgent" 
activity in the public sphere, provoking protests like were seen in Leicester. I 
will have more to say on that in chapter five. 
That concludes the more abstract discussion of deliberative democracy and its 
legitimacy problems in theory and practice. It is now time for a change of focus. 
In the next three chapters, I dive more deeply into the case material to see how 
the theoretical concerns discussed so far are grappled with by real policy actors. 
I explore in detail the three answers which my interviewees gave, explicitly or 
implicitly, to the question, "What makes deliberative democracy legitimate?" 
Those answers were when insiders represent outsiders; when communication is 
open and public; and when the inputs and outputs of a deliberative process are 
rational. The first of those is the subject of the next chapter. 
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REPRESENTATION AND REPRESENTATIVENESS 
Making good representation claims is one of the most important ways of 
establishing the legitimacy of having one particular set of participants and not 
another at any given decision making moment (Judge 1999, 19). I ask two major 
questions in this chapter: what are the representation claims made in deliberative 
processes, and how do the different claims interact in a deliberative system? 
That is, how do different representation claims conflict with or complement each 
other? 
To address the representation issues, I have taken a similar approach to that of 
Saward (2003) who points out that before one can ask about the basis of a 
representative claim, one needs to ask who or what is being represented (also 
Becker 1986; Catt 1999, Ch.5). This is important because the way in which 
constituencies are constructed by representative claims can have significant 
political impacts. Take, for example, the way in which a limited construction of 
"the Swiss" as German-speaking mountain-dwellers is used to define and limit 
the rights of immigrants in Switzerland (Kobach 1997; Parkinson 2001); or 
supposedly universal ideals of rough-humoured "mateship" have been used in 
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Australia to advance conservative social and immigration policies (Johnson 
2003; Stokes 1997). I follow up this "who" question by asking what kinds of 
representation claims are made; and what normative strength each claim has, 
both from the perspective of my respondents and my own normative framework. 
I have outlined the key elements of my methodology in chapter one, and won't 
go over all that ground again here, but the bulk of the argument derives from an 
analysis of 108 mentions of representation issues in the 30 interview transcripts, 
identifying the answers that participants offered to each of the questions above, 
and the normative valuations they gave the various claims. Sometimes the 
answers were explicit, often they were not. Indeed, claims of representation 
were most often stated as fact without the grounds of that claim being made 
explicit or the statement being challenged which, as will be seen in later chapters, 
was the case with many such claims in the cases. It was not difficult for me to 
infer the grounds of the claim from other things the interviewee said, although 
there were six occasions where the nature of the claim was indeterminate. 
However, it is important to recognise that it was very rare for the interviewees 
themselves to discuss the grounds for representation claims or make them 
explicit in any way: only four interviewees directly commented on conflicts 
between different kinds of representation, and two of them were academics, 
familiar with the idea that there are different models. The remaining 26 wielded 
"representation" as an unproblematic category without drawing attention to the 
contradictions in the ways they themselves used the term. In what follows, 
therefore, the claims have been inferred by me from the context, unless 
specifically noted otherwise. 
A final note before proceeding: it needs to be kept in mind that for the most part 
I will be discussing the normative value which the interviewees themselves put 
on the various events and claims- where my own normative evaluations come 
into play, I will attempt to indicate that as far as possible. 
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Who is represented? 
In much of the democracy literature, the answer to this first question is 
considered unproblematic and is assumed to be "the people" or "citizens"; in the 
deliberative democracy literature, it is "all those affected", although precisely 
how political actors determine who is affected and who is not is left as an open 
question. I have already noted that these categories can be constructed in fairly 
limited ways. Phillips (1993, 26-7) makes the point that these kinds of 
exclusions are an ever-present part of group identity formation; when a group is 
identified as "the people", it is only done by reference, often hostile, to another 
group that can be labelled not the people. The people means "us", but only with 
reference to a "them". In such ways, "the people" can range from pretty much 
everyone on the planet, to those present in a given state, to citizens of that state, 
to a bare majority of participating voters of that state (Sartori 1987, 22), to 
"people like me" and so on. 
Ordinary people and excluded groups 
As emphasised in the previous chapter, in the UK's involvement initiatives the 
people being represented are usually defined in opposition to "the usual 
suspects", excluding people who belong to organised groups, or who have 
specialist training or socialisation in medicine by which they would "acquire new 
norms, assumptions, values and ways of behaving" (Hogg and Williamson 2001, 
3). What is left is the concept of "ordinariness", stressed by many interviewees 
using terms such as: 
"Joe Public" (NHS manager, Leeds) 
"the bloke in the street" Goumalist, Leicester) 
"ordinary members of the public" (City councillor, Leicester) 
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"we don't want the usual suspects, let's get some real people .... They were real, 
ordinary people" (CHC officer, Bradford) 
"we were trying to get a way of looking at the citizen without representative 
groups representing the citizen; you know, what could you do with 'the citizen' 
without some proxy for citizen" (NBS manager, Belfast) 
This emphasis on ordinary people was for a good reason when seen from the 
public manager's point of view: it was to ensure some kind of equity in the 
representation of different groups in decision making, to make sure that all kinds 
of voices get heard in the decision making process, a need identified well before 
this particular phase of deliberative experimentation began (Richardson and 
Jordan 1979, 173). Indeed, five interviewees26 stressed the importance of 
representing excluded groups, those who did not usually have a voice in public 
decision making. The same point was made in the press release calling for 
applications to join the Citizens Council the National Institute for Clinical 
Excellence (NICE), one of the citizen bodies proposed in The NHS Plan (see 
chapter three, page 74). While several interviewees expressed the view, two put 
it this way: 
I suppose part of our problem always as a public servant is that you don't know 
to whom you are talking, and what weight to put on anybody' s opinion, because 
anybody is only one of 650,000 bodies, and so always at the back of your 
mind ... you felt it was those who talked loud, the people who speak often, the 
doers in the community who get heard, and I suppose the citizens' jury in a 
sense was us trying to move away from that. (NBS manager, Belfast) 
"you've got the same people with the same axe to grind all the time, and they're 
not representative of the wider public, because inevitably you ask people who 
are representing {mental health interest group} Mind or cancer where they want 
to see resources and you know what the answer is going to be. 
(NHS manager, Leeds) 
26 They were two interest group executives, one NBS manager, one health academic and 
a parliamentary undersecretary in the Department of Health. 
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The Q&A (questions and answers) attached to the NICE press release said this: 
Because groups such as NHS employees, suppliers to the NHS, or patient 
groups already have a strong voice in making their opinions known in the 
decisions NICE makes, we would decline applications from anyone in those 
groups. In addition we would decline applications from those who work in 
lobbying organisations. We are anxious to give a voice to people who normally 
find it difficult to have their opinions heard. 
(NICE 2002). 
Thus, the concern is to express the deliberative principle of inclusiveness 
(Webler 1995). The claim is not that the bureaucracy is excluding the usual 
suspects - they already have channels of communication - but is creating new 
channels for those who normally lack them. 
There are three main problems with how the category gets used, one to do with 
the representation role that activists can play; one to do with a tendency to 
individualise the concept; and one to do with motivations. I will postpone 
discussion of the first issue as it has much to do with conflicts between types of 
representation which I deal with in the next section. The second problem is to do 
with the way in which the category "ordinary" is used to try to find 
representative individuals. Interviewees reported that this causes problems in 
many situations, but it was most starkly illustrated in the Belfast jury. On the 
final day, the jurors asked to hear from a "service user", which posed the 
organisers a problem: how were they to find a "typical" service user, when 
everyone had such different experiences of the health service, different needs, 
different levels of involvement, let alone persuade them to come to the jury on a 
day's notice? The solution was to bring in a woman who cared for a disabled 
child, but that person was herself a member of a carers' organisation and 
therefore, by definition, not "ordinary". Another interviewee, an NHS manager 
and academic, almost put his finger on the problem when speaking of trying to 
find lay representatives for Primary Care Trust boards: 
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... how do you actually ensure fair, adequate, representation? By its very nature 
it's almost impossible, isn't it? It's like somebody saying, 'How do you get a 
representative GP?' As somebody said to me the other day, 'If you've met one 
GP, you've met one GP!' It's very, very difficult to get somebody 
representative of that wide community. 
The important point is that it's not "very, very difficult", it's impossible. There 
is no such thing as a typical individual, because it is an empty concept (Hogg and 
Williamson 2001), resting on a fundamentally mistaken idea of 
representativeness in statistics: it is to claim that the middle point (whether 
mean, median or mode) of a distribution curve is "representative" of all the 
points on the curve, no matter how far away from the middle those points are, the 
skew of the curve or how wide the variance in the data. One can only have 
statistically representative samples, within certain confidence limits, not 
statistically representative individuals (Huff 1993, 11-3). So, if representing the 
population in this statistical sense is important - and I will explore whether it is 
or not later- it makes more sense for the organisers of deliberative events to 
select random samples of participants than it does for them to attempt to select 
representative, "m:dinary" individuals. 
The next problem is that even if we could simply distinguish ordinary people, it 
was commonly suggested that it may be difficult to motivate them to participate. 
Perceptions of efficacy come into this, but just as important for interviewees was 
the concern that deliberation, like socialism for Oscar Wilde, would take up too 
many evenings: 
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Plan} is great in theory, but where are all these people who are going to be the 
foot soldiers representing patients? Life is busy these days: where there are 
couples, both people are working. I know myself from my own political 
experience ... people don't want to go to meetings in the evening. It's like, ''I'm 
busy, I've done my work for the day, what about me?" 
(Interest group officer, London) 
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Given the problem of time, four interviewees speculated that the new "lay" 
representatives on the various health boards were more than likely to be the same 
individuals who had served on the CHCs, the same individuals criticised by the 
bureaucracy as being "unrepresentative" because they were generally retired, 
upper-middle class, white and male. While one-off deliberative events might 
attempt to solve this by randomly selecting participants, as deliberative poll and 
citizens' jury organisers do, they would not escape similar problems if such 
methods became generally used: legal academics are becoming increasingly 
concerned about the demographic skew of legal juries towards those who have 
the time to participate (Abramson 1994, 143). A one-off event has novelty value, 
and may attract all sorts of participants; if it is one among thousands, novelty is a 
much less compelling motivation. 
Disability activists have identified another problem with the view that public 
servants are simply "adding channels" for the otherwise-excluded. As the 
bureaucracy has moved away from a reliance on interest groups and towards 
direct research and engagement with the public, some have felt that it's not so 
much a matter of creating additional channels but of changing channels, closing 
down the old ones while installing the new. This could lead to the exclusion of 
the disabled voice entirely because the very nature of disability tends to mean 
disabled people are only given voice through their own networks (Beresford and 
Campbel11994, 321). This is beyond the complaint by activists in the disability 
movement that citizens' juries and other deliberative techniques are a "top-
down" means by which the "abled society", especially the health bureaucracy, 
engages with disabled people on abled people's terms, rather than a grass-roots 
approach which allows disabled people to set the terms, set the agenda, develop 
and implement solutions (Health academic, Birmingham). 
This applies to more groups than just the disabled: the Leicester CHC chief 
officer pointed out the importance of representing the socially excluded, 
especially the working poor. Thus he placed more value on the social research 
commissioned by the CHC from De Montfort University which targeted those 
groups (Wilcox 2000, 17). One can argue with his valuation: the jury selection 
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process also tried to balance the jury on the basis of disability, employment, 
income and housing tenure and, from a new public manager's point of view, was 
more successful at doing so since the CHC's research only talked to interest 
groups for the excluded, not the excluded themselves. However, the general 
point still stands: an important legitimating factor for some interviewees was the 
degree to which a process included those whose voices are not normally heard. 
An alternative approach, mentioned by two interviewees and used in tandem with 
random selection by the developers of The NHS Plan, was not to represent 
people so much as views. This resonates with the more discursive approach to 
legitimacy in deliberation (Dryzek 2001), in which the important thing is not to 
make sure that all individuals are represented, but to make sure that all the points 
of view surrounding a particular issue are represented and get the chance to 
engage with each other in the deliberative moment. However, this was very 
much a minority response, and since the issues it raises are closely tied in with 
problems of how representatives are selected, I will postpone further discussion 
of this until the next section. 
Localities 
One other important answer was given to the question, "Who is represented?", 
and that was localities. In government documents and in the interviews 
surrounding the two citizens' jury cases, the people whose involvement was 
being sought were local people, local communities. Again, this ties in well with 
the Third Way emphasis on "strengthening communities" (Blair 1998). One 
general advantage of an emphasis on locality is that it allows a community to 
have on-going involvement in all sorts of initiatives which affect them (Health 
academic, Birmingham). Of course, randomly selected citizens would not 
individually have an ongoing involvement, and much would rest on how one 
defined "community" (Kukathas 1996). The local committee model, trailed in 
the West Midlands town of Walsall and taken up by the UK government for use 
by former coal mining communities (ODPM 1999), addresses the challenge by 
having 100 neighbouring households elect a representative to a committee to 
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decide on local development budget allocation and monitor council performance, 
a model that has been replicated in the Health Action Zone initiative.Z7 
Locality was used in an interesting way by citizens' jury managers: they tended 
to de-emphasise external factors and emphasise the locality not just of the 
participants but of the process itself, even to the extent of changing its name- it 
was called a "citizens' panel" in Leicester to create a sense of local ownership 
(Journalist and CHC officer). Speaking of a Scottish jury run for a local council 
on public health issues, one jury manager said, "I got the feeling they didn't 
much like us coming up from England and doing this process." Equally, in 
Belfast the organisers went to much effort to stress the originality of the concept 
in Northern Ireland and the involvement of a local think-tank, Democratic 
Dialogue, which only had a secondary role to that of the London-based IPPR-
the latter was almost invisible in documents and media coverage, and 
deliberately so. This was part of an effort to legitimate not only the process with 
the local public, but also to legitimate the commissioning agencies with central 
government, particularly in the face of pressure on local agencies to be more 
responsive to their constituents (DETR 1998). But it also attracted the attention 
of local media- a process that appeared to be "home grown" held more interest 
than the application of something designed in Germany or the United States-
which is important if one is trying to build communicative links between 
participants and non-participants, as discussed in the next chapter. 
Given the new public management concern with controlling local agencies, and 
the Blair government's concern with universal benchmarks and centralised 
performance measurement, one might think that this perspective is reversed for 
those in central organisations: that there would be a suspicion of locality and a 
positive valuation of people or processes which emphasised a national 
perspective, representing all the people of the United Kingdom (or whatever the 
relevant unit is for a given policy moment). However, suspicion of locality was 
27 For details on Health Action Zones, see http://www.haznet.org.uk/. For the Walsall 
initiative, see http://www.walsall.gov.uk!LocalCommittee/Dhinform.asp, both accessed 
25 September 2002. 
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not obvious in my cases. Instead, there is a view that local issues are best dealt 
with by local people, and that national issues require national perspectives; but 
that the latter are generated by creating debate between lots of different local 
voices so that a genuinely "national" perspective emerges. The key to this is 
inclusion of a range of people with different perspectives. So, while the 
deliberative poll presenter stressed the idea that participants represented "the 
whole of Britain" and "the country at large" (Channel 4 1998, Episode One, 
20:00:30), the role of those people was to contribute their different perspectives 
(Fishkin 1997, 40-1) so that a national view could emerge from the debate. In 
the NHS Plan process, the organiser and participants stressed the importance of 
including a range of locality and interest-based perspectives in order to generate 
a national consensus (NHS managers, Leeds and London). 
The major disadvantage of the emphasis on locality, however, is that it 
exacerbates the agenda setting problem, unduly restricting the scope of 
democratic deliberation to issues which are decidable at the local level. While I 
cannot make any firm claims on this point based on my case material, I would be 
willing to bet that where local people decided to operate in ways which diverged 
significantly from central standards, they would quickly be brought back into 
line. 
So, the major answers to "who is represented" are ordinary people and localities. 
In terms of legitimacy, ordinariness is valued for reasons of inclusion, giving 
access to decision making to excluded groups; but it is a category without much 
content which causes problems when organisers try to find "representative 
individuals" and when they definitionally exclude the active; it may also cause 
problems for time-poor citizens. Locality has legitimacy advantages in that it 
gives local people the chance to develop on-going rather than one-off 
relationships with decision makers, and gives them a sense of ownership of the 
process; its downside is that it can restrict the scope of deliberations to local 
issues only. 
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Types of representation 
Having explored some issues to do with who is represented, we now need to 
consider how they are represented, exploring issues of type, composition and 
role. Before doing so, it is worth reiterating where we got to with the theoretical 
discussion in chapter two. There I argued that good representation varies 
according to the purpose of the deliberative body: if it is research and opinion 
formation, then descriptive representation seems particularly important; if 
decision making, then principal-agent bonds are also required, along with 
requirements that representatives communicate back and forth with each other 
and their principals. When considering legitimacy, however, we are 
fundamentally asking questions about decision making, not opinion formation-
legitimacy is the grounds for obedience to decisions, not the grounds for agreeing 
with a point of view. Therefore, I place more normative weight on the 
accountability and authorisation requirements than the descriptive ones, without 
discounting the value of the latter for bringing a range of voices into a particular 
decision making moment. 
How do ideas about representation appear in the cases? To answer this, I look at 
the means by which a representative deliberative body is composed, connecting 
the method with one or more of the types of representation discussion above, and 
highlighting the advantages and disadvantages of the various processes. The 
major methods are random selection, self-selection and election. 
Random selection: mirroring the population 
Among micro deliberative techniques, random selection is by far the dominant 
means of choosing participants (Ryfe 2002). It was the way lay participants were 
chosen for both the citizens' juries, the deliberative poll, and for one of the 
consultation exercises in the NHS Plan process. 
One of the virtues of random selection, also known as lottery, is fairness 
(Goodwin 1992): given the democratic value placed on the political equality of 
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all citizens, it is a just means of choosing which citizens will rule and which will 
be ruled at any one moment because no-one with an interest in the outcome can 
control the result. Random selection has a venerable history: it was one of the 
means by which the Athenians selected many office holders, the Florentines and 
Venetians selected magistrates, which early republicans recommended as an 
essential element of good government (Manin 1997), and which recent 
participatory democrats including feminist groups and workers' co-operatives 
have used to apportion roles (Catt 1999, ch3). Indeed, lottery was regarded as 
the defining feature of democracy by Aristotle, with election characteristic of 
oligarchy and aristocracy (Aristotle 1997, VI, 9, 1294b6). Manin (1997, 41) 
argues that this was because alternating rulership and obedience, facilitated by 
lot, was seen as essential to the development of good citizens by giving everyone 
lessons in both leadership and obedience; because it helped avoid the undue 
concentration of power in professionalised political classes encouraged by 
elections; and because it protected equal rights to speak in assemblies. 
The other major virtue of random selection in the literature, and the one that 
receives more modem attention, is descriptive accuracy. For example, Carson 
and Martin (1999) criticise existing representative and bureaucratic institutions 
for being domin~ted by a limited set of powerful interests who then manipulate 
the public policy process and institutional arrangements for private ends. 
Random selection is said to solve these problems by comprising a decision 
making body of a variety of interests. The same point is made by Bumheim 
(1985, 195, nlO), for whom the point of randomness in his proposed "demarchy" 
is to create a body "that is sensitive to the interests of those affected". From a 
deliberative point of view, therefore, randomness seems to encourage 
inclusiveness, and thus seems a promising way of making up an assembly. This 
is beyond the other advantage that random selection is a relatively cheap way of 
choosing representatives (Broome 1984, 41-2). 
It should be noted, however, that what some modem advocates are talking about 
is not strictly random. Rather, it is random stratified sampling, or quota 
sampling, in which those selecting the sample have predetermined quotas of 
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certain characteristics to fill, proportional to their observed frequency in the 
population. This is quite a different concern from that of the Greeks: they aimed 
to give all citizens, regardless of their identity, an equal chance of exercising 
power and "representation" in the modem sense was not the issue. For modem 
advocates, however, two new considerations arise. First, identity is important, 
following the calls for a politics of presence (Phillips 1995), and so the 
descriptive characteristics of the people in the forum matter in ways they once 
did not. Second, the research paradigm (chapter three, page 67) dominates to the 
extent that randomly-selected bodies are used to research what the people think, 
or would think given the time and information (Park, Jowell, and McPherson 
1998); given that, it is important that the membership of the forum is 
descriptively representative of the population in order to give results which 
"accurately" describe what the rest of the population thinks (Carson and Martin 
1999, 26). A pure random sample can be descriptively representative if large 
enough, but a stratified sample can be much smaller, because it does not leave 
the selection of key characteristics to chance. The up-side is that relatively small 
groups can be said to be statistically representative of a large population on the 
criteria chosen; the down-side is that such small groups are representative only 
on those criteria leaving the risk of missing important differences which have not 
been selected for. 28 This concern with stratification has interesting consequences 
for the legitimacy of deliberative bodies, as I shall show shortly. 
Returning to the cases, both the fairness and rationality benefits were mentioned 
by those interviewees who noted random selection. One of the journalists 
covering the Leicester debate stressed the incompleteness of perspectives coming 
from well-organised interest groups and the "suits"- that is, the health authority 
managers- by implication hailing the jury's random selection for generating a 
more complete view of what should be done: 
28 Thanks to Jeff Wood ofthe Statistical Consulting Unit at the Australian National 
University, and to Kay Lipson, Swinburne University of Technology, for their assistance 
with the sampling issues and calculations in this section. 
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... because everyone's got an opinion based on their own experience, and some 
people are more outspoken than others, so it was felt that perhaps either the 
charities had a bigger voice than they should have got compared to other people, 
for example kidney patients. . . . So what we need {is} to get a group of people 
together who represent the whole of Leicestershire as best we can, in geography 
and age and class and everything else, and see what they think, and take it from 
what they think. I think everyone felt that meant there needs to be somebody 
else making the decision other than the suits. 
An interest group leader in Leicester linked randomness with rationality. He 
suggested that randomly selected "ordinary" people did not have specific 
interests which clouded their judgement about the benefits of alternative 
proposals. The implication was that they were able to weigh arguments free of 
emotional attachments to specific outcomes, and thus look at the information 
they were given in a rational manner. Thus it seems randomness can have a 
circuit-breaker role, helping move debates on when politics as usual, conducted 
between competing interests and networks, has broken down. 
The US originators of citizens' juries and deliberative polls make much of 
representativeness based on random selection. For example, the Jefferson Center 
(1998, 9) claims that "a random and scientific method is a critical step towards 
creating a jury that truly reflects the public as a whole", although those who have 
taken up the method in Britain have been careful to tone down the claim that a 
sample of 16 people can be "truly" representative in this way (Lenaghan 1999, 
54-5). Participants in a deliberative poll are said to be a "microcosm" of the 
nation, the word being repeated like a mantra by the poll presenter and in the 
various reports and briefing documents produced before and after the event 
(Channel4 1998; Park, Jowell, and McPherson 1998)- indeed, the ability of a 
deliberative poll to gather together a random sample of people in one place is an 
aspect many participants remark on, in words like this: "I've selected thousands 
of national random samples, but I've never seen one- no one has" (Fishkin 
1997, 163). The importance of this was further stressed to the field staff who 
recruited participants: 
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In order for the event to be successful, it is important that the people who tum 
up can be seen as representative of the British population. We appreciate that 
certain groups of the population will be less likely to agree to take part than 
others (for example, the very elderly) but we must try as far as possible to get a 
balanced sample of participants. Therefore, when necessary, stress that it is 
important that we represent everyone so that we can get a true cross-section -
the old as well as the young, the less well-educated as well as the well-educated, 
those who know little about the subject as well as those who know a great deal. 
(SCPR 1998, 8) 
This is clearly representation in the descriptive sense. The groups are selected as 
random stratified samples, either by telephone or by door knocking, filling 
specific quotas from national census data on the basis of age, gender and 
geographic location. Further, the claim is made that the groups so selected are 
representative of wider opinions, not just physical characteristics: according to 
deliberative poll developer Fishkin (1997, 205-6), there were no significant 
attitudinal or demographic differences between those 300 people who 
participated in the first UK poll and the 869 people who responded to the initial 
survey. That may not be quite true, however: if there were any distortions in the 
sample they would have occurred at the stage before the one Fishkin uses as his 
baseline; that is, those unwilling to participate even in the initial survey may be 
in some important way different from those who did participate. 
The importance of this descriptive, statistical representativeness was expressed 
by Fishkin in an interview in the NHS poll broadcast: 
They are in effect a microcosm, not only of the nation's attitudes, but of the 
nation's health vulnerabilities: its future cancer victims, its future heart attacks, 
its future diabetics. And so to make hard choices, in effect they have to choose 
among themselves, face to face. 
(Channel4 1998, Episode 3, 19:20:40) 
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The idea is that people must confront uncomfortable facts, and have their views 
challenged because they are sitting with and engaging with those who have 
different experiences, sometimes experiences of oppression or deprivation. 
There are several remarks to be made about representation in a deliberative poll, 
and about random selection more generally. First, it appears that Fishkin 
overstates claims to statistical representativeness. Even if we accept that, with 
appropriate stratification techniques, a sample of 300 can represent the British 
population on their stated criteria of locality, age, gender, working status and 
social class- and that is by no means assured29 - those 300 never actually get 
to deliberate together: the deliberative poll process only brings the entire sample 
together during the plenary sessions, sessions which are in a question-and-answer 
format rather than a mutual giving, weighing, and acceptance I rejection of 
reasons. The participants only get close to the deliberative ideal in their small 
groups, but these groups number just 15 to 20 people. With a group of 20 it is 
impossible that all the relevant differences between people will be present, and 
so unlikely that participants will confront anything other than the most dramatic, 
dominant cleavages in the personal, face-to-face way Fishkin envisages. That is 
beyond the problem that the small groups' deliberative quality is moderate at 
best: they spend only four hours in those groups, of which at least one hour is 
spent on settling in, introductions, setting ground rules and choosing questions to 
ask in the plenaries (Gibson and Miskin 2002). This is not enough time to go 
29 To get to the 95% confidence level one would need a sample of 399 people just to 
accurately "represent" the observed gender proportions in the population, let alone all 
the other factors. The details of the NHS poll's stratification are as follows. The 
localities were broken down into 50 clusters of postcodes used for the British Social 
Attitudes survey, also run by SCPR, managers of the deliberative poll. There were four 
age categories: 18-29; 30-44; 45-64 and 65+. The five working status categories were 
working full-time or part-time; unemployed; retired; looking after home I family; and 
other. The five social class categories were based on the standards used in British 
statistics, namely professional I managerial (classes A and B); junior manager I other 
non-manual (class Cl); skilled manual (class C2); Semi- or unskilled manual I 
unemployed I dependant on state (classes D and E); and not known I can't classify. 
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through all the stages of breaking down barriers, expressing emotions freely and 
searching for mutual understanding that occurs in longer, more intensive 
processes like a citizens' jury (Jury manager, London). 
The second remark is about a problem created by selecting samples which are 
stratified proportionally to the presence of relevant characteristics in the wider 
population. As I have already argued, if a body is to have any moral force for 
winners and losers alike it is more appropriate to represent relevant 
characteristics equally: equal numbers from different classes, regions, 
educational backgrounds and so forth. If one's sample is proportional, there will 
only be a few people with particular minority characteristics to go around: not 
every group will have a black member, not every group will have someone from 
an isolated rural community, not every group will have a young mother on 
welfare. Without direct observation of the groups, I am unable to say how this 
affected the NHS poll: the broadcasts included only 9 minutes 41 seconds of 
small group activity in 2 hours 45 minutes of broadcast, almost all of which 
featured single speakers relating stories without much engagement from other 
participants. However, the potential is clearly there for any process which relies 
on such "mirror" representation: they may exclude minority perspectives from 
elements of the debate entirely, as was the case with the Belfast jury which 
included no non-Europeans because they make up only 1% of the Northern 
Ireland population (Barnes 1999, 63); and that, where a minority is given a 
presence that is less than the effective threshold, those perspectives are not heard 
or taken seriously. Being present is not enough; those voices also need to be 
heard, recognised, and effective. 
However, even if it were possible to create a body with effective quotas, it is not 
at all clear that such purely descriptive representation is desirable because of its 
inherent essentialist problems. By selecting participants by quotas (as opposed to 
a more purely random system), the selectors set an expectation that, for example, 
the women will "represent" the views and experiences of all other women, 
without having had any contact let alone received any instructions or mandate 
from those other women. My evidence on this is limited, but two citizens' jury 
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managers noted that people who are chosen to represent certain sectors of society 
in such ways strongly resist attempts to label them "representatives", while an 
indigenous woman participant in the Australian deliberative poll I attended made 
a point of specifying that nothing she was about to say could be taken as 
applying to or binding other indigenous women. She was there to present her 
perspective, no-one else's. 
What seems to be at stake here is some slippage between "representativeness" in 
a statistical or descriptive sense and "representation" in the principal-agent sense. 
Lotteries produce representativeness but not representation, and so lack a 
fundamental legitimating element, but it is a major criticism in the literature 
(Manin 1997), and one raised by four of my interviewees, that decision makers 
will nonetheless feel pressure to act on the recommendations of such bodies, 
even though their participants have no direct bonds of accountability to non-
participants who are still subject to their decisions. The concern is that without 
the discipline such bonds provide, representatives will make unjust, inefficient, 
or otherwise irrational decisions - witness the worries expressed by two 
members of the Belfast steering committee that jurors would make financially 
irresponsible recommendations for which they were unaccountable. 
However, the lack of formal controls did not seem to have the dire consequences 
predicted: 
... people were actually quite astounded at the recommendations and how 
sensible they were, that they weren't outrageous. 
Jury commissioner, Belfast (original emphasis) 
A consultant who had run several juries reported that this is common experience, 
that jurors generally do feel a sense of responsibility to the wider public interest, 
take that responsibility seriously, and so act as if they were being held to account 
(Jury manager, London). This raises an important potential divergence from 
theory: if deliberators feel accountable to others thanks to other mechanisms, 
then perhaps my insistence so far on principal-agent bonds is overstated. I am 
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speculating now, as I have no direct evidence on this, not having been able to 
interview lay participants; but I wonder if the simple fact of being placed in a 
position where one's decision will matter means that one takes one's role more 
seriously, an argument Bumheim (1985, 167-8) runs, although he too does so 
without direct empirical support. This effect would be enhanced to the degree 
that the deliberative event is subject to public scrutiny by the media, which I take 
up in the next chapter. It is certainly consistent with Goodin's (2000) idea that 
participants in any democratic process imagine what it is like to be in others' 
shoes, and what impacts their decisions will have on those others, which in tum 
generates some limited democratisation of their internal reasoning processes. As 
Goodin himself argues, however, such processes cannot be a complete 
replacement for more "external", public deliberation and decision making 
because of how accountability appears to the outsiders themselves. Legitimacy 
still depends, in the final analysis, on a public act of consent, while confronting 
difference face-to-face may still be necessary before people can make the 
"imaginative leap" needed to fully take another's interests and point of view into 
account. Therefore I still insist on either direct public involvement or directly 
accountable representatives when it comes to decision making; I am less 
dogmatic when it comes to informing those decision making processes. 
Unlike Bumhein, other modem partisans of processes which rely on randomness, 
such as Lenaghan (1999, 50) and Fishkin (1997, 162), accept the 
"unaccountable" criticism and suggest that randomly selected representative 
groups should only have the power to make recommendations, not decisions; that 
is, they should be restricted to opinion formation as in Habermas's model 
(Habermas 1996, Ch.7). Fishkin agrees, although in his typically enthusiastic 
style he does seem to be suggesting something more binding: 
A deliberative poll is not meant to describe or predict public opinion. Rather it 
prescribes. It has a recommending force: these are the conclusions people 
would come to, were they better informed on the issues and had the opportunity 
and motivation to examine those issues seriously. It allows a microcosm of the 
country to make recommendations to us all after it has had the chance to think 
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through the issues. If such a poll were broadcast before an election or a 
referendum, it could dramatically affect the outcome. 
(Fishkin 1997, 162) 
As I suggested in chapter two, this is fine if there are many other deliberative 
processes which are decisive and into which randomly selected bodies feed 
information, but if this is the only purpose to which deliberative principles are 
put, then deliberation has not deepened democracy very much. 
The final problem of "representativeness" is one that is peculiar to deliberative 
democratic ideals. It is what I call the Grandview problem, from a story related 
by Fishkin (1997, 1-7) about the 1947 movie Magic Town. In a nutshell, the 
Grandview problem is that deliberation destroys the representativeness of 
descriptive representatives. As I noted earlier, deliberative poll and citizens' jury 
members are chosen to be representative not just of physical characteristics but 
of the attitudes, beliefs and values of the population too; but as they deliberate, 
those facts and values are challenged and, to the extent they are found wanting, 
undergo transformation in the face of more persuasive arguments. Thus, if the 
deliberative moment is working as it should, by the end of the event the members 
are no longer representative of the attitudes, beliefs and values of the population. 
Fishkin himself suggests this is a likely outcome of deliberation when he 
discusses the effect that becoming the polling microcosm of the whole nation had 
on the town of Grandview: 
With this new sense of responsibility, and their heightened interest in the issues, 
the townspeople's views soon diverge from those ofthe rest of the country. The 
climax comes when the town announces the result that 79 percent of them would 
be willing to "vote for a woman for president"! This is taken as such a 
preposterous departure from conventional opinion that they become a source of 
national ridicule. 
(Fishkin 1997, 1-2) 
However, Fishkin does not draw the lesson from his own example. The moment 
that a group's opinions start to depart from the distribution found in the general 
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population, they cease to be "representative" in a descriptive sense on anything 
other than physical characteristics. Because the deliberative poll is 
representative in no other sense (authorisation or accountability) it loses even its 
weaker, descriptive legitimating element between the first and second survey, 
and so it is not clear, from Fishkin's own account, what "recommending force" a 
deliberative poll retains. This is not just a problem for deliberative polls: it is a 
problem for citizens juries too, as Smith and Wales (1999, 300) point out; for 
citizens' panels (Pretty, Hine, and Deighton 1999), as a student in a public policy 
class once pointed out to me; for any process which transforms the preferences of 
the citizens on the inside, but not those on the outside. 
It is a problem which did not escape the notice of interviewees. A health policy 
academic who was a panellist on the NHS poll directly challenged Fishkin's 
"recommending force" claim by reference to the usefulness of deliberative events 
as a guide for policy makers: 
Q: Do you think these processes have a place in policy making? 
A: Nope! I don't. Because they're utterly unrepresentative. I mean, it is useful 
for me as an educator and as a general concerned citizen to know that if a cross-
section of the general public is given a lot of information about a topic they 
will ... respond to the information and deal with the topic in a much more 
sensible and well-informed way .... When policy makers make policy, though, 
they are dealing with the public who is not in this highly artificial jury-type 
situation. And actually the citizens' jury responses might be totally misleading 
as far as the response of the general public are concerned when the policy maker 
is trying to convince them of the merits of the policy. 
As well as the lack of correspondence between deliberators and non-deliberators, 
some interviewees were concerned about the effects of deliberation on the 
representativeness of the jurors themselves. One of the Belfast jury 
commissioners used some of the jurors as a reference group well after the event, 
but worried about their usefulness in these terms: 
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... this is a group of informed people now, these are not recruited off the street 
anymore, these are people who had this concentrated time together and who 
learned the structure of health and social services. So you can't regard them as 
ordinary people, you have to accept that they're now educated, informed 
individuals ... 
Another jury manager reported that in a series run near Brighton a woman who 
had been on the first jury was selected again in the pool for the second: 
... you're looking for a fresh public voice, and you wonder, having gone 
through the jury process, are you ending up with someone who's essentially like 
an activist, although you could say that the whole point of the jury is to create a 
nation full of activists, if you like. 
In other words, some managers worried that deliberation transforms the 
"ordinary" person into a "usual suspect", something which was clearly 
problematic, concerned as they were with the attempt to find some mythical 
ordinary person, unsullied by knowledge or interests: 
... the definition {of ordinariness} can seem to imply that as lay people become 
more knowledgeable and develop more understanding of the professions, health 
services and clinical issues, they lose their amateur status and, thus, their value. 
Like the wise fool of mythology lay people's innocence and naivete are 
considered useful by professionals, managers and health service commentators. 
Knowledgeable individuals are considered unrepresentative of other lay people. 
In particular, activist members of voluntary lay groups are liable to be regarded 
as unrepresentative (atypical) and, therefore, unable to represent (voice) the 
views of their peers. 
(Hogg and Williamson 2001, 4) 
This may well be an unfounded fear- there is no reason to connect being 
"informed" with the bias which is thought to come with membership in a 
particular interest group, no reason to think that informed jurors will behave 
anything like activists. However, there is an alternative normative standpoint 
which positively values activism and involvement, which would suggest that 
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even the fear of interests is over-stated, and it is to this kind of activist 
representation that I tum next. 
Before I do so, let me briefly sum up the main points about random selection 
identified so far. Pure random selection seems to have legitimacy benefits in 
terms of promoting fair access to decision making positions, and in terms of 
promoting rationality: it curtails the ability of the powerful to influence the 
selection of the deliberators and thus influence the arguments which come up, 
diminishing the chances that they can protect poor arguments from scrutiny. 
However, modem deliberative designs are not purely random: thanks to the 
impact of the politics of presence and research imperatives, deliberative moments 
have been stratified to ensure the inclusion of various groups. Again, from a 
legitimacy point of view, this inclusion is a positive thing if different voices are 
represented equally- and equal representation may mean that only some kinds 
of people are invited into particular deliberative events if others have alternative 
channels of communication. However, if there are no other channels, or if an 
important group is numerically small, or simply is not captured by the categories 
used by those who conduct the sampling, then important voices may be left out 
or be ineffective in processes which rely on randomness. In addition, randomly 
chosen participants resist the implied essentialism that comes with stratification: 
they have no formal bonds with any principals, so any decisions they make 
cannot bind non-participants, and they resist any implication that their 
recommendations "represent" what others would have said. That is to say 
nothing of the Grandview problem, which is that participants are not 
"representative" post-deliberation, and so offer no guide as to how arguments 
from decision makers will be received by the wider population, and no strong 
reason for those non-participants to go along with the recommendations. On top 
of all that, face-to-face deliberation tends to happen in small groups which 
cannot be strictly representative in this statistical sense. That may have an 
unintended benefit: the designers of small groups like citizens' juries, by not 
being able to deliver strict proportionality, may in fact improve equality, and thus 
the deliberative quality, of their events. 
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All this is additional to the major problem that randomly selected participants 
have no direct bonds of accountability to non-participants, and so their 
agreements should not be binding. While the fears about "unaccountable", 
randomly-selected participants were not borne out in the cases I looked at -
such people did feel a sense of responsibility to others, despite the lack of formal 
electoral sanctions - nonetheless, principal-agent links are essential when it 
comes to legitimate decision making. This is important because the designers of 
some deliberative processes have got a little hung up on representativeness, 
confusing it with representation, and making claims about the former which only 
apply to the latter. The real value of random selection lies elsewhere: not in 
representation per se, but in its ability to promote fairness, inclusiveness, and 
political equality. In order to do that, quotas must be used with caution to avoid 
exclusion based on the use of over-broad categories, and must be filled equally, 
or at least to some threshold level. 
Self-selection: activists representing the inactive 
The next idea to explore is the representation of inactive citizens by the active. 
At one level this too involves a kind of descriptive representation, in which 
activists claim shared experience, shared interests, and sometimes shared 
physical characteristics as the basis of their representation claims, although these 
claims must surely be weak for the essentialism reasons already discussed. 
Sometimes there can be direct principal-agent linkages through some form of 
democracy within activist groups, but rarely do activists hold positions in 
organisations thanks to an election conducted among all the constituents they 
claim to represent. Generally they are the self-selected, and for public managers 
this makes a great deal of difference in their normative scheme: indeed, it is 
perceptions of the unrepresentativeness of the self-selected that has driven public 
managers to embrace the possibilities offered by stratified random selection. 
The idea that activists have a role in democracy to represent, and on occasion 
mobilise, inactive citizens is associated most obviously with pluralism (Dahl 
1961; 1967; Truman 1955). Pluralists saw activism, particularly through forming 
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voluntary associations, as a means by which citizens secured various rights from 
the state (Dahl1982, 10), and that those who faced problems would form a group 
to seek its redress (Baumgartner and Leech 1998, 83-7). While many pluralists 
were actually more sceptical of this optimistic vision than some critics have 
alleged (Jordan 1993), it was pretty much destroyed by Olson's (1965) exposure 
of the collective action problems involved; studies which revealed low actual 
participation rates in interest groups (Verba and Nie 1972); and the accusations 
of bias and "capture" of public services for private gain emerging from the 
neoliberal tradition, noted in chapter three, which greatly thinned the ranks of 
"legitimised" interest groups (Kogan and Bowden 1975). 
The pluralist view assumed a passive state which presented few barriers to 
citizen engagement; since then, difference democrats have highlighted the range 
of barriers that face a variety of groups attempting to engage with the state 
(Dryzek 2000, 89-90). Dryzek suggests that interest groups may have a role in 
challenging the status quo, breaking down the barriers. Within that tradition, the 
relationship of groups to inactive citizens has been discussed most clearly by 
Christiano (1996) and Mansbridge (1992) who defend interest groups in very 
similar terms to Truman but stress what I call a deliberative facilitation role. 
Given the need to "devote time, resources and energy to acquire knowledge" 
(Christiano 1996, 257), and given interest groups' ability to marshal such 
resources, they emphasise the role groups can have in providing the entire 
deliberative system with information that would not otherwise be available, 
facilitating debate at all levels of the public sphere, including between other 
interest groups, between citizens, and within the state- although Christiano 
puts this forward as a normative ideal, while Mansbridge offers it as a description 
as well. Thus, interest groups need not have direct principal-agent links with the 
relatively inactive citizenry to have a legitimate role in a deliberative democracy: 
they are the essential facilitators who do have the time, resources and expertise to 
facilitate communication throughout the macro deliberative system. 
One can find this kind of facilitation happening most clearly in the Leicester 
debate. While the announcement of the imminent reconfiguration was the 
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triggering event, it was attentive interest groups like Heart Link and Bosom 
Buddies who acted to focus a vague and general public fear of NHS service 
degradation into a specific and actionable fear. It was they who set up the 
petition and solicited signatures, went to the media and encouraged letters to the 
editor, mobilised local councillors and MPs and lobbied the CHC; who provoked 
the dispersal of a discussion which, until then, had been conducted by a much 
smaller group of specialists and managers. One can also find it in the NHS Plan 
case, in which the CHCs' national body, the Association of Community Health 
Councils of England and Wales (ACHCEW), provoked a wider debate on the 
future of patient involvement in the NHS in response to the Plan's proposals to 
abolish the councils, a case I will take up in more detail in the next chapter. At 
the micro level, interest group officers also acted as witnesses and steering group 
members for both citizens' juries, providing information to the jurors and to the 
organisers right from the agenda setting stage. 
Deliberative facilitation of this kind is not necessarily about representation: 
Christiano and Mansbridge advance it for reasons of efficiency and effectiveness; 
they do not make claims about direct principal-agent linkages or even descriptive 
representativeness between the active and inactive. However, interest groups in 
my cases did not confine themselves in this way: they linked facilitation and 
representation claims. Specifically, they made a trustee type of claim: 
facilitation was talked about in terms of "championing" those who could not 
speak for themselves. Several interest group representatives argued that people 
from excluded groups were at a power disadvantage to others in society, and so 
needed "professional" representatives in interest groups with greater power to 
make their case for them. One took this a step further and stressed that their 
knowledge and expertise made them both more effective advocates and more 
effective at holding the powerful to account (March and Olsen 1995, 152): 
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sidelined {by a} sharp manager who can just wipe the floor with {them}. 
They're very dedicated people, but to keep up with the changes in health: 
{even} I nod and make out I know sometimes when I haven't a clue what 
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they're on about. It needs to be more professional, and then you can really hold 
these people to account. 
CHC chief officer 
While it is too early to assess this view of lay people's capabilities in the post-
Plan NHS context, it does receive some support in other domains. Farrell and 
Jones (2000, 256) report that many parents on school boards "feel they lack the 
expertise and experience to challenge professional expertise", while others 
struggle with workload. As a result they are marginalised by head teachers and 
board chairs. Foley and Martin (2000, 486) report similar results in the case of 
local development initiatives. However, such results may well be process-
specific: my interviewees reported significant improvements in citizens' jury 
participants' sense of efficacy and willingness to get involved in future collective 
decision making, whether deliberative or not. Every jury manager I spoke to had 
anecdotes about people being transformed from passive shut-ins into active 
citizens by participation in the jury, and of people becoming much more willing 
to engage in other political and civic activities beyond the jury itself. This has 
clear resonance with earlier studies on the effects of workplace participation on 
political efficacy (see Pateman 1970, ch.3). 
However, even micro deliberative processes emphasise facilitation in another 
way: by the use of professional moderators to guide small group discussions. 
Moderators help those with low efficacy gain both the confidence and space in 
which to speak (Carson and Martin 1999, 55; Dryzek 1987). From the 
discussion of motivations in chapter two, one would expect that the decisiveness 
of the event would have an impact as well: a well-moderated research exercise 
on an issue with low salience is likely to have less effect on efficacy than a well-
moderated decision making exercise on an important public issue. Nonetheless, 
it may be that the concern about lay people being marginalised is only valid in 
non-deliberative events without skilled moderators; when moderators are 
involved, anecdotal evidence suggests that the concerns are less well founded. It 
seems, therefore, that champions are useful, with interest groups performing the 
119 
Chapter Four 
champion role in macro deliberative settings, moderators performing it in micro 
deliberations. 
Interestingly, exactly the same "champion" claims are made by, and on behalf of, 
other political actors. While stressing the value of direct involvement of ordinary 
people, one Leicester City councillor argued that they needed guidance from 
professionals and councillors who could act as "champions of the community", 
vested as they were with powers to hold health authorities accountable, and 
accountable themselves to the people at election time. The Department of 
Health's Local Voices paper made mention of the aspiration of health authorities 
to become a "champion of the people" (NHS Management Executive 1992, 3); 
the cross-departmental Age Positive programme looks for individuals and 
organisations to "champion" the cause of elderly people within various social 
services, including health; at the time of writing, the word "champion" appeared 
in 442 documents on the Department of Health's website, including speeches by 
the Secretary of State calling doctors and nurses the "patients' champions". The 
concept originates in management consultancy approaches to change 
management, in which successful projects are pushed through by enrolling 
people in positions of power and influence to champion the project at various 
decision making forums, from the board down; it's a concept not dissimilar from 
the policy entrepreneur "softening up" a policy community to accept a problem 
definition and take specific action (Kingdon 1984, 134-7). 
There is another way in which the "champion" idea is applicable, but not one 
which came up in the interviews, and that is that public managers may champion 
"ordinary people" simply by deciding to run a deliberative process. This can 
happen in two ways. Jo Lenaghan of the Department of Health highlighted the 
normal way that the department made decisions, "particularly in the creation of a 
white paper. .. which would traditionally have been drafted by Ministers and 
officials, perhaps sent out to a few stakeholders to read and comment on and then 
published" (personal correspondence) - indeed, she was eager that this usual 
approach, rather than ideal theory, be the comparator in my study. For 
Lenaghan, the point was that she and others within the NHS broadened debate 
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beyond the normally limited circles, devising means of involving non-traditional 
participants directly in the decision making process, thus "championing" their 
right to be involved directly in decisions which affect them. 
The other way this can happen is as an unintended consequence of the concern 
with statistical representativeness. Because process managers have been focused 
on achieving a statistically representative sample of participants, they have been 
active in approaching people from excluded groups, investing considerable time 
and effort in persuading them to join a jury or deliberative poll. This means that 
managers do not give up on people who would normally face great motivational 
problems to do with low efficacy: rather than sending out an invitation and 
hoping for the best, they actively "shoulder tap" such people and encourage them 
to attend, helping them with payment for time and expenses, child care 
arrangements, transport and so on. Thus the high-level concern to encourage 
public and patient involvement, combined with a local concern for 
representativeness, can help overcome the motivational barriers which many 
people would otherwise face in deliberative democracy. 
The facilitation claims made by various actors went largely unremarked and 
unchallenged; the representation claims made by interest groups were attacked 
strongly by public managers. Indeed, the perceived weakness of those claims, 
plus a new public management view of interest groups as bleeding the 
deliberative system rather than lubricating it, was a key ground used to justify the 
sidelining of activists in deliberative processes. Managers dismissed the 
representation claims on both principal-agent and descriptive grounds, 
suggesting that many interest group officers either do not get elected; or match 
the demographic features of the people they claim to represent; or even share 
their experiences (NHS managers, London and Leeds); or, in the case of the 
CHCs, all three. 
Activists are on somewhat firmer ground when they can demonstrate descriptive 
representation based on shared experience: the disability movement suggests 
that the only difference between those active in a movement and "ordinary" 
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others is not their experiences or the content of their views but their willingness 
to formulate political aims on the basis of those views and take action to achieve 
them (Beresford and Campbell1994, 319), although I have no evidence whether 
this is a true claim or not. This may be as firm as their footing gets: some can 
claim principal-agent links between themselves and their members (BCODP 
2002), but they have not yet gone as far as many environmental, anti-
globalisation or women's groups in using participatory democratic practices for 
their internal structures (Catt 1999, 43-4), while such election legitimates their 
position as leaders only of the members of their particular group, not disabled 
people as a whole. 
The difference between the ideal expressed by the disability movement and the 
health interest group leaders I was able to interview was that the latter claimed 
shared experience and emphasised their expertise in the policy field, but could 
make no stronger claims of connection with the grass-roots, by means of internal 
democracy or anything else. One recognised that merely talking to a lot of 
people "out there in the community" was an inadequate representation claim, and 
felt that deliberative techniques, or even social research, gave more solid ground 
for claiming to know what the people thought on a given issue (CHC officer, 
Leicester). The lack of clear representative links between interest groups and 
those they claimed to represent seriously undermined their claims to be decisive 
in public deliberation. 
Thus, the actual role of interest groups in these deliberative events contrasts 
somewhat with Christiano and Mansbridge's ideal. While they certainly 
performed a deliberative facilitation role they were confined to that role by the 
various event managers. Their information gathering skills and expertise was 
recognised to an extent, and thus they were found useful in informing the 
deliberations of others, but their representation claims were not generally taken 
seriously and so were not allowed to be decisive in any way. In one way this is 
rightly so: it has the benefit of not allowing those with weak representation 
claims to be decisive within deliberative moments. As I noted in the previous 
chapter (page 81), however, this leaves the preferences of those interest groups 
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unchallenged and untransformed, which may undermine the rationality of the 
deliberative system as a whole, particularly if these groups are, as Mansbridge 
suggests, important providers of information and stimulators of debate in the 
deliberative system. It may be that restricting the role of interest groups in micro 
level deliberations may damage rationality at the macro level. 
Nonetheless, it seems clear that self-selected representatives have only weak 
claims to make about speaking for non-participants. Interest groups' positions 
are strengthened when they successfully claim shared experience; but they are 
strongest when they can claim direct principal-agent linkages, and it is to that 
kind of representation that I now tum. 
Elected representation 
The final type of claim to be explored here is elected representation, the direct 
choice of a principal by one or more agents. I have already spent considerable 
time exploring the normative status of elected representation, so this sub-section 
will be fairly brief. I have argued that the bonds of accountability created by 
election is a significant legitimator of the division between those inside a forum 
and those outside it: the lack of those bonds undermines legitimacy. However, 
the lines of accountability between elected representatives and their principals 
can cut across each other, so in this section I want to look at what elected 
representation claims are made and how they conflict. 
As noted in the last chapter, it was frequently suggested by interviewees that the 
reason health policy suffers from legitimacy problems in the UK is that it is 
under the control of unelected managers in quangos, as opposed to managers in 
departments with direct accountability to ministers (Commons Select Committee 
on Health 2000, q.62). When making this claim, respondents linked legitimacy 
with elections, so that the people responsible for health care could be re-elected 
or replaced depending on public evaluations of the outcomes. Health authority 
managers were unelected, and could not be held accountable in this way. While 
they certainly face an increasingly sophisticated barrage of scrutiny from a 
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variety of agencies and the media (Day and Klein 1987), most of these are only 
indirectly "public", and so don't help much with the democratic legitimacy 
problems, as I have argued earlier (chapter two, page 40). Deliberative 
techniques have been implemented by local agencies in part to try to remedy this 
accountability deficit (Harrison and Mort 1998), but we have already seen how 
randomly-selected deliberators lack clear bonds with those left outside the forum, 
which means they should not be used to reach binding collective decisions. 
However, the claims of different elected representatives can conflict, and it was 
in the period immediately following The NHS Plan that the tensions between 
various representatives became most fraught. 
Underlying all the NHS reforms was a general, background representation claim 
which is fairly familiar: essentially the government claimed legitimacy for its 
actions on the basis of the free choice by the electorate for them and their 
programme, a programme which specifically included devolving power to 
doctors and removing the NHS internal market, but which did not make special 
mention of the public and patient involvement initiatives.30 This is the 
"mandate" claim which contains both trustee and delegate elements: the 
government claims it has been elected both on the basis of electors' judgements 
about its fitness to do whatever needs to be done in the course of a parliament, 
and its promises to deliver specific outcomes, for which it will be held 
accountable at subsequent elections.31 This is not to say that the mandate view is 
unproblematic: recent scholarship undermines mandate-based legitimacy claims, 
partly because elections do not provide clear, uncomplicated signals about the 
details of voters' intentions and preferences (Catt 1996, ch.2), partly because 
legitimacy derives from more than just a vote. Saying that, however, does not 
mean the vote is unimportant: legitimacy is enhanced by elections simply by 
30 A plain text version of the 1997 Labour Party manifesto, along with the major political 
party manifestos for all UK general elections since 1945, is available from 
http://www.psr.keele.ac.uk/area/uk/man.htm, accessed 23 October 2002. 
31 The classic account of the development of the mandate doctrine is Emden (1956). See 
also Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge (1994, 5). 
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virtue of the fact that politicians can be thrown out of office by the public. They 
can be held electorally accountable, which is quite a different kind of moral force 
than public servants or interest group leaders lay claim to (Kateb 1992, 37). 
Given that background representation claim, all the NHS Plan consultations only 
had advisory force: the Secretary of State for Health, as the person directly 
accountable the people, would be the one to make the final decisions. In 
practice, this meant that the status of representatives in the various consultative 
processes could safely be left somewhat vague: even with the Modernisation 
Action Teams, the explicit goal was to get them to react to and refine ideas for 
specific reforms of the health system developed by the Department of Health, 
given the broad principles of devolution and patient involvement set out by the 
Secretary of State for Health (DoH manager, London). Whether the participants 
were elected to their positions, whether they had prior instructions from their 
principals, or were left to their own devices did not enter the department's 
calculations; nor did not seem to cause problems for any of the participants 
afterwards. One NHS manager in Leeds wondered whether this was as it should 
be, although she posed it as a question which troubled her rather than as a firm, 
thought-out position: 
Preserving that line {between decisive and advisory roles} is legitimate, because 
Alan Milburn, whoever's the incoming secretary at the time, is actually 
accountable to parliament and therefore to the people for the planning and 
expenditure in the NHS. So, if you've got individuals who are accountable to a 
parliamentary process, what further value and legitimacy can be added by 
asking individuals, lay people to get involved in this process? Shouldn't it just 
be left to the people who are {elected} to do it? 
However, the Secretary is not just accountable to the people at election time: he 
or she is also accountable to parliament, which is the deliberative body which 
explores his arguments, both in committees and in full sessions of the Commons 
and the Lords (Uhr 1998, 159). In the case of The NHS Plan, the issue that 
caused particular problems was one which was not part of the consultation 
process, the decision to replace the CHCs with a series of local organisations 
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with more or less democratic control. This decision was strongly resisted by the 
Association of Community Health Councils of England and Wales (ACHCEW), 
which decided to fight by exploiting other channels of influence. While 
ACHCEW lobbied extensively in a variety of ways, its most fruitful channel was 
the Commons select committee which scrutinised the Health and Social Care 
Bill, whose chairman was also chair of a CHC; another committee member also 
sat on a CHC board. The committee worked to ensure that the sections of the bill 
relating to CHCs were removed, although they did so by also claiming the 
legitimating mantle of elected representation. 
However, the government did not simply accept that as the legitimate outcome of 
a legitimate process. The criticisms should easily be guessed: the decision's 
legitimacy was attacked on content grounds, that it was the "wrong" decision in 
the context of the rest of the reforms and that CHCs were ineffective at 
representing the public anyway;32 and on consent grounds, because the reforms 
were necessary to achieve what the people had said they wanted in consultations 
(Commons Select Committee on Health 2000, q.317). Privately, one interviewee 
suggested that it was on source grounds as well, that the committee was "tainted" 
by its associations with CHCs. While the government did a deal to get other 
reforms passed before the May 2001 dissolution of parliament, it returned to a 
consultative process and built support among other interest groups and other 
members of the Health Select Committee for the new structure, bolstered by 
claims that "this is what the people want". The changes were reintroduced to 
parliament as the National Health Service Reform and Health Care Professions 
Bill, which abolished the CHCs in July 2002. 
In the UK case there is little in the way of the descriptive I elective blend which 
is so desirable for legitimate representation, but this is due to the plurality voting 
system and the limited pool from which potential parliamentarians are recruited 
32 A point made by the Secretary of State thus: "I genuinely think that if my hon. Friend 
were to ask most members of the public whether they had heard of their CHC-let alone 
contacted it-he would find that the answer would be a resounding no" (House of 
Commons 2000, vol.357, col.160). 
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in Britain (Catt 1999, 98; Norris 1997, 158). Legitimacy would be enhanced if 
elected representatives were themselves more descriptively representative, at 
threshold levels, of the people they represent, but even without those descriptive 
elements, elected representation offers clear legitimacy benefits in that there are 
bonds of accountability between participants and non-participants in any given 
deliberations. In practice, however, the claims of different elected 
representatives can cut across each other, with some representatives claiming a 
mandate for a specific programme while others claim the right to scrutinise and, 
if necessary, change that programme on behalf of the public between elections. 
Mandate claims are not particularly sound when voters are being asked to vote 
on more than just a specific programme: only a referendum can deliver that kind 
of legitimacy. In an election of representatives, voters are rarely choosing on the 
basis of one preferred programme, or even a basketful of them. As a result, 
elected representatives are on safer ground when all they claim is the obligation 
to engage in the mutual giving and weighing of reasons; their ground is more 
slippery when they try to claim legitimacy for a specific plan of action. 
Representation complements and conflicts 
How do all these different claims by different kinds of representatives interact 
when they come together in a deliberative system? As I noted right at the start of 
this chapter, very few interviewees noted conflicts of representation directly, 
using the category in a somewhat unreflective way. However, for some there is 
clearly a conflict between elected and randomly selected representation. Some 
elected representatives feel that deliberative events usurp their role. In the 
Belfast example, the Eastern Health and Social Services Council (EHSSC) was 
hauled over the coals by the members of the North Down Borough Council 
Health Committee in a resolution which stated, "That the Committee write and 
advise the organising authorities that it reject the concept of the Citizens Jury and 
would have nothing more to do with it on the grounds that it was merely a 
window dressing exercise." (North Down Borough Council1998). 
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Although not formally accountable to any borough council, the chairman and 
chief officer of the EHSSC went to North Down to try to explain the citizens' 
jury concept, putting it in the context of the enormous cost of market research. 
Their stance was that we didn't need to go out and ask people. That they're 
elected by the people to speak on their behalf and we didn't need to go out and 
spend £25,000 engaging 16 people. We could have engaged them and they 
would have told us what their opinion was. And I don't know that we actually 
convinced them that that wasn't quite right. ... We have a council. .. and we 
wouldn't dream of presuming to know what all the people are thinking, and 
that's why we constantly engage in consultation and public participation .... But 
their stance was, they're elected representatives, they could have told us, and we 
wasted public money. 
Jury commissioner, Belfast 
This kind of reaction by no means reflected the attitudes of all. In Leicester, for 
example, the two (Labour) city councillors most closely involved in the fight for 
Glenfield could understand the reaction of the North Down councillors, but saw 
themselves more as facilitators than trustees: 
But, at the end of the day, you've got to put your personal feelings aside, and it 
is what is best for the community, what is best taking it forward, what is best for 
the resources; and I feel, so what if our power is diminished, if it's for the 
benefit of the people? 
The response of the Leicester councillors suggests a way out of the apparent 
conflict between elected and selected representatives. That is, elected 
representatives like those in North Down are simply wrong if they claim that 
they know what the people want on the grounds of having been elected with a 
mandate. Given that, consultative events are useful means of probing beneath 
the vague signals that an election sends and as means of sorting through new 
issues and the details of existing ones. Nonetheless, final decision making power 
should rest with representatives who can be held electorally accountable. 
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Other kinds of conflict and complementarity can arise between different kinds of 
representatives in a deliberative system. It is useful to look at the Leicester case 
to highlight these dynamics since all of the actors and processes in the case were 
aligned with different concepts of representation and different kinds of 
legitimacy claim. The initial decision had little legitimacy because it was based 
on an exclusive process in which only a limited range of experts' facts and values 
were represented- the decision was also dramatically at odds with popular 
values and the popular understanding of what the 'right' decision was. Activists 
opposing the changes had fairly limited legitimacy on their own. There was no 
agent-principal relationship between them and those they claimed to represent, 
but they could claim shared interest on the grounds of shared health experiences. 
However, the petition device allowed them to solicit and win consent from the 
people of Leicester, which boosted their representative claims. The legitimacy of 
the petition was contested by the CHC on the grounds that it had only 150,000 
signatures, "Which," said the CHC Chief Officer, "is a tenth of the population I 
have to represent". The CHC's representation claim was partly a mandate claim 
-"this is what we've been appointed to do"- and partly based on the 
representativeness of the sample used to generate a series of focus groups and 
survey research commissioned from De Montfort University (Wilcox 2000), but 
that "scientific doctrine" claim weighed less heavily in the public discourse than 
the direct public voice claim of the petitioners. Further, it was the petition and 
protest which opened the doors of previously limited deliberations conducted by 
the health authority. The local city councillors claimed representative status and 
legitimacy on the grounds of their election to public office, but they also backed 
that up with a claim that they were representing the specific wishes of the people 
when they took the petition to the Department of Health in London. Having 
forced the doors open, however, mere rhetoric was not legitimately decisive: 
rather than depending on involving just those who "shout the most", legitimacy 
was further enhanced by the citizens' jury whose random selection ensured that 
no interested actor could influence the outcome by influencing the selection of 
decision makers. 
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There were, of course, clear imperfections in the process, some of which 
enhanced and some of which undermined legitimacy. For one, the statistical 
selection of jurors had an advantage in that they were seen to be independent of 
the various sides in the argument; but this also meant that their recommendations 
could not be binding on representatives who had clear bonds of accountability to 
the public. Thus there was room for the legitimacy claims of different kinds of 
representatives to conflict. This can be most clearly seen if one considers what 
would have happened if the citizens' jury had not reached broadly the same 
conclusion as the protestors. The CHC Chief Officer speculated in this way: 
Q: What do you think would have happened? 
A: Wisdom of Solomon, that would have been. I think we, the CHC, would 
have agreed with the citizens' jury, and you can imagine the flak that we would 
have got from the Save Glenfield campaigners. 
Q: Who do you think would have won? 
A: They were very, very organised. They got powerful. {There was} Patricia 
Hewitt33 behind the scenes. They had a lot of contacts with the Department of 
Health- it would have been a political decision, it wouldn't have been our 
decision. 150,000 petitioners, Labour government, three Labour seats in the 
city, we had councillors putting pressure on, we had a CHC councillor, he never 
turned up for CHC meetings, {but} when the Glenfield issue {came along you} 
couldn't get him off the papers. So politically I think {the Health Authority} 
would have been forced to change that decision. 
In other words, the jury recommendations may have given way to the petitioners' 
demands, simply because they had many other political channels through which 
they could apply pressure, particularly through their elected representatives-
the jury was not the only game in town, just one element among several, each 
33 Hewitt is the MP for Leicester West, the constituency in which Glenfield Hospital is 
sited, and a former deputy director of the IPPR who was thus aware of, if not involved 
in, the early discussions at the IPPR to introduce citizens' juries to the UK. 
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with more or less power. Overall legitimacy would have been enhanced even 
further had those other "games" operated according to deliberative principles, 
and to the extent that the protestors, the health authority and the CHC 
themselves were democratic in their internal workings. Still, this is speculation: 
without a real case of fundamental disagreement between a deliberative process 
and wider public opinion it is hard to draw any concrete conclusions. 
Summing up this section, then, there can be some conflict between elected and 
non-elected representation, but that conflict is minimised if elected 
representatives give up any tenacious adherence to the mandate model and 
realise the contributions consultative processes can make to deliberative 
democracy; and if elected bodies are themselves more descriptively 
representative of the population at large. Interest groups too play a vital role in 
opening up deliberative systems to new voices, but without principal-agent bonds 
they have limited legitimate decision making power: they enhance their 
legitimacy by democratising their procedures for appointing office holders and 
spokespeople, so that they have more well-founded claims to speak for those 
they descriptively represent. Finally, randomly selected participants -I hesitate 
to call them "representatives" for reasons already explained- can play a vital 
role where politics between elected representatives and interest groups has led to 
an impasse. Random selection, if genuinely random, means greater fairness 
because it stops any one interest from influencing the outcome. However, it 
remains unclear whether the losers in such processes would go along with the 
outcomes: there may be good normative grounds for asking them to, but whether 
their substantive interests overwhelm those grounds is a question I have not been 
able to answer beyond a speculative "yes". 
Conclusions 
What have we discovered, then, about how legitimacy questions in deliberative 
democracy are managed in practice, and how has this added to the theoretical 
understanding reached at the end of chapter two? 
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To begin with, who is being represented matters a great deal as it can have an 
effect on the scope of deliberation, and thus its motivational attractiveness and 
democratic character. If, as has happened so far in Britain, deliberative 
democracy is all about local communities, then this exacerbates the scope and 
motivation problems noticed in the last chapter. Where micro deliberative 
processes focus on involving the "ordinary people" then this is positive for the 
deliberative system as a whole, since it gives those people a channel of direct 
influence over policy which they have never had before; where other channels of 
influence are closed off, however, then deliberative techniques simply become a 
legitimating mask for exclusion in macro deliberation, hiding the degree to which 
those who have a legitimate facilitation role are silenced. I get on to that role in a 
moment. 
Next, principal-agent claims seem to have the most strength not only in my 
normative scheme, but in practical politics as well. It is not a matter of having a 
"mandate"- such claims do not stand up to much scrutiny- but is rather a 
matter of such representatives being subject to electoral accountability. 
However, exactly to whom such agents are accountable can be hard to sort 
through, a problem which goes beyond the constituency definition issues noted at 
the beginning of this chapter. A representative like the Secretary of State for 
Health has multiple constituencies which at least include his own electorate, 
those who voted for his party, parliament, the Commons Health Committee, 
patients, the medical professions, and so on, all of whose interests can and do 
conflict. Furthermore, some of those constituencies will be more powerful than 
others, which means that the minister need only pay attention to a subset of them 
if he is to retain support. Therefore, the use of inclusive consultation processes, 
preferably of a deliberative kind, is essential to balance out the range of opinion 
and interests of which elected representatives take heed. 
No matter how difficult that balancing act and how constrained they should be to 
consult widely, electoral accountability gives such representatives greater 
authority than those who do not face such discipline at all. One example of the 
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latter is interest groups who, I have argued, should not have decision making 
power because they are frequently self-appointed, lacking even descriptive 
features in common with those they claim to represent. This does not mean that 
interest groups should have no role at all in the deliberative system. In both 
macro and micro deliberative processes they can play a valuable facilitation role, 
acting as "champions" for others who, for whatever reason, are not so active. 
Championing should be two-way, however: there should be some mechanism by 
which citizens are able to state publicly, "On this issue and at this moment, these 
people speak for me." The Leicester petition was one such mechanism. 
Championing happens in another way: by running micro deliberative processes, 
managers shoulder-tap citizens who might otherwise lack the efficacy required to 
get them to participate directly in the deliberative system. This clearly has 
legitimacy benefits by giving the citizens involved the confidence and skills 
needed to engage in other political environments, and by giving "ordinary" 
people a direct role in macro deliberations which they would otherwise lack. The 
wider spread deliberative practice becomes, the more people and politics would 
benefit from this increased efficacy. Random selection processes have some 
serious theoretical flaws, however: the lack of principal-agent links which mean 
their decisions cannot be binding on others; the essentialism problem created by 
quota sampling; the fixation on proportionality which marginalises minority 
voices, and thus the great importance of how process managers actually design 
their stratification criteria. The worry among some interviewees was that the 
lack of principal-agent (or any other) accountability would mean that citizens 
would make irresponsible recommendations which would be difficult to ignore 
given the democratic value placed on listening to ones' citizens, but this fear 
proved unfounded. Nonetheless, I have argued that this does not lead to the 
conclusion that one can dispense with the insistence on principal-agent bonds. 
One needs to keep in mind the distinction between deliberation as opinion 
formation and deliberation as decision making: randomly selected participants 
have valuable roles in the former, not in the latter. 
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What is the overall lesson? No one representative can claim perfect legitimacy 
because every kind has flaws. Legitimacy depends on a variety of 
representatives, activating a variety of constituencies, coming together at a 
decision making moment. The Leicester debate had a legitimate outcome for 
exactly this reason: the interest groups opened up the debate in the first place 
and acted as critical information brokers throughout; politicians acted as 
facilitators, championing the people's right to be consulted; the petition provided 
an act of consent to the interest groups' and politicians' claims; while the jury 
acted as neutral arbiters, helping cut through the sloganeering which had 
dominated up until that point, although their flaw was a lack of effective 
accountability which means that had serious opposition remained, the outcome 
might have been very different. The NHS Poll was weakened because it was 
unclear whether any of the participants were "speaking for" anyone else, 
undermining the claim that such events have "recommending force" for non-
participants. 
However, establishing strong representation claims is not all there is to 
legitimacy. Another significant means of developing bonds between insiders and 
outsiders is by means of the publicity condition, and the way that plays out in the 
cases is the subject of chapter five. 
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DELIBERATION AS DRAMA: PUBLICITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
Witenagemote34, old Parliament, was a great thing. The affairs of the nation 
were there deliberated and decided; what we were to do as a nation. But does 
not, though the name Parliament subsists, the parliamentary debate go on now, 
everywhere and at all times, in a far more comprehensive way, out of Parliament 
altogether? Burke said there were Three Estates in Parliament; but, in the 
Reporters' Gallery yonder, there sat a Fourth Estate more important far than 
they all .... Literature is our Parliament too. Printing, which comes necessarily 
out of Writing, I say often, is equivalent to Democracy: invent Writing, 
Democracy is inevitable .... Whoever can speak, speaking now to the whole 
nation, becomes a power, a branch of government, with inalienable weight in 
law-making, in all acts of authority. It matters not what rank he has, what 
revenues or garnitures: the requisite thing is, that he have a tongue which others 
will listen to .... The nation is governed by all that has tongue in the nation: 
Democracy is virtually there. 
Thomas Carlyle, 1840 
On Heroes, Hero-worship, and the Heroic in History 
34 Witenagemote was the assembly of the Anglo-Saxons. The word means "assembly of 
the wise". 
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So far we have seen that representation, while an important legitimating factor 
for any set of decision makers, is a complex, partial and sometimes contradictory 
solution to deliberative democracy's scale problem. The other solution that I 
want to consider is using publicity, establishing communicative links between 
insiders and outsiders such that those outside are exposed to the arguments that 
are made inside a deliberative forum. 
In deliberative theory the publicity condition is the requirement that only those 
arguments which can be made in public should have any force. In some ways, 
publicity is the essence of deliberative democracy: it is its procedural 
foundation, the means by which information is brought into a deliberative 
moment and by which claims and counter-claims are weighed and sorted; and it 
is its ethical foundation, the yardstick by which one judges the rightness or 
wrongness of political action, and one of the means by which the powerful are 
restrained (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 95; Luban 2002, 296). Thus it has, in 
Haberrnas's words (1996, 171), the function both of "monitoring" and "feeding" 
deliberation. However, as I have argued before, accountability also depends on 
those who hold decision makers to account having the power to make their 
displeasure effective, which is one of the functions of elections. 
This idea of accountability through publicity can hold both in micro and macro 
accounts of deliberation: in the micro account, all the participants are in one 
forum together, and exchange reasons face to face; in the macro account, citizens 
participate in all sorts of debates, conversations, forums, assemblies, each of 
which must give account for its actions and decisions to the others. The 
troublesome nature of the micro account should be fairly familiar by now: not all 
those affected can be in any given forum, so accountability in this sense is only 
generated between participants, not between participants and non-participants, or 
among non-participants. As I suggested in chapter two, one solution is to 
abandon the micro account in favour of the macro: think of publicity operating 
between rather than within different forums in a deliberative system, and then 
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legitimacy is created to the extent that people in different forums or 
conversational threads give account to each other by sharing reasons throughout 
the system, typically through the news media but also through the myriad of 
ways human beings interact every day. This is precisely the point that Thomas 
Carlyle (1993) made in the fifth of his London lectures in May 1840, quoted 
above: democracy exists to the extent that citizens engage with each other in 
public debate in the public sphere, well beyond the four walls of parliament or 
any other deliberative forum. 
But is accountability in the macro sense itself unproblematic? I have already 
suggested a reason for thinking it might not be: there may be problems of 
intervening institutions of the same kind encountered in chapter three. Both 
formal institutions like the news media or informal social structures like 
discourses are likely to shape communication in various ways, ways which may 
alter the content and nature of that communication. What is lost and what is 
gained when we rely on various formal and informal media to bear the weight of 
responsibility for generating insider-outsider links? These questions of mediated 
deliberation are the central concerns of this chapter, and I explore them primarily 
by focusing on the nature and use of the news media, and the distinction between 
speakers and audiences which this kind of large scale deliberation presupposes. 
The news media are notorious for their distorting effects on communication, yet 
those deliberative institutions which rely on the media do not take those 
distortions into account. As I shall discuss, the media have certain practical 
effects on deliberation, effects which can undermine the very deliberative values 
such processes strive to uphold. 
Of course, there is much more to the public sphere than the news media; indeed, 
there is much more to the media than news. The various media produce drama, 
comedies, satire, documentaries, talk shows, even sports coverage which are 
permeated by political discourses: think not just of obviously political comedies 
like Yes, Minister but of films or even soap operas which tackle issues like 
criminal justice or HIV/AIDS (Merelman 1991). Beyond the formal media, 
people engage in political discourses at work, through membership in or 
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affiliation with interest groups, through all sorts of everyday talk (Mansbridge 
1999). Furthermore, the advent of the internet may expand dramatically the 
means by which people can engage in democratic dialogue (Grossman 1995), 
although emerging scholarship suggests that the democratic claims of early 
"internet futurists" were wildly overstated (Edwards 2002; Norris 2000, 278). 
So, a thorough analysis of publicity would need to look right across the public 
sphere, not just at the news media - the collection edited by Chambers and 
Costain (2000) sketches some of the terrain. To pursue all these elements, 
however, would be a thesis in itself, and I simply do not have space to do that. I 
focus on the traditional news media for two reasons: it is considered the most 
important part of the public sphere by many deliberative democrats, including 
Habermas (1989, 15), and was one of two key sites in the public sphere that 
interviewees consistently identified and took into account in their planning; and 
the media has an important influence on what issues become defined as 
"problems" which require public action (Cohen 1973; Edelman 1988; Iyengar 
and Kinder 1987, 33). The other site which attracted the attention of 
interviewees was interest groups, whose media-related activity I deal with later in 
the chapter. 
The chapter begins by setting out the place of the media in democratic theory, 
and surveys the reasons why the media may be considered to play its democratic 
role poorly, concentrating especially on the structural features of news. I then 
examine how these features influenced what the television audience saw of the 
NHS deliberative poll, asking whether certain arguments made it through the 
media to reach non-participants. I then tum to look at cases which were more 
successful in generating media coverage, asking what features of those cases 
made a difference, before concluding with some general implications for my 
quest to establish links between participants and non-participants in deliberative 
democracy. 
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Democracy and the construction of news 
That the news media are central to democracy is an old and well-known idea 
(Uhr 1998, xiii). It is central to liberal democracy in both its developmental and 
protective variants: for Mill (1974, 75), for example, the media encourage self-
government by exposing people to different ideas, growing their capacity to 
exercise citizenship and judgement; it protects self-government by scrutinising 
the powerful (Street 2001, 254). For economic theorists of democracy, the media 
are essential to ensure that all voters possess adequate and equal information 
about the choices confronting them (Manin 1997, 228-9; Page 1996, 2). In these 
accounts the mere presence of the media is not enough: the information they 
provide must also be undistorted, free from domination or interference by 
powerful interests. Thus media freedom is part of what defines democracy 
(Beetham 1994, 39; Dahl1971; Gastil1994, 672). 
The news media are central to deliberative democracy for much the same reasons 
(Nickel 2000, 3; Sunstein 1993, 130). For Habermas (1996, Ch.8), the media 
have a two-way role, to make the public sphere more inclusive by spreading 
political communication among a broader public, and to provide means by which 
public opinion is transmitted to the state for action. Normatively, "the mass 
media ought to understand themselves as the mandatary of an enlightened public 
whose willingness to learn and capacity for criticism they at once presuppose, 
demand, and reinforce" (Habermas 1996, 378). The principles are applied by 
Fishkin in the deliberative poll: indeed, it was specifically designed by him to be 
televised, so that deliberation among a few would be brought to "an audience of 
millions", acting as a "catalyst" to change the nature of discussion on a topic in a 
broader community (Fishkin 1997, 130, 17 5). 
That the news media fulfil their "fourth estate" function poorly is as venerable an 
idea as their indispensability although, oddly, it is not one that appears much in 
the democracy literature. Perhaps reflecting the deep disciplinary divides in 
political science (Wasby 1997), media pathologies tend to be the preserve of 
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students of media politics, sociology and political economy rather than 
democracy theorists, which is a peculiar omission given the centrality of the 
media to democracy. Nonetheless, three kinds of criticism tend to be made. The 
first is that a media dominated by powerful private interests does not facilitate an 
unencumbered, universal dialogue between citizens (Habermas 1989). One 
answer to this is to point out that the universal dialogue is an unreasonable 
standard: 
... it is impossible for all citizens simultaneously to be full-time senders and 
receivers of information; ... at any point in time and space some citizens will 
normally choose to remain silent and only certain other individuals and groups 
will choose to communicate with others. 
(Keane 1991, 164-5) 
Instead, numerous authors argue that the role of the media is to supply a variety 
of opinions to audiences who then engage in their own discussions at the more 
informal end of the deliberative system, particularly "activating the active" who 
then work to mobilise others (Norris 2000; Page 1996, 7-8; Zaller 2002). The 
role of the citizen can then be more realistically "monitorial" (Schudson 1999, 
311-2), scanning the vast amount of information produced every day but 
choosing to focus on particular issues which affect or interest them; that is, which 
is salient for them. Thus, Page argues, democracy theorists should concern 
themselves more with the range of information that is available to citizens rather 
than the balance or otherwise of particular media outlets taken in isolation. 
The problem with this view is that it assumes two unlikely conditions: that the 
range of facts and values available through the media is a fairly complete set; and 
that people pay attention to the range of views available. Working backwards, 
Peterson (1992) has demonstrated that while people from high-status groups 
(connected with income, education, occupation, gender and ethnicity) tend to be 
"omnivorous" in their media consumption, people from low status groups tend to 
be "univorous" and thus hear a more limited range of views on a given topic, 
rendering them unable to take those views into account in their own deliberations 
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(see also van Eijck and van Rees 2000). The univores' political agenda is 
therefore set by a much more limited range of problems, facts and values than 
that of the omnivores (Iyengar and Kinder 1987). But prior to that are problems 
recognised by political sociology to do with the fact that public problems are 
constructed in more or less limited ways to begin with, thanks to their fit with 
dominant ideologies (Edelman 1988), with core values (Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith 1993), with frames of facts and values (Schon and Rein 1994) or 
discursive frames (Dryzek and Braithwaite 2000). Given those issues of opinion 
leader fragmentation, limited use of news sources, and the limited construction of 
public problems, it is not at all obvious that elite-led pluralist deliberation has the 
rationalising effect on the rest of the public sphere that Page claims. 
Even if we accept Page's revised account of the media's role as a normative 
standard, there are still questions about how well the media can meet that 
standard. The second of the three criticisms is the one that appears most often in 
the democracy literature, the complaint that journalists and editorial teams are 
biased because they are self-interested, ill-trained and inattentive, or are just so 
pressured that they do not have the time to get things right (Gutmann and 
Thompson 1996, 124; Stokes 1998, 132; see Street 2001, Ch.1). However, this 
complaint can be based on some dubious presumptions: it is often framed in 
such a way as to presume that authoritative knowledge is possible on any given 
topic- sometimes it might be, sometimes it might not- or that there is a 
deliberate conspiracy to deceive on the other, presumptions which may or may 
not be valid (Langer 1998, 5; Tiffen 1989, 3). I would also argue that these 
failures are relatively minor. Even if we fix them through training and regulation 
(Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 126), and guard against conspiracies, there are 
still features of news which systematically favour some kinds of information and 
filter out others, features which relate to the political economy of news and are 
thus less tractable to incremental policy solutions. This is the third complaint, 
and I want to spend some time on those structural features as they matter for our 
discussion of building legitimacy through publicity: if the media can only 
transmit some arguments and not others, then we need to know what kinds, and 
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the impact that has on the exchange of reasons between deliberative participants 
and non-participants. 
The features of news can be divided into three major categories: news values, 
physical characteristics of media, and organisational I economic imperatives. 
News values 
What makes something newsworthy? This is something widely taught to 
journalism students but rarely understood elsewhere. Overall, the media is 
looking for something significant, but significance is defined not so much in 
terms of any intrinsic value of the issue at hand, but in terms of salience to a 
given audience (Negrine 1989, 141; Tiffen 1989, 52-3). 
One way of grabbing an audience's attention is to focus on the unusual rather 
than the commonplace (Negrine 1989, 141): as the old journalistic adage has it, 
"dog bites man" is not news, but "man bites dog" is. While the media does 
report on some routine things, such as court reports or the stock market, it does 
so by focusing on the unusual: the murder, not the bag-snatching, unless there is 
something unusual about the perpetrator or the victim. Another way is to focus 
on what triggers peoples' emotions: sex and protective instincts towards children 
and other loved ones are the prime examples. 
News is narrative, with a plot and actors. There needs to be a tale to tell, with a 
beginning, middle and ending, and that tale needs to be in one of the classic 
narrative forms of tragedy or comedy, each with its own sub-genre (soap opera, 
sit-com, and satire, for example). As Street (2001, 36) emphasises, "This is not a 
metaphor; this is how news is told." As narrative, people are central in news 
stories: there needs to be a central character or characters who interact with each 
other to make a news story. This is why popularisations of great science tend 
also to be popularisations of great scientists, as much about the person as the 
idea: everyone knows the name Einstein but few could explain why he was 
important. In news, it helps if those people are themselves in some way 
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significant; indeed, an insignificant thing done by a significant person is news: 
"Princess Di' s haircut can become front page news, mine passes unnoticed" 
(Tiffen 1989, 52). Some argue that the fascination with celebrity is starting to 
override all other news concerns, such that an issue is not considered significant 
unless it involves a famous person in some way (Langer 1998, 45). 
Thus news values tend to emphasise contrast and conflict rather than harmonious 
working relationships, except of course where such relationships are themselves 
exceptional; to emphasise the atypical features of public life rather than its 
norms; to over-state the role that individuals play in events rather than groups; to 
emphasise celebrities at the expense of everyday experience and solutions to 
problems (Edelman 1988, 34-6); and to marginalise accounts which "draw 
attention to the social forces or structures that drive change" (Street 2001, 49-50) 
-studies of media narratives which personalised the 1991 Gulf War (Kellner 
1995; Neuman 1996) are particularly instructive here, as will be, no doubt, 
studies of the so-called War on Terror. 
Physical limitations 
Different media have different physical constraints which limit what they can 
and cannot cover. At the broadest, this is an issue of space: newspapers have a 
limited number of column inches, although the amount of space available 
depends in part on how much advertising can be sold to pay for it, which raises 
issues I will cover shortly. This means that there is a relatively small "news 
hole" in which a story can appear. This hole is made smaller by the deadlines 
imposed by daily production processes and competitive pressures between media 
(Tiffen 1989, 15). Because of their reliance on speech in real time, and because 
they cannot add more hours in the day like newspapers can add pages, television 
and radio shrink that hole even further, such that "the text of a half-hour news 
service would not fill the front page of a broadsheet newspaper" (Tiffen 1989, 
22). However, this can also work in the opposite way: even on a day when not 
much happened of national significance, broadcast media still have to fill a news 
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slot. What they tend to fill that with is not more in-depth analysis of "olds" so 
much as less significant "news" (Sandra Grey, personal communication). 
Different media also emphasise different aspects of stories. This is a particularly 
complex topic which I do not have space to go into in any detail, but take one 
example to illustrate. As a visual medium, television is said to be the most 
powerful simply because of the way that the emotional content of a story can be 
conveyed so quickly with well-chosen pictures (McLuhan 1987). The fact that 
those pictures are chosen means that they are chosen to support a particular 
narrative line and not another: frame the picture in one way, and one story is 
told; frame it another way, and quite a different story emerges (MacGregor 
1997). This also influences which stories get covered: a story which interests a 
newspaper may not get television coverage simply because it cannot easily be 
told in pictures. 
Organisational and economic imperatives 
The media in modem democracies are embedded a political economy in which 
information and cultural production are more or less marketised: even those 
media which are largely state supported still face some kind of market discipline 
thanks to changes in public sector accountability regimes since the mid-1980s.35 
The main form of marketisation is that many media outlets rely on advertising, 
directly or indirectly, to fund their activities (Street 2001, 141). However, 
organisations buy advertising in order to reach a given audience, not any 
audience: they may be more interested in high-income earners, or main 
household shoppers, or teenagers, or 30-something single women, because those 
are the people for whom their specific messages are salient. Therefore, 
organisations buy advertising with outlets which reach their target audiences; 
35 See, for example, the market-type accountability regime created in New Zealand for 
State-Owned Enterprises (SOBs), and administered by the Crown Company Monitoring 
Advisory Unit, part of the New Zealand Treasury, available from 
http://www.ccmau.govt.nz/aboutUs/companiesmonitored.asp 
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which means that outlets work hard to reach some audiences and not others, 
again by considering what is salient to those audiences and not others. 
In Britain, half of television broadcasting, almost all narrow-cast television 
services, most radio, and all national and regional newspapers are in private 
ownership, and advertising is their major source of income (Negrine 1989, Ch.4). 
The need to improve advertising revenues, and thus returns for shareholders, 
dominates. This leads to aggressive competition to attract audiences with 
"popular" content which favours entertainment and narrative at the expense of 
thought and analysis: the so-called "dumbing down" of political information 
(Street 2001, 150-2). This is not to say that all media coverage is "dumb"; rather, 
that what might be termed "smart" coverage only appeals to a small (but often 
influential) audience and so tends to be restricted to small-circulation, often state-
supported, media, while the large audiences receive "infotainment". Even then, 
high-brow and state-run media are not immune from such pressures. For 
example, in Britain the state-run BBC and the non-profit Channel 4 must still 
compete with the commercial media for audience share in order to justify the 
owners' investment- spending has been explicitly tied to success in attracting 
an audience by the Chancellor of the Exchequer (House of Commons 2002, 15 
July 2002, column 22) - and so must still offer content which attracts a mass 
audience in addition to its more narrowly targeted programming, despite their 
public service remits. The same influences on public service media have been 
noted in the United States (Kerbel, Apee, and Ross 2000). 
Competition means that every outlet is looking for an "exclusive", preferably 
being the first to publish a story at all, but at least to have an exclusive angle on a 
story, such as exclusive access to a given interviewee. This has two effects on the 
likelihood of a political story getting coverage. For run of the mill stories, it 
means that only one outlet will cover it: as soon as a television station, for 
example, learns that a competitor is also airing the story, it loses interest. 
However, if the story is newsworthy enough, no news outlet will want to be left 
out: this means that once a significant story is broken, news organisations will 
jump on the bandwagon. 
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Effects and implications 
These features of news, news media, and media organisations have effects on the 
kinds of information which dominate the public sphere, and thus the kinds of 
facts and values that can reasonably be expected to be transmitted in that sphere, 
and the kinds that cannot. First, physical limitations on the coverage of political 
stories mean that only some of what will inevitably be a complex tale can be told. 
Second, the choice as to whether a story is told or not depends on whether it can 
be made consonant with news values, particularly whether it is out of the 
ordinary, can be personalised, polarised, and easily narrated. Third, the choice 
also depends on whether it is, or can be made to be, salient with a given target 
audience, an audience which is in tum defined partly by the financial imperatives 
of the media organisation concerned. Each story must compete with many other 
stories in order to make it into the media in the first place, unless it is so 
significant that the media themselves compete to cover it first. These pressures 
face every medium to some extent, no matter how high or low brow; while there 
are many differences between The Guardian and The Sun newspapers, for 
example, they have much in common as well. 
The implication of these three points for any given deliberative system is that in 
order to get their story told rather than someone else's, the advocates of a 
particular issue, event or viewpoint must jockey hard for the media's attention, 
largely on the basis of news values and salience to organisationally-significant 
audiences. One of the most important means of doing this is to use specifically 
dramaturgical modes of communication to attract attention to problems such as 
using a "colourful phrase" or sound-bite (Tiffen 1989, 81), or setting up "staged" 
events in which conflict is maximised and played out symbolically (McAdam 
2000; Scalmer 2002). 36 Another means is to personalise a story by focusing on 
leaders to the exclusion of their sometimes-vast organisations (Street 2001, 49) 
36 There are limits to this: to be credible, news must use authoritative genres rather than 
frivolous ones, as Street (2001, 40) reminds us when he asks us to imagine the news 
presented by a pop star or comedian. 
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or by using celebrities to advocate a cause in public, since a famous person 
advocating something is more newsworthy than you or I doing so. What gets left 
out by doing so, as already noted, are the grey zones between black and white, 
right and wrong, good guys and bad guys - that is, the technical and moral 
complexities of issues - as well as the material and discursive forces at work. 
What is not at issue here is arguments about whether the media has a direct 
influence over what people think, or whether people pick and choose more 
critically, accepting some information and rejecting others on the basis of 
validity tests against their own experience, other conversations, and so on 
(Habermas 1996, 377; Street 2001, Ch.4). My point is prior to this kind of 
controversy: that it matters whether certain kinds of arguments are absent from 
the news media if we rely on those media to build publicity between deliberative 
sites, regardless of where we stand on questions of the relative strength of 
influence of the media on opinions. Without a full range of facts and values to 
weigh and sift, non-participants in a deliberative moment may well come to quite 
different conclusions from participants, leaving us with the problem of whose 
judgement should be decisive for participants and non-participants alike. 
Let's now return to the cases to find out what effects the media had on 
deliberation, and what claims did and did not make it through the media filter. 
Narrating a deliberative moment 
The deliberative poll is the format which most obviously takes the media into 
account. While Fishkin notes that television has its problems (Fishkin 1997, 14), 
he suggests that these problems are more to do with the content of what is 
broadcast rather than the structure of the medium itself. As we have seen, 
however, television is not a neutral transmitter of whatever is put into it-· nor is 
any other medium- so changing what goes in will not have an uncomplicated 
influence on what comes out. 
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The NHS poll was a joint production with Channel 4, a station funded by 
advertising yet run by a trust which ploughs back all revenues into programming 
rather than as returns to shareholders. The first point is that while this makes 
Channel 4 subject to commercial pressures to attract an audience which will in 
tum attract advertisers, it gives them some more leeway than fully commercial 
channels to run risky or "niche" programmes. This leeway allowed Channel 4 to 
run something like the deliberative poll which would attract an audience which 
they believed would be small in terms of total numbers, but important in terms of 
influence. My Channel4 interviewee described it this way: 
Because of our privileged position here, we're not for current affairs 
programmes solely chasing ratings. It's perfectly acceptable here just to have, if 
necessary, five to 700,000 per show. When we did Portillo's Progress,31 I think 
we got only seven or 800,000, but because it reached all the people at the party 
conferences, all the people at the political magazines - in other words, its target 
audience- then what we're making is television to be talked about, and if it's 
talked about in the right circles, and the circles it's aimed for, that's fine. 
However, in the case of the NHS poll it is hard to find any impact on those 
opinion leaders let alone the rest of the public sphere. For reasons which I will 
explore later on, the only reaction SCPR received was "a few phone calls and e-
mails" (SCPR manager, London); it generated no other media coverage; even the 
four expert panellists I was able to contact could not recall having been involved 
without prompting, on the grounds of which three of them refused an interview. 
So, while Channel 4 faced less restrictive audience requirements which allowed 
them to take up deliberative polls as a project in the first place, simply 
broadcasting something does not mean it will have an impact on the wider public 
sphere. 38 
37 About former highly ranked Conservative MP Michael Portillo. 
38 A personal observation may be useful here. It was my experience as a media relations 
consultant that the promoters of an event or product grossly over-estimate the impact of 
their media relations activity on their target audiences, because they judge the coverage 
they receive out of context: they would look at clippings from newspapers and measure 
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In the case of the NHS Poll, the organisers chose the topic in part because they 
thought it would make good television : the 50th anniversary of the creation of 
the NHS was approaching - indeed, the whole event was timed to coincide with 
that anniversary on 5 July 1998 (SCPR and Channel 4 interviews, London). That 
was not the only reason, though: the topic was also felt to be a good one given 
the aim of deliberative polls. 
I feel quite strongly that these things work best when you've got topics that are 
quite complicated, and that in some ways force people to go against views they 
might hold superficially but haven't really challenged. Something like health 
rationing is a good example where, certainly in this country, the NHS is a sacred 
thing and people wouldn't really question their right to it .... I think all the topics 
picked in Britain have been good for deliberative polling in the sense that 
they've all been things that people have quite strong views on, but its unclear 
what exactly they're rooted in. To me that's an ideal topic. 
Event manager, London 
However, it would misleading to suggest that the NHS poll was an independent 
entity with an internal, academic logic, which just happened to attract the 
attention of a television crew; rather, media and academic imperatives were 
intertwined right from the start, a fact which caused some conflict in the early 
planning stages: 
To a certain extent there's always a tension. The sort of research we do is 
primarily aimed at producing variables which are useful for analysing for detail 
later on, whereas from the telly point of view, they want a nice, snappy question 
the column inches, or collect video and count the seconds, without considering what 
proportion it was of the total media content their audiences were bombarded with that 
day, let alone that week or that year. Equally, promoters of deliberative events tended to 
wave books of press cuttings at me to show what an impact their event had had without 
considering whether that coverage was seen by their audiences, let alone understood or 
remembered. 
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which will give them the frequencies, and they're not really interested in 
whether it's "strongly agree" or just "agree". 
Event manager, London 
One can see the way these imperatives intertwined by comparing the broadcast 
version of the poll, The Prescription (Channel4 1998), with the elements of 
news noted in the previous section. To begin with, television imposed a dramatic 
narrative structure on the event, a point which my Channel4 interviewee 
stressed. It was divided into scenes or chapters, each of which ended with a 
"teaser" pointing out what was coming next so that the television audience would 
stay tuned. It had a plot- the transformation that the participants went through 
-with a beginning, middle and end. The beginning was to stress the fact that 
these people were complete strangers to each other; then showed them getting to 
know eac~ other casually; then getting down to business in the small groups; 
progressing to asking questions of and reacting to the panellists; gaining 
confidence to tackle the politicians; and finally a small group of eight sharing 
their considered opinions and reactions to the event. 
To see the effects of trying to impose a narrative structure, compare how 
different the experience of the deliberative poll is for those who watched it on 
television versus those who participated in the Manchester studios. As can be 
seen in the chart of time allocation during the poll event (figure 5.1 below), the 
participants spent a great deal of time with each other listening, checking, 
debating and forming opinions in their small group sessions, during meals and 
coffee breaks; from the Friday evening to the Sunday afternoon they spent at 
least 20 hours together, of which only 4 hours 45 minutes, or 22 per cent, was 
spent in plenary sessions of one kind or another. However, as can be seen from 
the chart of talk-time given to different groups in the broadcast (figure 5.2), very 
little of what the participants went through made it into the broadcast: group 
discussion, for example, made up only 15:26 minutes, or 9.5 per cent of the total 
programme. Of that 15 minutes, a third was edited highlights from the first day, 
and all but 50 seconds of the rest was of one small group out of 20. Even that 
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remaining ten minutes featured individuals making points to each other- it 
featured little discussion. 
Figure 5.1 NHS Deliberative Poll talk time (in minutes) by participant 
3-Jul-98 4-Jul-98 5-Jul-98 All 
II Compere 
DExperts 
D Politicians 
II Small groups 
II Meals/informal 
IIAII plenaries 
IIAII public 
Figure 5.2 "The Prescription" talk time (in minutes) by participant 
Episode 1 Episode 2 Episode 3 All 
II Compere 
DExperts 
D Politicians 
II Small groups 
IIVox pops 
II Public inter/v 
II SCPR inter/v 
II All plenaries 
I!JAII public 
What the programme did do to show changing minds was a series of "vox pops" 
(short for vox populi, voice of the people, which are 5-10 second, "person on the 
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street" comments about a news topic) giving some top-of-mind reactions to the 
various plenary sessions; and an interview with eight participants at the end of 
the whole event who talked a little about their reactions to the issues. Again, 
however, in none of this was there any discussion- they were simple, brief 
answers to questions. 
The influence of the narrative form is further demonstrated by showing what the 
programme did focus on, rather than what it did not. Referring once again to 
figures 5.1 and 5.2, while the plenary sessions took up relatively little time in the 
main event, the television programme devoted more time to this aspect of the 
deliberative poll than any other, 1 hour 15 minutes, or 46 per cent of the total. 
This is because the plenaries are consonant with another element of news, 
namely the focus on conflict. While the deliberative role of panellists is to 
provide a range of views and information for the participants and the external 
audience, their narrative role is to provide clearly contrasting, polarised views, 
generating the element of conflict. On this respect, the health professionals and 
academics seem to have been disappointingly in agreement with each other-
although they spent two hours with the participants in the event itself, the 
programme only showed 12:49 minutes of their session in the first episode (11 
percent of their real time allocation) plus another 5:36 minutes of highlights in 
the third. By contrast, the sessions with the health spokespeople from the three 
main political parties generated more conflict- and, of course, they were 
considered by the media to be much more significant people by virtue of their 
powerful positions. They took the same amount of time, two hours, as the 
experts did in the event itself, but gained three and a half times more coverage in 
the broadcast, 40:52 minutes in episode two (34 percent of their real time 
allocation), plus another 21:32 of edited highlights in the third. 
While the politicians provided views and styles which contrasted nicely with 
each other, the Conservative spokesperson, Ann Widdecombe, conflicted directly 
with a questioner and the compere, journalist Sheena Macdonald, a somewhat 
testy exchange which lasted for several minutes. The exchange finished like this: 
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Macdonald: Is the logic of your utopia that everybody should have private 
health insurance? 
Widdecombe: No, I haven't said that. I'm really rather saddened that this is 
the way the debate is going. What I have said I want, and I'll say it again (looks 
pointedly at Macdonald), and I'm amazed that with all this time in the studio I 
have to keep saying the same thing again (audible muttering from the audience), 
I want a National Health Service that is available to all regardless of means .... 
Now I could say that another six times and you would not necessarily choose to 
hear it. 
(Channel4 1998, Episode 2, 15:07:36) 
This exchange was, in the context of the rest of the show, television gold. In 
episode three which included edited highlights of the previous two shows, this 
exchange was the only segment of any length that was included unabridged. 
None of the other elements made it into the final episode unedited, be they small 
group discussions, interviews or vox pops. 
The final element of news which impacted on the poll was the presence of a 
strong central character in the shape of Sheena Macdonald, a reporter who enjoys 
celebrity status and who thus enhanced the event's significance by being 
significant herself. The television show feels more like a documentary in which 
the lead character does a great deal of direct-to-camera presentation and one-on-
one interviewing, rather than a broadcast of parliament, say, where the television 
crew is invisible. Compare the proportion of talk time taken by Macdonald with 
the time devoted to others, including panellists, the SCPR team and the lay 
participants. Over the three episodes,39 Macdonald spoke direct to camera, did 
voice-overs, or ran interviews for more than 37 per cent of the 2:42:39 total 
running time, almost as much time as was devoted to the plenary sessions. Even 
in the rest of the broadcast, Macdonald was a dominant presence, introducing 
panellists, asking questions at least as often as the lay participants, and directing 
39 Note that just under half of episode three consisted of edited material from the first 
two; only 25 minutes out of 49 was new material. 
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the interviews with James Fishkin and the SCPR staff. Thus, even though the lay 
participants and their experiences were the putative subjects of the programme, 
more than 80 percent of the actual airtime was dominated by the "significant" 
people, Macdonald and the politicians. 
So, the version that was televised differed from the version experienced by the 
participants in some important respects. The issue here is not that the television 
crew failed to capture the vast majority of the actual deliberating; it is that they 
could not do so using the medium of television in an environment where the 
needs of the audience are a significant factor. While participant development 
may have been the "plot" around which the programme was organised, it would 
have been a struggle for the editorial team to maintain a narrative just by 
focusing on that. There was not enough drama, not enough conflict, not enough 
black and white statements, not enough ups and downs and highs and lows in 
those small group and informal deliberations to capture an audience's attention 
and hold it over a sustained period of time. So, they needed to use two key 
elements of news, significant people and polarisation, to carry the narrative 
burden. 
The problem for our legitimacy question here is that viewers were exposed to 
little of the reason-giving that might have gone on between participants over the 
three days, and so had little solid basis on which to judge the quality of the 
conclusions to which the participants came. Television does not show an 
audience "what went on": it shows just one of many possible new things 
constructed from the pieces of what went on, and thus can leave audiences and 
participants with quite different impressions of events. In the case of the NHS 
Poll, the audience was exposed to some of the information provided by the 
panels, but not much of it: 11 percent in the case of the expert panels, 34 percent 
in the case of the politicians. They got a taste of what went on in the small 
groups and informal discussions during breaks, but again, not much: just over 5 
percent of the total, and most of that was from a few individuals in just one 
group. 
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One could, of course, argue that this does not matter very much, so long as the 
"key messages" from the poll were conveyed to the television audience. Note 
that it does not count against the process if people do not agree with the key 
message; it only counts if they did not hear it or process it properly, and I will 
deal with questions of persuasion in the next chapter. There is some indication 
that the messages got through to the poll participants at least, as one of the 
panellists remarked: 
... the education that had gone on, or the information that had gone on, was 
clearly productive in the sense that the questions that came up were better 
informed questions than you usually get in those kinds of- I mean, I've been 
in forums before .... 
Did that mean you were able to give different kinds of responses? 
I think it probably did, yes. I think I remember commenting to people 
afterwards that I was quite impressed by the quality of debate. It was a higher 
level than normal. 
However, just because a message gets through to the participants, does not mean 
that non-participants pick it up. Unfortunately I lack evidence on whether this is 
the case: to explore it properly, I would have needed to interview each of the 
panellists to identify what they were trying to get across, and to have recorded 
the major arguments in each of the small group sessions, then looked to see 
which messages were (a) accurately sent, both in the plenary sessions and in the 
television broadcast; and (b) accurately received and understood, both by other 
participants in the poll and by the wider public audience. However, as already 
noted, I was unable to get access to more than one of the panellists, let alone 
conduct that more detailed evaluation. I must put this down as an area deserving 
future research. Nonetheless, given the dominance of narrative imperatives, 
there was plenty of room in the NHS deliberative poll for the reasons which 
persuaded participants not to be transmitted to non-participants, and so a question 
mark must remain over the ability of the deliberative poll to generate publicity 
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sufficient for non-participants to confer legitimacy on the process and its 
outcomes. 
Incidentally, the difficulty of making deliberative polls work in narrative terms is 
one of the reasons that, after doing five of them, Channel4 decided that the NHS 
poll would be the last. My interviewee stressed that it was not that they thought 
that the polls were bad things in themselves, nor even that they thought the 
ratings were too low at the time, just that 
... onejust has to ask whether here, now, that's the amount of time one wishes to 
devote to this sort of process, whether it actually gets you back the reward in 
television terms or not.. . . I remember points at which the watchability of it was 
debated even in here by people outside the {commissioning} department, 
because it is a slow thing. Television works in narrative terms and often better 
in hour bites than it does in two hour bites. So something like a deliberative poll 
is difficult. Now, I think we're in a multi-channel environment, we're having to 
make sure our schedule is one that will be watched when people are surfing with 
a zapper. 
Conditions of successful publicity: salience and the limits of newsworthiness 
I noted in the last section that the NHS Poll had almost no impact on the rest of 
the public sphere beyond the Channel 4 programme: no other media covered it, 
and it could barely be recalled by the panellists. However, the experience was 
quite different with both the citizens' jury cases: they generated significantly 
more media coverage in their localities. Why was that, and what does that say 
about the likelihood of generating legitimating bonds with non-participants 
through the media? 
Both the Leicester and Belfast juries attracted media attention, while anecdotal 
evidence reported by the process organiser suggests that people in Leicester still 
recalled their jury some months later (Jury moderator, London). However, the 
Belfast media coverage focused almost exclusively on the process: of the four 
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newspaper clippings given to me by the EHSSC, the three pre-jury clippings 
concentrate almost exclusively on the process, with only five sentences out of 35 
mentioning anything about health service reorganisation. The single post-jury 
item summarised the recommendations, but a third of the article focused on the 
process.40 
This emphasis on process can partly be explained by the wider political concerns 
of the time. The Belfast jury took place just a few months after the signing of the 
Good Friday Agreement which re-established horne rule for Northern Ireland. 
Various sections of the enabling legislation, the Northern Ireland Act, especially 
Section 75, included an array of measures for consulting all of the province's 
"communities" on every major piece of policy administered by every one of the 
province's government agencies. In such an environment, there was intense 
public and media interest in processes which promised to make such cross-
community consultation possible without degenerating into name calling or even 
violence. The citizens' jury process seemed to offer such hope, and so received 
some (but still limited) coverage from newspapers, radio and television. 
However, the topic was unusual in that the commissioners were using it to 
prepare a response to the Westminster government's NHS White Paper 
(Secretary of State for Health 1997). Service restructuring was not highly salient 
in the sense that it had not been debated in the Northern Irish media, no specific 
decision was being taken, nor was it likely that the participants would see much 
in the way of concrete outcomes. These features made it a "bad question" 
according to the jury moderator because, 
... it also has to be something that's quite 'live'. This sounds obvious, but 
because it's quite a long process, and because quite a lot happens in it, it's 
40 It was difficult to get an accurate view of the Belfast media coverage in the short time 
I had available, while the internet archives of the major Northern Ireland newspapers 
either return null results or do not extend back to July 1998. Ulster Television would 
only provide video tape of their coverage, including one extended television interview, 
at rates which were well beyond my means. Therefore the remarks about the coverage 
generated by the Belfast jury should be treated with caution. 
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obvious quite soon if the {health} authority is not asking about something that's 
a real issue still, or a live issue, or a real thing they're trying to make a decision 
on. So it's the specificity, the realness, the liveness of the question which is 
important. 
Jury moderator, London 
Interviewees suggested that this general pattern is repeated wherever citizens' 
juries are held for the first time in a locality: consonant with news values, the 
first one is news simply because it is the first one, not the usual way of doing 
things; subsequent ones are not news, unless they deal with a significant and 
pressing public issue and are part of, and have an influence over, a bigger 
decision making process (Jury moderators, London; Jo Lenaghan, personal 
correspondence). Thus, in Belfast, the actual substance of the discussion came a 
distant second in terms of media interest to the process itself. This is not at all 
unusual: think of something far more dramatic such as space flight. The first 
moon landing held the television-watching world spellbound in 1969; the Apollo 
13 mission was captivating because of the inherent dramatic tension of not 
knowing whether the crew would make it back alive; by 1972, the missions on 
which most of the useful science was conducted were "boring" (Lewis 1974, 
172). Now, note the feverish attempts to make each space shuttle flight a "first" 
or "most" or to highlight some other arbitrary milestone- first Japanese 
astronaut, for example, or the lOOth mission, heaviest payload, longest, highest, 
fastest, cheapest- anything to attract media attention and thus to maintain 
public interest and support. 
By contrast, the Leicester citizens' jury generated significant coverage focused 
on the substantive issue, not just on the process - although as another "first", 
interest in the process itself was also high (Bums 2000g). It was run in the 
context of a specific decision that needed to be taken, involving numerous 
powerful stakeholders both within and outside the local, regional, and central 
governments, about an issue that had very high salience thanks not only to the 
deliberate efforts of the "Save Glenfield" campaigners to make it salient, but also 
to the regular coverage given to the plans by the local newspaper, the Leicester 
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Mercury, over a period of at least six months between October 1999 and April 
2000. Furthermore, there was likely to be a practical outcome: the jury 
recommendations were presented to the Health Authority which was expected to 
act on them (Burns 2000c ). As a result, publicity focused not just on the process, 
but on the substantive issues being debated. 
Given that I was able to access much more of the publicity surrounding the 
Leicester jury, it is in this case that we can explore whether arguments were 
reliably transmitted between deliberative sites by the media, and the answer, at 
first, was "depends". The agenda for public debate, including the problem 
definition, was set early on by the protestors, not by the health authority, because 
the latter had conducted its four-year consultation with a very limited circle of 
medical interests and behind closed doors. While the authority thought that what 
they were doing was improving service efficiency across all three hospitals, the 
protestors focused on the changes at Glenfield in isolation. They believed that 
the authority's plan would downgrade Glenfield to the extent that it would make 
it easier to close in the future: 
Unless the users' and future users' voices are heard and listened to, this friendly 
and successful hospital, 'a friend in need', will be downgraded to the position of 
a rehabilitation unit which, over a short period of time will be found to be 
uneconomic and those driving daily round the New Parks Estate island will see a 
for sale notice- "Apply to the LHA for details and price". 
(Letters to the editor 1999) 
Thus the media coverage up until December 1999 focused on "plans to turn 
Glenfield into a rehabilitation unit", entirely reflecting the protestor's problem 
definition, a definition which was only partially borne out by the available 
evidence. From January 2000, the phrase changed to "planned care and 
rehabilitation site", suggesting that the authority's communication machine had 
finally started to work to get its version of events heard, although headlines still 
ran the "save Glenfield" line right up until the jury convened at the end of March 
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2000.41 The coverage only dropped the "rehabilitation unit" description, opting 
instead for the more accurate "centre for planned care", from 1 April, after the 
health reporter who had covered the issue from day one had sat in on the jury 
deliberations over the four days and had heard the various arguments. Indeed, 
the newspaper carried extensive coverage of the various claims and counter-
claims of the protagonists during the jury itself, reporting on each of the 
presentations the morning after (Bums 2000a; 2000b; 2000e; 2000h), 
summarising them all on the final day (Bums 2000c ), and providing a detailed 
outline of arguments and recommendations (Bums 2000f). 
So, we can say that in the Leicester case, the media did successfully transmit the 
various arguments, although this was facilitated by the citizens jury which 
provided a forum in which those claims could be aired- before the jury, the 
protestors' problem definition dominated the media coverage, even after the 
health authority got its communication act together.42 Regarding the concern 
with the transmission of arguments through the public sphere, it seems this is 
more likely to be undistorted if those claims are made in a well-designed 
deliberative moment like a citizens jury, at which others like the media are 
present, than if they are allowed to percolate through the media without such a 
deliberative focal point. 
We can also say that the salience of the issue at hand, and its connection to a 
decision making moment, are also important. This, I suggest, is what made the 
difference between the Leicester citizens' jury on the one hand and the Belfast 
jury and deliberative poll on the other. Clearly, the lack of a decision making 
setting had interesting consequences for the NHS deliberative poll. While the 
impending 501h anniversary gave it some sense of timeliness, it was not as if 
41 Journalists do not generally write their own headlines; they are written by sub-editors 
who edit the journalists' copy into its final form. Thus it is often not surprising that the 
headline of a story and the body can give quite a different impression. 
42 This reflects one of the rules of media communication: be the first with a story so that 
your side sets the agenda (Cutlip, Center, and Broom 1985), a lesson which the authority 
had not learned (CHC officer, Leicester). 
160 
Deliberation as drama 
anyone else could do much with the results: there was no upcoming vote, nor 
was there a specific government process into which the results were fed, a point 
made to me by an interviewee at the Department of Health. This meant that not 
only did it receive little media coverage, it had little impact even on the experts, 
policy makers and politicians who were part of it, generating pretty much no 
debate in policy circles. 
Other features of the news media are important. In the NHS Poll case, 
competing television stations were not going to cover a Channel 4 event unless it 
was a great deal more significant, and newspapers found relatively little in the 
results worthy of reporting (and by the time of the fifth poll, the process itself 
was no longer news). Similarly with the Belfast jury, the BBC would not cover 
it because Ulster Television had, the story not having enough salience to override 
that desire for exclusivity in a competitive environment. These points have 
important implications for those attempting to create links between participants 
and non-participants in deliberative process by means of the news media: most 
deliberative processes are simply not newsworthy, and will fail to generate bonds 
between participants and non-participants. Something is interesting the first 
time, but not the second or third, so long as it deals with issues which are outside 
the fairly limited parameters of newsworthiness. 
Conditions of successful publicity: political theatre 
I noted above that the Save Glenfield campaigners made the issue salient in the 
first place, and thus their problem definition set the terms of debate for most of 
the nine months in which the public controversy raged. This emphasises the 
point that while it is true that, as suggested in the previous discussion, an attempt 
to generate media publicity will be unsuccessful if the issue is not salient, 
salience can be manufactured, and that issues- or, more correctly, problem 
definitions (Edelman 1988)- can be put on the public agenda. As already 
suggested, the means of doing this are dramaturgical rather than strictly 
communicative in the Haberrnasian sense (Haberrnas 1984, 93). In this section, I 
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want to explore how two groups in the cases under study tried to get their 
problem definition accepted in the media, and the implications of that for 
publicity in the wider public sphere. I do so by concentrating on issues of 
scripting and performance rather than the setting (Benford and Hunt 1992; see 
Edelman 1976).43 
ACHCEW and the NHS Plan 
The first place to see such dramaturgy in action is in the NHS Plan case. Recall 
that when the plan was launched in July 2000 (following pre-announcements in 
late May), a central plank of Chapter 10, Changes for Patients, was to boost what 
the Department of Health saw as the key functions of the CHCs- namely 
complaint handling, service quality monitoring, and providing a patient voice on 
service changes - by redesigning and redistributing those functions amongst 
elected local governments and new patient advisory boards, new patient 
advocacy services at NHS trusts and various government agencies. The CHCs 
saw it a little differently: what they focused on was Part 1, clauses 14 and 15 of 
the Health & Social Care Bill which concerned the "abolition of the Community 
Health Councils", rather than clauses 7 to 13 which redistributed their functions. 
The months of consultation had focused on the principles which should guide the 
design of the new "patient-centred" NHS; the precise institutions which should 
embody those principles were designed by a much smaller group comprising the 
Secretary of State and his small circle of advisors. The abolition of the CHCs 
was thought by the designers to fall logically out of the principles, and so the 
abolition decision was made very quickly without further consultation (DoH 
manager, London). 
Opposition was organised quickly by the Association of Community Health 
Councils of England and Wales (ACHCEW). ACHCEW ran a "very, very good 
campaign", according to one interviewee, by selecting one clear message and 
43 See Hajer (2002) for a case study of the effects that setting can have on a policy 
debate. 
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hammering it home to their members, the 
media, the Health Select Committee, and 
a network of other organisations like Age 
Concern, the Royal College of Nursing, 
the Royal College of Obstetricians and 
Gynaecologists, the Patients Association, 
even the Local Government Association 
(whose members were gaining new 
powers under the Bill). The key message was that the government was trying to 
abolish patients' only independent watchdog, using the slogan "Watchdog, not 
lapdog", implying that the new patient advocates, as employees of the various 
health trusts, would not have the independence to fulfil their scrutiny function. 
Its media "hook" was to connect the existence of CHCs with two cases of 
medical malpractice which had already caused significant scandal: 
CHCs, which represent patients' interests, played an important role in bringing 
the case of disgraced gynaecologist Rodney Ledward to light, and supported the 
relatives of the victims of Harold Shipman, the killer GP. 
(Staff reporter 2000) 
By comparison, the new systems' designers were on the back foot in publicity 
terms because they had neither a simple message (DoH manager, London) nor an 
emotional hook- indeed, they were held to be partly responsible in both the 
cases used by ACHCEW as hooks, not having had proper mechanisms in place to 
catch Shipman in particular. Having framed the issue in the way it did, 
ACHCEW ensured that the government could not win that particular battle. 
The overall point is that this example shows how the publicity function can be 
used to subvert as well as enhance the deliberative process where specific 
strategic goals are at stake. On the one hand, ACHCEW had a legitimate gripe: 
just as the Leicester patients' bodies had been left out of a decision making 
process which clearly affected them and took action to force the deliberative 
doors open, so ACHCEW had been left out of a process which affected their 
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interests and took similar protest action. But where the Leicester case resulted in 
the campaigners being given a role in putting their cases to the citizens jury, 
agreeing to leave the decision to them, ACHCEW never asked to be included in 
some future debate, nor was it offered to them. Instead it pursued a specific 
outcome using deliberately dramaturgical rather than communicative means, 
setting the terms of the debate by positioning themselves as the good guys in two 
scandals in which the government were seen as culpable, terms which could only 
come out in their favour. 44 Thus they used the real features of the media (that is, 
its affinity for simplicity, scandal and sound-bites) rather than the imagined ones 
of pure and unfiltered transmission of whatever is put into it not so much to open 
public debate, but to foreclose it, staking out a position in advance and not 
entertaining changes to it. 
Disability activist campaigning 
The second case where dramaturgy is important is in the activities of the 
disability movement. As noted in chapter one, the movement engages with the 
rest of public sphere in ways which try to ensure that it does not get co-opted by 
powerful interests like large charities, care providers and the medical profession, 
preferring self-help and direct action. Most notable in this respect is the Direct 
Action Network for Disabled People (DAN) which, since 1994, has undertaken a 
variety "actions" (a word borrowed from the environmental movement), aimed at 
inaccessible public transport, and protesting against what it saw as the Blair 
government's failure to honour a pre-election pledge to strengthen the Disability 
Discrimination Act's accessibility requirements for building and public transport 
operators. That, and proposals to decrease disability payments to beneficiaries, 
resulted in DAN's best-known action in 1997 when the group staged a highly 
visible demonstration outside Downing Street, chaining themselves to the gates 
44 At least in the short term: the government gave way, but worked to build support for 
its measures with some of ACHCEW' s erstwhile suppmters, then reintroduced the 
measures in the NHS Reform and Health Care Professions Bill in November 2001, 
which became law in June 2002. 
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and splattering themselves with red paint to represent the people killed by 
neglect. 
The key feature of DAN's actions is that they use publicity in much the same 
way that ACHCEW used it in its battle over the abolition of CHCs - to create a 
self-contained situation full of conflict which will attract media attention and 
thus apply pressure to other decision making processes. DAN gives journalists 
advance warning of actions so there will be plenty of coverage. Indeed, its press 
releases are sent out in advance of actions bearing notes to editors such as: 
N.B. Photo journalists: There will be dramatic photo opportunities DAN 
actions are non violent, typically high profile and confrontational 
Arrests are likely. 
(DAN 1998, original punctuation) 
(photographs from http://www .outside-centre.corn!depend/) 
While espousing non-violence, 
DAN's actions are designed to 
provoke an equally confrontational 
reaction, which, it is hoped, will 
lead to policy change; indeed, 
Scalmer (2002, 176) points out that 
shock and "hysterical critique" are 
necessary pre-conditions for attracting that media and policy community 
attention. For DAN, there's nothing quite so likely to stir the emotions and make 
a media impact as images of disabled men and women being hauled into 
wheelchairs by police officers and taken away. The point here is that, where a 
group lacks a voice in decision making moments, or where it has good reason for 
rejecting the model of engagement used by decision makers, then more 
"reasonable" means of attracting publicity may not be effective. In a media 
environment which focuses on the theatrical, the deliberate use of theatre is a 
particularly effective means of having their voice heard. 
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Such effectiveness comes at a cost, however. What gets lost in such theatrical 
media accounts, as noted on page 147 above, are the technical and moral 
complexities of issues, as well as the material and discursive forces at work; and 
the everyday experiences of people rather than the exceptional. In the ACHCEW 
case, what was lost was the point that its functions were being given to 
organisations which were more accountable to citizens rather than less, which 
would draw their membership from a wider demographic base, and which had 
more extensive watchdog powers. In disability movement actions, what gets lost 
is the fact that the social model of disability is itself controversial because it can 
serve to undermine attempts to solve physical problems (Humphrey 2000), 
leaving people with genuine medical needs sidelined by the movement and by 
the policy priorities it advocates. This returns us to the concerns about interest 
groups raised in the previous chapter- unless they themselves are inclusive and 
internally democratic, there is no reason to expect that the arguments they make 
are representative of the claims that might be made by those for whom they claim 
to speak. If we rely purely on dramaturgy to gain access to the media, and rely 
on the media as our means of building publicity, then it seems that we privilege 
those points of view which can easily be dramatised and exclude those which 
cannot. 
The solution may well be one that Dryzek (2000, 108) puts forward: a 
movement may make a strategic choice to split itself into radical and engaged 
wings, one which works in civil society, sets the agenda and challenges the 
exercise of state power, the other which works with the state to integrate the new 
voice into state decision making, as the green movement has sometimes done in 
Germany. This is precisely what has happened with the disability movement: 
groups like DAN have forced issues onto the public agenda while the British 
Council of Disabled People and others get invited to join working parties to write 
anti-discrimination legitislation and onto the board of the newly-created 
Disability Commission. The fact that activists help open up the agenda but more 
"reasonable" others get invited to join in the subsequent conversation may not be 
a problem- from the standpoint of the deliberative system, what matters is that 
the public conversation is changed rather than who precisely is speaking at any 
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televised version with extensive coverage of combat between celebrities. The 
end result was that non-participants probably did not get exposed to many of the 
key arguments which were made in the poll event, but this conclusion is 
tentative, based on the balance of probabilities from limited evidence. 
Looking at the Leicester citizens' jury case I was on firmer ground, and was able 
to show that a newspaper, with its greater space and lack of visual constraints, 
was able to transmit the key arguments to non-participants once they had been 
made in the jury itself. Prior to the jury, however, the newspaper's coverage 
reflected the protestors' claims much more than the health authority's. Thus it 
seemed that the jury itself provided an "opportunity structure" (Tilly 1978, 56) in 
which the range of arguments could be shared, but that the media on its own, 
without a deliberative site on which to focus, did not. In this case, accountability 
was dispersed throughout the public sphere when a deliberative forum provided a· 
focal point. The possibility here is that macro deliberative democracy may only 
share a reasonably comprehensive range of available arguments among citizens 
when it focuses on micro deliberative moments, which means we cannot entirely 
abandon micro deliberation in favour of macro. 
The reasons why the Leicester jury attracted coverage in the first place had a lot 
to do with the fact that it was addressing an issue which had already been 
elevated to "problem" status - had become salient, that is - and because it was 
connected with another decision making moment, unlike the NHS Poll or the 
Belfast jury. In both Belfast and Leicester, the fact that the process itself was 
new helped made it "news". Given a lack of newness, of salience, or of 
connection with a decision making moment, the NHS Poll made next to no 
impact on the public sphere. 
Where salience is absent, it can be created by dramaturgical means. Both 
ACHCEW and the more radical arm of the disability movement used political 
theatre which emphasised conflict to generate salience and gain media coverage; 
by so doing they hoped to force decision makers to accommodate their wishes. 
They both gained some success: the disability movement was successful in 
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one moment. This can only be a partial solution, however: activists cannot 
determine which bits of a complex message survive publicity's filtering process, 
and thus cannot determine entirely how the problem is reconstructed by 
government for action.45 
Conclusions 
I want to conclude this chapter by summing up the key points and drawing out 
the implications for my quest to establish legitimating bonds between 
participants and non-participants in deliberative democracy. 
The first step was to highlight the often unrecognised but always implicit 
importance of the news media in democratic theory, having as it does a role in 
determining what issues become seen as "problems" in the public sphere and 
thus what issues get political attention or not. However, while few academics 
argue that the present-day media performs that role in the pure way imagined by 
Thomas Carlyle, I have been at pains to point out that the reasons for this go well 
beyond the personal failings of individual journalists, subeditors, editors or 
proprietors: they concern the very political economy of news, including what 
counts as news in the first place. These structural features mean that certain 
kinds of issues get covered easily in the news media while others do not. In 
particular, those who have arguments to advance through the media must do so 
by personalising, polarising, and dramatising their issues such that they construct 
a narrative- a story- with all the conventions which accompany the narrative 
form. This was seen in action particularly in the case of the NHS Poll where 
television's narrative constraints overwhelmed the reason-giving which is 
supposed to be the key feature of the small group deliberations, replacing it in the 
45 In the context of women's movement activity surrounding childcare and unpaid work, 
Grey (2003) shows that movements have very limited success while holding firmly to 
their discursive frames; they have significantly more success when they reframe debate 
in terms that are consonant with dominant discourses, but at the cost of dropping key 
demands which only found support in their old discourse. 
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having government agencies established and human rights legislation amended, 
while ACHCEW won a stay of execution, albeit temporarily. But dramaturgy 
can undermine deliberative democratic values, either by sidelining inconvenient 
complexities or inconvenient viewpoints. Normatively, therefore, I would 
suggest that drama has a role in opening up deliberative space so that excluded 
voices can be included; but is dangerous when allowed to go further into the 
pursuit of specific policy goals, simply because such communication may very 
well exclude some relevant perspectives. 
Can deliberative democrats therefore rely on the media to transmit arguments, to 
be the means by which bonds of accountability are created between participants 
and non-participants? At least in the cases I examined, it seems this is only so 
where the following conditions are met: that a particular deliberative system has 
a micro level deliberative focal point, a forum in which arguments can indeed be 
made freely; where the issue is already salient; where it is the subject of an actual 
decision; and where it can be easily narrated. Without them, mediated 
deliberation is at best an unreliable builder of links between participants and non-
participants. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
REASON AND PERSUASION 
Great public events cannot be carried by the influence of mere reason. 
Robert Peel (1846) 
The last of the major grounds on which legitimacy battles were fought in my 
cases is rationality. Rationality issues, broadly defined, were raised by my 
interviewees on 105 occasions, only slightly less than representation issues, and 
were one of the two major motivations for local NHS managers to experiment 
with deliberative processes (chapter three, page 78). Indeed, it is frequently 
argued in health policy settings that if something is irrational it is therefore 
illegitimate (Tenbensel 2002, 175n). This reflects a technocratic frustration with 
politics as usual, with strategic game-playing and the undermining of important 
public initiatives for selfish ends, or simply with decision making processes 
which don't seem to take important facts and values into account (Gutmann and 
Thompson 1996, 12; see Fischer 1990). Micro deliberative processes like 
citizens' juries and deliberative polls have rationalising benefits simply because 
they systematically inform participants about the issues and encourage people to 
check their understandings, interpretations and opinions with each other- while 
hardly perfect, it is better than driving policy by uninformed "non-attitudes" or 
"pseudo-opinions" (Converse 1964; Fishkin 1991, 82; Neuman 1986, 23). 
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Questions about rationality connect with my theoretical concerns in several 
ways. As will be seen, there are connections with all three of the motivations 
problems: speech culture, limited agendas and pre-deliberative commitments. 
Rationality is also an essential part of the concept of legitimacy I have been 
working with: the reasons for a proposal, including substantive judgements 
about its rightness, are necessary for judging whether or not it should be 
implemented or obeyed (chapter two, page 33, and Cohen 1989, 148). However, 
I have also argued that appeals to rationality, even from experts who have spent 
time considering the details of an issue, should not have decisive force: they 
should have weight only in as much as they are offered in a process of public 
deliberation. 
Nonetheless, some deliberative theorists and practitioners worry because it is not 
at all obvious that people are persuaded solely by what even they agree is 
reasonable. As Peel said in the quote above, and as thousands of years of 
rhetoric have taught us, persuasion requires argumentation which engages the 
heart as well as the mind, but this risks re-opening the doors of deliberative 
forums to manipulation of emotions for strategic ends, a door which rationalists 
try to keep firmly closed (Chambers 1996; Habermas 1984; Spragens 1990; see 
Dryzek 2000, 52-4, 66-7). If this tension between reason and persuasion is 
unresolveable then once again there seems to be no way of reaching legitimate 
agreements in deliberative democracy: any process will either fall foul of the 
rationality requirement, or will fail to persuade. 
In this chapter I explore that tension in theory and practice. I begin by looking at 
how the majority of public actors have come to conceptualise rationality, and 
some of the problems with that construction both in descriptive and normative 
terms. I then return to the cases to see how these issues arose and were dealt 
with, and conclude by summing up the strengths and weaknesses of the different 
deliberative models on these dimensions. 
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Bureaucratic rationality, bureaucratic argument 
For many public actors rationality has come to require two things: first, 
instrumental action, the selection and implementation of good means to 
consistent and clarified ends; and second, that choices about rational actions be 
made against objective standards which are universally applicable, such as the 
rules of evidence, or the methods of scientific enquiry, or the values of efficiency 
and effectiveness (Dryzek 1990, 3-4; Elster 1983, 16-7; Fischer 1990,41-3, 61). 
On this account, a well-resourced, well-informed and well-trained policy analyst 
should, after gathering the facts and evidence, be able to identify, select and 
implement rational courses of action from the comfort of her office chair. 
This account of instrumental rationality has been advanced both as a description 
and as an ideal. The description met its death at the hands of March and Simon 
(1958), who noted that while the ideal of instrumental rationality relies on clear 
problem definition, full information, and adequate resources, such conditions are 
rarely met in the real world of decision making. Instead, rationality is almost 
always "bounded"- for March and Simon by cognitive limits, but also by 
inequalities and competitive pressures between actors, structural distortions and 
the political economy (Forester 1984, 24)- such that the instrumental ideal can 
rarely be approximated, let alone achieved, although different institutional 
settings apply different sorts of pressures. Furthermore, scholars working in a 
more Foulcauldian mode have argued that rationality itself is context-dependant; 
that what counts as rational bends to suit the interests of the powerful in a given 
situation (Flyvbjerg 1998; Hindess 1988). Nevertheless, the instrumental ideal 
continues to exert considerable normative force among policy makers. 
Instrumental norms penetrated expert thinking in each of my cases. The extent 
of that can be most clearly seen in the way that Leicestershire Health Authority 
managers talked about their case. In contrast to my media, CHC and local 
council interviewees, who described the debate in more "political" terms-the 
seat-of-the-pants search for a resolution to a crisis-the health authority people 
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reconstructed the Leicester debate in terms of an idealised, instrumentally 
rational process selection: 
And so we had a problem really, which was how do we look at not just one set 
of factors in relation to how the services ought to be-in other words, the 
service model for the future-but also how do we make the decision about 
where those services ought to be based .... Is the model that we're looking to 
adopt for the next ten years seen in the public's eyes as one they could support? 
In other words, is there a compelling case for reorganising services? ... 
I mean in many respects we were on the horns of a dilemma really. How do you 
gain consensus when in fact there are different views within the system? There 
was a clinical view that said yes, we think it's right to organise these services in 
such a way. On the other hand, loyalties towards a particular hospital were very, 
very pressing, and how do we get not necessarily just an informed view, but 
how do we test out of some of those assumptions with a group of people? So we 
decided to do it that way. 
Leicestershire Health Authority manager 
My interviewee claimed three things here which were not supported by other 
evidence. He claimed ownership of the idea to run a citizens' jury, when in fact 
the suggestion was made by Patricia Hewitt; he claimed that theirs was the 
decision to go with that model, when in fact the decision had been made for them 
by central and local politicians and the CHC, under pressure from the media; and 
he claimed it was the calm, logical, instrumentally rational selection of a good 
means to a well-defined end, when the real situation was anything but calm and 
the problem anything but well-defined. I will get to issues of problem definition 
next, but the point I want to stress here is how striking the mismatch between 
descriptions was, and thus how powerful the instrumental rationality norm was, 
leading the health authority manager to reconstruct events to fit the norm of how 
things should have happened. 
Policy makers try to overcome the "boundedness" of instrumental rationality by 
a variety of strategies. Depending on the nature of the challenges faced, these 
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include satisficing, making do with the first workable solution rather than the 
best possible; networking to improve problem definitions, information and 
resources; bargaining and adjusting positions with competing actors (Lindblom 
1965); or more communicative solutions (Forester 1984). Putting this another 
way, to deal with boundedness issues, managers are required to consult various 
stakeholders about issues, options and plans; they need to discuss issues with 
others, use arguments for and against proposals, weigh evidence and attempt to 
persuade others to their point of view. As Majone (1989, 1) stresses, "public 
policy is made of language. Whether in written or oral form, argument is central 
in all stages of the policy process." 
But this means that there is a mismatch between what public managers actually 
do, and what instrumental rational norms tell them is the "right" way of going 
about things. This mismatch can have unfortunate consequences. For one, it can 
lead public managers to miss the ways in which power, discourses, networks and 
institutions shape the policy agenda, and determine what counts as a problem in 
the first place (Kingdon 1984), so blinding them to potential problems with, and 
challenges to, their programmes. Another problem is that it may blind different 
participants to the ways in which the evidence wielded in favour of a proposal, 
and the persuasive power of that evidence, depends to a large degree on 
discursive frames (Hajer 1993; Schon and Rein 1994). There is no reason to 
suspect that even instrumentally rational actors sitting down together will count 
each others' evidence as relevant, let alone valid. Perhaps more seriously, given 
a "deep-seated animosity towards politics-particularly democratic politics" 
(Fischer 1990, 21), public managers may resent the political, discursive 
processes which are necessary for them to get their well-thought-out plans 
accepted. All this may lead them to reject the diverse grounds of others' 
arguments while at the same time finding it impossible to live up to the ideal 
themselves. They may bewail the irrationality of others, to the detriment of 
democracy, while unable to be rational in this way either. 
The solution, for some theorists, is to question not just the descriptive grounds of 
the instrumental ideal, but its normative grounds as well- that is, to advance a 
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more democracy-friendly account of rationality in which the linguistic aspect 
plays a more central role (Dryzek 1990, Ch 1; Fischer and Forester 1993; 
Habermas 1996, 3). In communicative rationality, processes of discussion and 
persuasion, rather than being bemoaned, are celebrated for helping form bonds of 
understanding "across the boundaries of scientific paradigms, political theories, 
cultures, or normative positions, even in the absence of transcendent criteria", so 
long as the discussion is under dispersed and competent democratic control 
(Dryzek 1990, 11), although this approach rarely touches public managers. 
The communicative approach helps lessen the tension between rationality and 
persuasion as well. While acknowledging Aristotle's observation that emotional 
appeals (pathos) can be stronger than logical argument, Dryzek (2000, 52-4) 
blunts the more rationalist criticism by pointing out that such appeals can be 
"subjected to rational justification, because emotions often rest on beliefs," 
which themselves can be checked for accuracy. For example, expressing public 
anger at particular circumstances can be perfectly justified by the unfairness of 
those circumstances. The same goes for character-based appeals (ethos): 
O'Neill (1998) points out that under the time constraints of real deliberation, 
participants may have no choice but to take ethos into account, but can 
nonetheless make rational judgements about those appeals - I will highlight 
some examples later. 
The next question is, on what terms does rationality get fought over in the cases? 
In the next two sections I discuss the two most important grounds of contention: 
problem definitions and attachments to particular outcomes. I then look at how 
participants in these deliberative moments reasoned together and worked to 
persuade each other before, in the final section, offering some brief thoughts on 
the strengths and weaknesses of the different processes in allowing for 
rationalisation in this richer, communicative sense. 
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Rationality and problem definitions 
I argued in chapter three that legitimacy requires that problem definitions be 
contestable, and agendas broad enough to at least engage with, if not solve, the 
larger social, political and economic issues which provide the context for local 
issues. This is both to make deliberative events more motivationally attractive, 
and to ensure that deliberators do not overlook the impact of a given situation on 
groups which might otherwise be invisible. However, this requirement can 
conflict with the practice of instrumental rationality in a technocratic 
environment. While instrumental rationality requires a well-defined problem so 
that remedial action can address what is "really" going on, if the problem is 
defined by experts in advance of any consultative process, this can shut out 
competing definitions (Fischer 1990; Schratz and Walker 1995, 11), which then 
undermines the legitimacy of any subsequent deliberation. In all of my micro 
deliberative cases, this turned out to be a problem to some degree: all were 
commissioned by public managers to address a particular problem, and so it 
should not come as a surprise that one of the most important legitimacy battles 
concerned limited problem definitions and the scope of deliberation. 
In its initial stages in particular, the Leicester debate can be seen as an instance of 
contested problem definitions. The health authority's problem was an artefact of 
what Kingdon (1984, 117) calls "comparative drivers": the decision to compare 
the resources devoted to chronic and acute ailments and the subsequent discovery 
that chronic services were at a relative disadvantage.46 Given that definition, the 
hospital service reorganisation looked like a sensible response. However, as 
noted in the previous chapter, the "problem" for the protestors and petition-
signatories was the closure of accident and emergency services, or entire 
46 This is an example of an issue that has been identified in public management studies: 
that "what gets measured gets managed." The phrase is used by Schick (1996) to 
describe how some issues become "problems" simply because they can be easily 
quantified, with the result that management focuses on lowering or raising the relevant 
number, ignoring issues which are less easily reducible to numerical indicators. 
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hospitals, in smaller centres around the country. The proposed changes at 
Glenfield Hospital were interpreted as making any future closure easier, and so 
was to be resisted (Letters to the editor 1999). 
Judgements of rationality depended on which problem definition the protagonists 
were allied with. For the health authority and for the CHC, who had been 
involved in the authority's early consultations, someone was irrational if they 
thought that the reorganisation was about closing Glenfield. Such people were 
simply mistaken about the facts (as determined by the authority's frame of 
reference), and going off half-cocked: 
I did go to the local media and said, ... "Glenfield Hospital is not closing, it's not 
about closing of hospitals. It's actually about building services." And I did say 
a lot of people do feel that they were signing petitions to stop closure of 
hospitals ... 
CHC officer, Leicester 
For the protestors, irrationality was pretending that closure was not a possibility. 
So, the health authority found its first job was not so much to persuade people 
that it had chosen the right means to a given end, but to change the terms of 
debate such that its problem definition became accepted, something they never 
completely achieved. Indeed, the problem definition battle became one of the 
questions the citizens' jury had to decide: "are you convinced of the need for 
change?", as well as, "which is your preferred option?" (OPM 2000, 3). 
Similar problems occurred in the deliberative poll, where there was a clear gap 
between what the organisers and expert panellists thought the debate was about, 
and the aims and values of the lay participants. Recall that the NHS Poll was set 
up largely as a social scientific experiment to see whether lay people, confronted 
with information about the unsustainability of the current system, would accept 
the need for some form of explicit priority-setting, as opposed to the implicit 
processes which have always been a feature of medical practice (Klein, Day, and 
Redmayne 1996), as well as asking what principles they would recommend to 
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guide such decisions (Event manager, London). In other words, the problem 
definition included the assumption that explicit priority setting was the right way 
to go, and that rationality required that public opinion shift in that direction. This 
was indicated in comments by one of the poll organisers: 
I expected people to become more accepting of rationing; and I think that what 
we underestimated was people's unbelievable attachment to the NHS and 
unwillingness to contemplate it changing dramatically in the way it was 
structured. 
Two of the NHS poll panellists implied very similar prejudgements in responses 
to questions during the plenary sessions, demonstrating a lack of respect for lay 
values and knowledge by drawing contrasts between "obsessions" on the one 
hand and being "serious" on the other: 
The waiting list issue is a very complex one. The first thing I'd say is that it's a 
very small proportion ofthe total NHS. There's a tendency for the tail to be · 
wagging the dog, and I don't think that obsessions with clearing waiting lists are 
at all helpful. 
Public health academic 
If you want to reduce inequalities in health, if you're really serious about it-
and I'm not sure that everybody is - but if you are serious, you should be 
prepared to redirect resources away from those who have already had a good 
innings towards those who are unlikely ever to get it 
Health economist (original emphasis) 
By contrast, lay participants placed a great deal more emphasis on the value of 
ensuring equal access to a full range of services regardless of age, lifestyle or 
other factors, and were willing to pay higher taxes to keep things that way. 
Indeed, the perceived egalitarianism of the NHS is one of the reasons that 
support for the institution remains very high (Park, Jowell, and McPherson 
1998). These attitudes were very robust- surprisingly so, to the poll organisers 
- such that while the poll raised general acceptance of the probable need to 
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ration services from 10 per cent pre-deliberation to 33 percent after, attitudes 
against specific bases for rationing (such as position on a waiting list, quality of 
life, cost of treatment and so on) actually hardened after deliberation. That is, 
people became less accepting of specific policy changes even while some at least 
recognised the general need. 
While no-one would say this so bluntly, I got the feeling that some took this 
"robustness" as evidence for lay irrationality, a failure to face facts, especially 
when "emotional attachments" to particular situations or institutions mean that 
"you reach a point where rational argument simply doesn't prevail" (Politician, 
London). However, the point I want to stress here is that the NHS Poll does not 
so much provide evidence of lay irrationality, as evidence that two conflicting 
problem definitions were in play, based on conflicting values between policy 
makers and lay participants (Schon and Rein 1994). It is of concern, therefore, to 
note that the deliberative poll format really does not allow much room for such 
conflicts to be exposed and discussed: the problem definition is set in concrete in 
the questionnaire which cannot be changed during deliberation without 
undermining the logic of the social scientific experiment. One of the poll's 
organisers admitted as much to me when she said that she would want to 
"unpick" the reasons for people's robust attitudes more than she was able to 
using a broad questionnaire. The NHS Plan process is equally vulnerable to 
criticism on this point: the various participants were asked to design the 
implementation, not to question the fundamental principles. The citizens' jury 
model seems less susceptible as the jurors have the power to call witnesses and 
ask their own questions, and have on occasion rebelled against manipulative 
agendas or witnesses, while the openness and composition of the steering group 
is clearly important if a variety of perspectives are to be brought to bear on the 
initial problem definition and agenda setting: 
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the jury process, if they're going to attack on the grounds of legitimacy, one of 
the things they will say is "Who decided the question, who decided how you are 
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get?" Something we tried to do to counter that to some extent is to ensure right 
from the design process, the early stages of design, that it's as open as possible, 
where possible including the local media. 
Jury manager, London 
Despite this, the citizens' jury model still faces problems if the process is only 
used by local agencies, as this limits agendas to those things that can actually be 
decided and acted on at the local level (chapter three, pp.76-7). Small-scale 
deliberations are constrained by how near or far they are from the centre of 
power, by how much influence they have over legal and economic frameworks 
which limit what they can achieve. In the Leicester jury, one of the factors 
which created the acute I planned "problem" in the first place was a national 
shortage of clinical staff, a factor which was not within the remit of the 
Leicestershire Health Authority to address which caused the Leicester jurors 
some frustration (Journalist, Leicester). The Belfast jurors were even more 
constrained, not just by the terms of the brief they had been given, but by the fact 
that Northern Ireland health policy had to fit into policy frameworks determined 
in Westminster and by the terms of the Good Friday Agreement. The NHS Plan 
process was commissioned at the highest level in the Department of Health, but 
even then participants were constrained by decisions taken by cabinet to drive 
through the "modernisation" agenda. 
The activist-driven, "insurgent" model is the least susceptible to such agenda 
problems, as I have stressed before. Activists in such groups seek to influence 
the terms of macro deliberation before getting involved in micro processes, 
maintaining a delicate balance between engagement with the state and insurgent 
activity against it (Dryzek 2000). This is precisely the strategy pursued by the 
disability movement both in working to set up government institutions such as 
the Disability Rights Commission on the one hand, but explicitly challenging the 
dominant frame of reference, the "medical model of disability", through direct 
action on the other hand. This can be an extremely difficult balance to maintain, 
something which disabled academics Barnes and Oliver (1995, 115) put nicely: 
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To get too close to the Government is to risk incorporation and end up carrying 
out their proposals rather than ours. To move too far away is to risk 
marginalisation and eventual demise. To collaborate too eagerly with the 
organisations for disabled people risks having our agendas taken over by them, 
and having them presented both to us and to politicians as theirs. To remain 
aloof risks appearing unrealistic and I or unreasonable, and denies possible 
access to much needed resources. 
This is not to say that the removal of all agenda constraints is possible: one is 
always constrained to some extent by prior agreements, even prior democratic 
agreements, while even governments face constraints on their ability to act, self-
imposed or otherwise, particularly economic constraints like the need to attract 
and retain investment and trade, or the need to maintain international agreements 
on human rights, justice, labour and so forth - this is one of the reasons why 
Dryzek (2000, 138) argues in favour of the democratising potential of 
transnational citizen networks rather than individual states. Nonetheless, within 
the confines of my particular group of cases, the point to stress is that 
deliberative events are significantly more constrained, and face greater 
legitimacy challenges, when they are run at too great a distance from the real 
locus of decision making power. 
Not only is the removal of agenda constraints not always possible, in the case of 
micro level practices it may not be desirable either. This is because micro 
deliberations do not work well with over-broad agendas. The Belfast jury was 
criticised by one of its managers on such grounds. Two of the three questions 
were to elicit people's values surrounding health and social services generally, as 
well as public involvement in health decision making, an "issue that was not 
really having a major policy decision made about it" instead of "something quite 
concrete ... , something that's quite 'live"' (Jury manager, London). Because the 
questions were so broad, and not focused on a particular policy event, the 
responses were fairly broad too: indeed, on the second question the responses 
were pretty much what one would expect from any undeliberative opinion poll, 
demanding services available free to all regardless of other factors, shorter 
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waiting lists, more clinical staff and fewer managers. An identical criticism was 
made of the NHS Poll: 
... it was vague, doing the classic deliberative thing: no clear question, the body 
commissioning it had no powers to act upon that anyway, it was a media stunt, 
and it had four million different questions. If you look at the size of the 
questionnaire, I mean, you know. SCPR have a very different understanding of 
what they mean by "deliberative". 
Department of Health manager, London 
Instead, a citizens' jury agenda needs to be quite focused if it is to deliver a 
thorough, well-deliberated, and thus more rational response to a given question. 
But herein lies the rub: greater focus leads to better quality deliberation on a 
given question, and thus more legitimacy from a instrumentally rationalist point 
of view, but less legitimacy in terms of agenda constraint. Micro deliberations 
have their uses when the problem is well-defined and affects a clearly 
identifiable and contained group of people, but the broader the problem and the 
more diffuse the impacts, the less likely it is that a citizens' jury or any other 
micro deliberative practice is going to be able to deliver legitimacy, simply 
because they cannot possibly deal with all the competing problem definitions. 
This is a further reason for democrats not to neglect the broader strategies of 
engagement and contestation with the state, to re-emphasise macro models of 
deliberation rather than putting all one's eggs in the micro process basket. 
Pre-deliberative commitments and rationality 
The second major ground on which rationality was contested was the presence of 
attachments to a cause, to an issue, to particular decisions or particular 
institutional forms: the pre-deliberative commitments problem, in other words. 
The problem was seen to be greatest for those who had the greatest stake in an 
issue, for whom it was most salient. This came out during the Leicester citizens' 
Jury: 
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... we had one consultant who decided not to turn up as a way of protesting. 
That consultant felt as though we'd reached the right solution, we had the right 
recommendation and we'd taken four years to get there, and now we were going 
to overturn it by asking the people what they thought about it. It was then in 
some ways like an affront to the value of doing it as managers and clinicians. 
Health authority manager, Leicester 
The managers' response to this was to give such people a subsidiary deliberative 
role as witnesses or steering group members, and to involve "ordinary" citizens 
in the actual deliberation: this is one of the key reasons why the citizens' jury 
model appealed. However, as argued in chapters two and five, salience is 
necessary both to motivate participation and to achieve publicity. This may 
mean that the very engagement which disqualifies some people from having an 
active decision making role is required in order to get participants into the forum 
in the first place, or to get non-participants to attend to its proceedings. 
This conflict was apparent in the way interviewees talked about emotions and 
pre-deliberative attachments. On the one hand, some interviewees recognised 
that emotional attachments to an institution like the NHS provide it with a 
general salience which helps motivate participation. As the report on the NHS 
Poll noted, "the NHS has come to occupy a special symbolic place in British 
national life", becoming "a source of great national pride", particularly because it 
is comprehensive, free at the point of delivery and available to all regardless of 
means. It was this salience which was one of the reasons why SCPR chose the 
NHS as a poll topic in the first place. In addition, some talked about what might 
be called "righteous anger", the idea that people can have rational justifications 
for feeling angry about a situation in which important interests, values or 
principles have been affected. In Leicester, both the health authority and the 
CHC acknowledged this point: 
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.. .I could see why {the 'Save Glenfield' campaign chairman, Mike Turner} was 
angry. He'd raised a lot of money, he had done a good job, he had got this 
centre open for women- breast care is incredibly emotive as well, incredibly-
and a few weeks later he saw that all of that work, all that energy, apparently 
looked as if it was worthless. They weren't going to close the service down, but 
for him they were closing it down because it wasn't in Glenfield, and he was 
bloody angry that he hadn't been informed, that he hadn't been told. 
CHC officer 
On the other hand, interviewees frequently set up contrasts between rationality 
and emotional engagement in terms such as these: 
... the charities are generally set up by people that are ... quite emotive. But the 
jury were a little bit more detached I think, and I think they did a fantastic job. 
Journalist, Leicester 
... at the end of the day you've got to put your personal feelings aside, and it is 
what is best for the community, what is best for the resources. 
City councillor, Leicester 
The point is that while these attachments were necessary for motivating 
participation, they were also seen as undermining the rationality of decision 
making, because attachments are not equally distributed, which leads to some 
options not getting a fair hearing in some cases. Putting it another way, some 
issues matter more than others for reasons which have little to do with their 
severity and more to do with the social processes by which salience is 
constructed, a situation which would be anathema to a rationalist public servant 
attempting to apportion resources on "objective criteria" rather than on the basis 
of who "shouts the most". 
The uneven distribution of such attachments can clearly be seen in the gap 
between the disorders that were most salient for patients and those that were 
salient for the wider public. Four interviewees noted how difficult it was in 
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general to motivate patient involvement on issues surrounding acute illnesses and 
comparatively easy to get involvement surrounding chronic illnesses. An NHS 
manager in Leeds put it this way: 
I'm thinking social care, mental health, learning disabilities, where patients, 
users, clients and their families have a vested interest in continued involvement, 
and of course a lot of expertise in managing their own conditions, their own care 
.... These patients are experts, they're part of the system, they've been in the 
system and will continue to be in the system and therefore have ownership and 
investment in it. It will be far more difficult where you have your large acute 
hospital or your primary care trust where either it's in a very deprived area, if 
you're thinking primary care, where people don't actually go to the doctor's 
very much, or you've got people passing through the system at a rate of knots, 
having time-limited procedures, and getting people involved in those settings is 
always going to be far more difficult. 
That is, chronic illnesses or disability are major factors over the whole lives of 
their sufferers- indeed, in severe cases they could be said to define their lives 
-whereas acute illnesses are just one episode which claim the attention, and the 
political interest, of sufferers. 
Salience is reversed for the rest of the public, with acute illness attracting a great 
deal more attention. The Leicester case is a demonstration of this: acute services 
not only received more public resources in the first place (unfairly so, in the eyes 
of the health authority), but it was the threat to acute services which motivated 
petitioners much more than any subsequent inconvenience to long-term patients: 
... the people in the General {wanted} to keep the General as it is ... {but} 
Glenfield has got incredibly powerful support networks, more so than any 
hospital that I've ever come across ... it's almost on a level with something like 
Great Ormond Street.47 It does children's heart surgery which is probably why, 
and it also has intensive care and ... it's all very strong with heart {disease}. And 
the General just hasn't, and it's awful really. It's older, it's got a lot of very old 
47 A well-known children's hospital in London. 
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parts, very crumbly bits of building, but it's still the centre for diabetes and renal 
which are not very sexy areas of medicine. 
Journalist, Leicester 
It is therefore interesting to note that the Leicester citizens' jury provided a 
forum in which these competing patient I public claims could be sorted through, 
as one journalist covering the event pointed out: 
One of the things they did do, which I thought was brilliant, they recognised the 
fact that kidney patients were very much the underdogs in all this. Heart and 
kidney had to go together {but} at the moment they're at separate hospitals, so 
one of them would have to move. The heart group were the loud shouters, but 
the Kidney Patients Association, they also had very good reasons for wanting to 
see services stay at the General. And what ended up happening is that the jury 
took that on board, and although they found that the Glenfield should stay, and 
the General should become this planned care centre, they asked that a satellite 
centre should be set up at the General for patients to go to for treatment. They 
recognised that a lot of patients had moved closer to the General so they could 
go and have their three hours treatment. I think it was great that the jury 
members picked up on the fact that they needed to provide something. They 
didn't take the choices as read, they didn't sit and say, "Right we need to decide 
this or this because that's what the health authority's told us." 
One reason why the jurors were able to sort through these competing claims was 
to do with the scheduling of different presentations. The "loud shouters" went 
first, but the Kidney Patients Association were given equal time in a later time 
slot, which meant that they could be asked questions in light of the evidence 
given by the Save Glenfield campaigners, something which the campaigners did 
not have the opportunity to do. In other words, volume of "shouting" was 
equalised between witnesses. Another reason, however, was because of the 
separation of roles between the "passionate" and the "detached". The former-
that is, the interest groups- helped set the agenda by sitting on the steering 
group and, as witnesses, provided the necessary competing viewpoints to the 
jury, but they were not allowed to have any decision making role. The implicit 
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judgement here is that their attachments would have overwhelmed their 
reasoning powers, ensuring that the process would degenerate into politics as 
usual. 
What evidence is there for that judgement? In my cases, the evidence is limited. 
Neither the citizens' jury nor the deliberative poll model can give guidance either 
way because, by separating roles, they assume an answer to that question. The 
NHS Plan process made no such assumptions, being a forum in which the 
"passionate" were themselves the deliberators, and as such offers more hope. 
From the limited reports of participants I have available, it showed that the 
various interests could indeed work through their differences and reach "working 
agreements" (Dryzek 2001), at least on procedures for taking the next steps if not 
always on substantive detail (NHS manager, Leeds). 
Nonetheless, this may be much easier where the deliberations are in camera. 
The risk of degeneration into strategic game-playing remains considerable where 
deliberation takes place in the glare of publicity, and where participants' prior 
commitments have already constrained their freedom to engage in authentic 
deliberation (Kuran 1998; Mackie 2002). This point was alluded to by a 
Department of Health official when talking about the reaction of various groups 
to the decision to abolish the CHCs: 
... all the patients' groups that I know were consulted as part of this have said, 
"Oh, absolutely, you're doing the right thing now." Most people don't like 
CHCs in private but they weren't {saying that} in public. 
In other words, the risk is that deliberators with prior commitments to others will 
"play to the gallery" rather than engaging in the spirit of authentic deliberation. 
That is, the audience of speech acts in deliberation may not be one's substantive 
opponent at all, but third parties watching from the sidelines, either already 
committed to one side or the other or still making up their mind about the issue. 
In turn, this would mean that the strategic goal of a deliberating party may no 
longer be to persuade his or her interlocutors, but to score points off them for the 
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benefit, even entertainment, of the audience. Should the deliberator decide that 
the encounter is swinging the other way, he or she may then may try to exploit 
other channels of influence rather than continuing to play the deliberative game 
(Hendriks 2002). 
This brings me to an unpalatable possibility. Combine the observation above 
with the representation and publicity requirements outlined in the previous 
chapters, and we are faced with yet another irony of deliberative democracy. It 
may well be that representation and publicity are required to create legitimating 
bonds between participants and non-participants, but with the unfortunate 
consequence that rationality and deliberative authenticity are undermined. Try to 
contain such outside influences, and the deliberations themselves may be more 
authentic, but have much less impact on, and legitimacy for, the wider 
community. 
There may be some hope of resolving this conflict if simply participating in 
deliberation encourages people to intemalise deliberative norms, which can 
either mean that people would not be tempted to "cheat" in the first place or, if 
they did, suffer the public opprobrium of those who had internalised the norms 
(Goodin 1992, 135). My cases proved to be an inadequate test of either 
possibility. The NHS Poll and the Belfast jury were too far removed from real 
decision making to make it worth anyone's while kicking up trouble even if they 
had disagreed with the outcomes. In the Leicester case, the jurors 
recommendations were broadly in line with the protesters' preferences and so 
there was no reason for them to continue the campaign - we can only speculate 
on what might have happened if the decision had gone the other way (chapter 
four, page 130). In the case of the NHS Plan process, it might be thought that the 
ACHCEW campaign to stop the abolition of the CHCs is an example of an actor 
choosing to play to the gallery, but they were never offered the opportunity to 
deliberate in good faith, and so we cannot tell what effect deliberative norms 
might have had on their actions had they been involved. ACHCEW's actions 
can be seen in another light, however: because the Department of Health had not 
met the principle of inclusion adequately when putting together the NHS Plan 
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deliberations, ACHCEW was quite justified in calling public attention to this 
exclusion, thus casting public opprobrium on the department when deliberative 
norms were transgressed. While it is reasonable to doubt the purity of 
ACHCEW's motives here- they worked to foreclose debate rather than open it 
(see pp.163-4)- their actions nonetheless reinforce the point I made in chapter 
four about one of the positive possible roles of interest groups in the macro 
deliberative system being to challenge exclusion both of people and of issues 
from deliberative processes. 
Still, we are left without much resolution on this point: it may well be that 
deliberative norms have a disciplining effect on those with pre-deliberative 
commitments; or it may well be that we cannot have both good deliberation and 
deliberation that matters, given current institutional arrangements at least. 
Reasoning together 
While there is a clearly negative role that emotional attachments to particular 
issues can play in deliberative democracy, on the positive side are some benefits 
to do with motivating engagement in deliberation in the first place, both in terms 
of the decision to participate and the way in which one engages with one's fellow 
deliberators, taking them and their arguments seriously. I have already 
mentioned the benefits of emotional attachments in generating salience; in this 
section, I show that expressing the emotions surrounding a particular issue helps 
to form communicative bridges between participants. 
This point speaks to some questions raised by Dryzek (2000, 65-6) about the 
incidence in actual deliberations of the speech culture problem raised by 
difference democrats, particularly by Sanders (1997) and Young (1996): namely, 
that deliberation represses difference because it privileges norms of 
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argumentation that are specific to powerful groups (chapter two, page 50).48 
The criticism supposes that deliberative norms would force people to engage 
together much in the same way that a university seminar sometimes would, with 
reasons being challenged, examined, defended and opposed on all sorts of 
grounds. However, people in real deliberations do not deliberate this way all the 
time: they also deliberate by swapping stories. The only case in which I have 
verbatim transcripts of actual deliberation is the broadcast version of the NHS 
Poll,49 in which participants spent about half their time telling stories and 
drawing lessons from them, and about half their time in more abstract discussion. 
To get some flavour of how the former works, here is one exchange from a small 
group discussion: 
One: "Who are all these people who complain about the health service? I 
haven't met anybody who says, 'Oh, it's terrible.' Are any of you saying it's 
terrible?" 
Two: "I think it's absolutely appalling, the health service. My mother was 
stricken with cancer, and it developed rapidly. Now my mother needed a 
syringe driver, and we couldn't get a syringe driver to inject the morphine in 
every so often. And my mother was in agony waiting for this. My brother said 
'I'll go and buy one.' They said, 'They're a thousand pounds.' He said, 'I'll 
buy one!' 'But you can't, there's only so many in the area and they're all being 
used.' And I think that is absolutely appalling. If you could break a window in 
a shop and steal one, we would have done it." 
Three: "If you do have a serious problem, then there's no waiting list, and you 
do get excellent service. That is certainly the case in Scotland. A friend has had 
to move near to Glasgow Royal Infirmary for him to get instant treatment, but it 
was available." 
48 Doganay (2003) offers one case study which seems to confirm Sanders' and Young's 
fears, but her example has many fewer micro deliberative features than even my cases, 
and so cannot be taken as a rigorous test of deliberative theorists' claims. 
49 What follows should therefore be read keeping in mind the differences between the 
poll event itself and the broadcast version, discussed in the previous chapter. 
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Four: "I have a friend whose wife is being treated at the moment and has to 
travel from where she lives, 30-40 miles, and there's no facility to get her to 
where she has to have the treatment, and she can't drive after the treatment, and 
her husband is self-employed, and she has to have this treatment every three 
days a week for a month. Now he has to give up three working days to take his 
wife to treatment." 
Five: "There are centres of excellence and you just can't have those all over the 
country because of the expense of putting small regional hospitals with expertise 
in nearly every area, which means people will have to travel." 
Four: "Yeah, but it's that thing of not providing a facility for her to get there. 
Yes, there is that centre of excellence for that person, but if they can't get there, 
it might as well be on Mars." 
This does not sound too much like the dry, committee-style approach bemoaned 
by Young. It is more like what Rorty (1998) calls "sentimental education". 
Rorty contends that moral education that appeals to people's sentiment is most 
likely to change people's thoughts and habits. This sentimental education 
consists of telling "long, sad stories" that begin, "you should care about this 
person because this is what it is like to be in her situation."50 This is the pathos 
of Aristotle, the most powerful persuasive tool in an orator's armoury (Remer 
2000, 76). This work of building empathy not only opens others' eyes to one's 
problems, it also creates a sense of being listened to, which further binds 
participants into the deliberative process, and to each other: indeed, the 
swapping of stories helps develop bonds of friendship between participants that 
in some cases can last lifetimes, as it did for five members of the Belfast jury 
who continued to be involved in regular consultations for the Eastern Health and 
Social Services Council for several years, while another two fell in love and 
married not long afterwards. 
50 See Forester (1999) on the importance of stories in policy and planning processes. 
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It is unclear from my cases whether "being heard" is enough, or whether there 
needs to be some substantive change in a deliberative outcome for the losers in a 
process to accept it as legitimate. In the NHS Plan case, the losers were the 
CHCs, and they protested vigorously, but that may well be because they had not 
been part of the consultations in the first place. In the Leicester case, the relative 
losers were the Kidney Patients Association who argued against shifting acute 
services from the General Hospital because many kidney patients had moved 
closer to the General in order to minimise travel time for their three or four 
weekly dialysis treatments, but their concerns were met when the jury 
recommended that a satellite centre for kidney patients be set up at the General, 
so that does not really test the question either. 
Still, friendship and bond-forming between deliberators may well be a necessary 
if not sufficient condition for persuasion. This is because those who can show 
mutuality in a deliberative setting are not only enhancing the legitimacy of their 
claims by making the effort to demonstrate "co-performance" (Schaar 1984), 
they are also at a distinct rhetorical advantage to those who cannot (Remer 2000, 
76). Speakers in deliberation need to be "appealing", likeable characters in some 
way (NHS poll organiser, London). I have both positive and negative evidence 
to support this contention from the cases. The negative evidence comes from the 
failure of Conservative health spokesperson Ann Widdecombe to form bonds 
with the NHS Poll's lay participants in the terse exchange noted in the previous 
chapter. It was clear from the reaction of the audience and from subsequent "vox 
pops" that the testiness, the implied criticism of the audience, and the implied 
criticism of the well-liked journalist running the show led people to discount 
Widdecombe' s message. Other speakers elicited quite different reactions. One 
of the panellists, health economist Professor Alan Williams from the University 
of York, delivered an unpopular message about his preference for prioritising the 
young rather than the elderly, but was able to do so without drawing fire from the 
audience by the humorous, self-deprecating way with which he prefaced his 
remarks: 
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(with a wry smile), Well, I don't think you suddenly become old, it creeps up on 
you (laughs, as does the audience; cameras cut to a big smile from the 
questioner), it's certainly crept up on me. At the age of 71, I've ceased denying 
that I'm old. 
Another, Professor Paul Dieppe of the Department of Social Medicine, 
University of Bristol, made a passionate plea for the present system, and earned 
rare spontaneous applause from the audience not just for his stand, but for the 
passion with which he delivered it. He was asked by the compere whether he 
agreed with a comment about using more of the private sector's capacity, and 
responded, 
No, absolutely not, I disagree very strongly with that. I think we should take the 
private sector into the NHS rather than the other way round, because I think one 
of the most divisive things (applause breaks out), I think one of the most 
divisive things is we have people working in a dual economy. It leads to the 
biggest inequalities in the health service and it's divisive in the staff. 
Note that, in part, what was going on in the NHS Poll was an implicit appeal to 
ethos, the authority a speaker has by virtue of the kind of person he or she is 
(Remer 2000, 76). Professors, especially medical ones, have enormous status 
(Harrison and Pollitt 1994) which gives them a head start over politicians who 
lack such status in the rhetorical race. But this does not guarantee winning that 
race: the deliberative poll participants were not persuaded that the private sector 
should have more of a role in delivery of health services either, despite the fact 
that it was medical authority figures who were trying to convince them. This is 
an instance of the kind of rational judgement of ethos that O'Neill (1998) 
suggests is possible. 
That it is possible, however, is not to say that it happens all the time. Two 
interviewees noted an incident in the Belfast jury concerning GP fund-holding, a 
measure by a former Conservative government to devolve budgets to GPs which 
was blamed for helping create a two-tier health system, one for the rich, another 
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for the poor (Klein 2000, 196). The Belfast jurors were not persuaded that fund-
holding was a good idea, at least in part because of who delivered the message: 
We had a GP fund-holder from Belfast, and they didn't like him, it was clear 
they didn't like him, he didn't convince them about fund-holding, and so they 
wanted- one of the witnesses they wanted was a non-fund-holding GP from a 
rural area, which we got, and they really liked him, they could associate with 
him, even though a lot of them were from Belfast. 
Jury organiser, Belfast 
On the other hand, just being "a nice guy" is not sufficient either. While the 
NHS poll audience reacted well to Simon Hughes, the Liberal Democrat health 
spokesperson, for speaking in terms that meshed well with the audience's stated 
opinions about the NHS, the vox pops after his session stressed that since Hughes 
was not in power he could promise all sorts of things but could not make any of 
them happen. Once again, proximity to power matters when it comes to 
persuasion, as much as in assessments of legitimacy, and again the audience 
showed themselves capable of making rational judgements about ethos. 
Nonetheless, the substantive content of people's positions is not sufficient to 
persuade. As Aristotle argued, logical explanation is only one, and by no means 
the strongest, of the rhetorical proofs: ethos is often stronger, pathos stronger 
still. 
There are two main implications of this discussion of practical reasoning for 
legitimacy in deliberative democracy. First, it seems clear that even in the far-
from-perfectly-deliberative worlds of my cases, "reasoning together" is quite 
consistent with a range of communicative styles, and although a great deal would 
depend on the skills and prejudices of the moderator of any deliberative event 
(Dryzek 1987)- they have a great deal of power to encourage or discourage 
different communicative styles- this did not cause problems in any of my 
cases. In my own experience as a moderator, participants of all sorts of 
backgrounds will challenge the authority of someone who tries to shut them up 
unreasonably, either within the forum or by withholding consent later. This 
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means that the motivational concerns of Sanders (1997) and Young (1999) may 
well be theoretical possibilities but empirical rarities in genuinely deliberative 
processes. 
Second, while lay participants clearly had the ability to make rational judgements 
about the rhetorical claims made through ethos and pathos, they did not always 
do so. Who delivers a message is at least as important as the content of the 
message itself: they need to be likeable characters and possessed of some 
rhetorical skill if they are going to move their audiences. We can connect this 
with the discussion of narrative in the previous chapter: when it comes to 
persuasion, the narrator matters, and the narrative requirements of 
personalisation and polarisation matter, more than the actual content of the story, 
the proposals themselves. This means that those who would discuss the 
important material and discursive forces which shape political problems are at a 
distinct rhetorical disadvantage even in deliberative democracy; and that the door 
remains open to manipulation, to the perpetuation of politics as a "spectacle" 
(Edelman 1988) which many advocates of deliberative ideals sought to 
undermine. It could be that attempts to manipulate public communication can 
themselves be subject to scrutiny and challenged: if someone tries, for example, 
to reduce a debate to ad hominem attacks, this can be exposed and ridiculed in 
tum by their interlocutors. However, as I argued in chapter six, it is important to 
get in first in debate: mud sticks, such that those at whom it is flung may end up 
spending more time trying to clear their own characters than having their 
substantive arguments assessed. Thus I have offered a solution to one of 
deliberation's motivational problems, only to have that solution potentially 
undermine the substantive requirements of legitimacy. 
Conclusions, tensions and implications 
Three sets of conclusions arise from this discussion of rationality and persuasion. 
The first is that my earlier, more tentative conclusion about the importance of 
deliberating at the right level of the hierarchy has been borne out by closer 
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examination of the cases, but it may be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, 
deliberation should be done as close to the real decision makers as possible so 
that people get to deliberate about things which really matter, rather than getting 
involved in very sophisticated and empowering processes which end up not 
changing things all that much. This is because of the requirement that agendas 
not be too restricted, which improves the motivational attractiveness of 
deliberation and its substantive legitimacy by addressing more fundamental 
issues and their consequences for as broad a range of people as possible. On the 
other hand, the closer deliberation is to the locus of power, the greater the 
incentive for those with pre-deliberative commitments to get involved in strategic 
game playing, but this remains just a logical possibility - my cases were not an 
adequate test of Goodin's idea that participation in deliberation disciplines this 
kind of behaviour, the positive view of ACHCEW's campaign notwithstanding. 
The opportunity for strategic manipulation of a deliberative process is opened by 
the necessary role of rhetoric in persuading, although rhetoric too has positive 
and negative aspects. On the one hand, appeals of pathos and ethos are 
necessary for building communicative bridges between participants and for 
motivating the involvement of those who are not normally empowered to speak 
in committee-style processes - indeed, it appears to be one of the normal ways 
in which people communicate with each other, either sharing stories and then 
drawing out general lessons from them, or making general claims and illustrating 
or countering those claims with particular tales. This applies just as much in 
macro as in micro deliberation; perhaps more so, given the tendency for 
mediated public discourse to favour narrative styles over more abstract 
discussion. Also, rhetoric can be a powerful tool to challenge limited agendas or 
exclusion of particular groups: the Leicester interest groups' "Save Glenfield" 
campaign and ACHCEW's campaign to maintain the CHCs can be seen in this 
light. On the other hand, such appeals can sometimes override substantive 
considerations, considerations which are also a necessary component of the 
legitimacy of any deliberative outcome. Deliberators in the NHS Poll seemed to 
make rational judgements about the safety of relying on ethos claims when it 
came to someone they liked: "Trust me, I'm a doctor," is not always an effective 
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rhetorical strategy; nor is, "Believe me, I'm a nice guy." When it came to 
someone they disliked, however, the ethos judgement overwhelmed the 
substantive content of what the person was saying. The points Ann Widdecombe 
made in the NHS Poll did not get a fair hearing because she got most people's 
backs up; the same went for the GP presenting the pro-fundholding viewpoint in 
the Belfast citizens' jury. The lesson here is that while O'Neill (1998) may well 
be right that people can make rational judgements of ethos and pathos claims, 
they seem to exercise their judgement better when it is someone they can relate 
to who is talking. This leaves plenty of room for worries about the discursive 
advancement of unjust ideas by a powerful, likeable character- history is 
littered with persuasive dictators- or the ability of one side to blacken the name 
of its opponents, neutralising their substantive arguments. 
The third set of conclusions concerns the ability of the different processes under 
study to handle these tensions. Micro deliberative processes in general do not 
handle the agenda setting issues well not just because they have been used at too 
low a level in the hierarchy, as I have argued before, but also because they work 
best at that level, with limited, tightly defined agendas. They may be fine where 
the issue is well defined and the impacts well contained; but many, perhaps most, 
political issues are not like that. It seems then that there is an inherent flaw in 
micro deliberative techniques as a tool of democracy: if they are best suited for 
use in local situations, then they seem unlikely to help much when considering 
national or international issues, issues which are the most pressing when it comes 
to enhancing democratic control (Dryzek 1996a; 2000). 
Despite that basic flaw, some micro deliberative processes handle the rationality 
tensions better than others. The deliberative poll is particularly weak, despite its 
interest as a social scientific experiment. Within the confines of the poll, 
deliberators have no influence whatsoever over the agenda and content of the 
questionnaire: to give them some influence would undermine the logic of the 
experiment which is the dominant purpose of any deliberative poll. Nor, even in 
the relatively small amount of time the poll gives people to debate the issues 
together, do many of the issues that people decide are important in their small 
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group sessions come up in the plenary sessions- edited versions of which non-
participants only see- and are not captured in the questionnaire. In the case of 
the NHS Poll, none of the issues raised in the small group discussion recorded on 
pages 188-9 above were reflected in the questionnaire or subsequent report. It 
may be possible to open up the initial agenda setting process beyond the very 
limited circles of people who have typically decided poll topics to date. One of 
the Australian deliberative polls provides a model, in which a series of focus 
groups were run in indigenous communities around the country to identify the 
key issues which should be discussed in the main event (Issues Deliberation 
Australia 2001).51 Still, the particular way in which the deliberative poll format 
uses the media opens it up to strategic manipulation more than others: because it 
is broadcast, and because it puts "significant" people centre-stage, it can easily 
become a soap-box for panellists to address the television audience, scoring 
points off their opponents, rather than an opportunity for them to deliberate with 
the poll participants, let alone each other (Gibson and Miskin 2002). 
The citizens' jury is much less susceptible to these problems. Those with pre-
deliberative commitments are assigned a subsidiary role as witnesses, which 
means they have less opportunity to manipulate the deliberations rhetorically. 
The deliberative quality is much higher given that jurors spend several days 
deliberating together in camera, rather than just a few hours in the deliberative 
poll, some of which is in front of the cameras which introduce new distortions. 
Another benefit of this is that it allows participants time to get to know each 
other, to get comfortable with each other, so that when difficult issues do come 
up, they can be dealt with properly: people have time both to get angry and to 
have that anger acknowledged and discussed (Jury manager, London)(Stone, 
Patton, and Heen 2000). Many people can have an influence on the agenda 
because of the way in which steering committees are normally made up of 
members of relevant interest groups or "stakeholders", to use the presently 
fashionable term. To a more limited extent, lay participants get the chance to call 
51 Fishkin has been silent on agenda setting questions in published work on deliberative 
polls. See Fishkin (1996; 2003), Fishkin, Luskin and Jowell (2000), and Luskin, Fishkin 
and Jowell (2002). 
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witnesses, write recommendations, and even, on occasion, challenge the terms of 
reference where they feel it is too limiting (Jury moderator, London). Even the 
decision to run a jury has been the result of activism rather than academic 
entrepreneurship, as happened in Leicester. Nonetheless, as for any micro 
deliberative process, there are still tight limits to the breadth of issues that a 
citizens' jury can deal with, and thus question marks remain over its democratic 
impact. 
Of the more macro deliberative processes, the NHS Plan process also suffered 
some agenda constraint issues because that agenda was set by a very small group 
in the Department of Health, with limited public involvement used more to 
legitimate that agenda rather than to make much in the way of substantive 
recommendations (see Mort, Harrison, and Wistow 1996), the department's 
protestations notwithstanding. At least it was run near the peak of the health 
policy hierarchy, and so mattered far more than the other processes. What it did 
show was that, within those constraints, even a semi-deliberative process helped 
those interest groups, NHS staff and DoH managers with strong pre-deliberative 
commitments to work together and come to agreements without fur flying. Just 
being part of the process seemed to help a great deal: the only significant 
opposition came from the CHCs and that may have had more to do with the fact 
that they and their champions on the Commons Health Committee were not 
included in the process at any stage. I can only speculate on what would have 
happened had they been included. 
The model which is least vulnerable to the limited agendas problem is that of the 
disability movement. They maintain a stance independent of government and 
private care agencies precisely in order to challenge effectively the overarching, 
and limiting, agendas of those agencies, dismissing micro deliberation for some 
of the reasons I have advanced here. However, the model seems in principle to 
be much more susceptible to criticism on rhetorical grounds, because there seems 
to be no reason why only those views which political theorists consider to be just 
or rational will be successful, given what I have suggested is an asymmetry in 
persuasive power between likeable characters and those who do not successfully 
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create communicative bridges. If that is the case- and certainly my assertion 
would require more empirical investigation before it can be made with any great 
confidence -then we are left with a worry which undermines macro 
deliberation as the solution I have been advancing to micro deliberation's 
legitimacy problems. This means there is no single solution, that different 
institutions have features which help with legitimacy but others which undermine 
it. In the next and final chapter, I try to pull all this together, summarising the 
legitimacy criteria, and putting together some picture of how different 
institutions might be arranged in a deliberative system to maximise their 
strengths and minimise their weaknesses. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
INSTITUTIONS OF A LEGITIMATE DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 
It is now time to pull together the various insights and conclusions from the 
theoretical and empirical work to answer the institutional question I posed in 
chapter one: what do we need to do to current deliberative instititions to make 
them more legitimate, given the problems of scale (not everyone can deliberate 
together) and motivations (not everyone may want to, because of pre-deliberative 
commitments and limited agendas)? When casting around the deliberative 
democratic literature for answers to that question, one comes up relatively 
empty-handed: it is dominated either by ideal end-points without much in the 
way of how we should move from our current position towards those ideals- a 
complaint Gunnell (1986) makes of a great deal of political theory- or what 
sometimes feels like tinkering with micro processes which, as seen in some of 
my cases, can leave mass politics relatively untouched. Indeed, some of the 
institutional recommendations do not appear to have much that is either 
deliberative or democratic about them, a criticism I have made of Button and 
Mattson (1999) in particular, although all sorts of micro level practices may well 
have important, legitimate, deliberative and democratic functions in the broader 
deliberative system, regardless of how many deliberative principles they 
instantiate themselves (Ryfe 2002, 369). 
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In this concluding chapter, I want to offer my own vision of what the next steps 
from current institutions towards a legitimate deliberative democracy might look 
like- an exercise more in institutional intervention than "from scratch" design 
(Pettit 1996, 55). To get there, I begin by drawing together the key insights into 
the nature of a legitimate deliberative democracy that have arisen from the case 
studies and theoretical discussion so far. I then compare the various processes 
featured in my cases, as well as the micro and macro models of deliberation, in 
terms of their strengths and weaknesses when it comes to legitimacy. After a 
brief discussion of some existing approaches to institutionalising deliberative 
democracy, I then put forward my own modest proposal before concluding with 
recommendations for future research. 
Of course, legitimacy is but one value among others when recommending 
institutions. Efficiency is one: deciding to take some action should not take up 
so many resources, let alone so many evenings, that the action itself becomes 
impossible, and so before any proposal for institutional change is accepted it 
should be subjected to some kind of analysis of costs and benefits. Effectiveness 
is another: questions have been raised about whether more deliberative talk will 
actually help resolve the most intractable political conflicts or whether it will 
simply make them worse (for example Bell 1999; Ryfe 2002; Schauer 1999), 
although the target of such critics is precisely the media-based discussion which I 
have shown is often not compatible with deliberative values. While I will try to 
keep these considerations in mind, inevitably I will focus on some issues more 
than others, and so some readers will necessarily find fault in the emphasis I 
place on certain points. My defence is that legitimacy is not just a necessary 
ingredient in any set of institutions, but one that should weigh more heavily than 
it has done so far when deliberative democrats, and their critics, have come to 
consider deliberative institutions. This is by way of redressing that imbalance, 
and contributing to an ongoing debate. 
One final introductory remark before proceeding. Often with good reason, 
critical theorists distrust institutionalisation, especially the "foisting of 
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institutions and practices on already oppressed groups by outsiders who cannot 
know the true interests of these groups" (Dryzek 1990, 30). As Dryzek goes on 
to say, this does not mean that institutions are intrinsically a bad thing: it could 
mean that they should be chosen by those subject to them, just as the institutions 
themselves embody the principles of democratic inclusion and publicity in their 
internal workings. This puts a question mark over efforts by small groups of 
state actors- in the Department of Health's Strategy Unit, for example- to 
impose deliberative models without those institutions themselves being the result 
of more widespread public discussion than was the case with the NHS Plan 
process. Equally, however, it is not always the case that the use of state power is 
a bad thing, especially at a time when enormous economic, technical and 
informational power is concentrated in relatively few hands. Individuals and 
small collectivities sometimes need large collectivities to take effective action on 
their behalf to restrain others, whether big businesses or bad neighbours, at least 
to drag the recalcitrant into discussion and enforce procedural fairness if not to 
impose particular solutions. Thus, to the extent that it really is the agent of the 
people and not an entirely independent entity with its own aims and goals, the 
state can be a force for democratisation against expressions of private power. 
While the state needs restraint so that it does not come to overwhelm private 
lives, it sometimes needs to be unleashed too. Given that, I shrink less from 
proposing models and recommending their implementation than many critical 
theorists once did- it's how those models are justified to whom, and who has 
the decisive voice, that is more important to me than who actually does the 
proposing. 
Principles of a legitimate deliberative democracy 
Throughout the thesis I have identified important elements of legitimacy in a 
complex deliberative democracy. Taking the descriptive scheme of Beetham 
(1991) as my starting point, but revising it through close attention to theory and 
the cases, I have argued for eight points which cover ideals and practical 
applications. In this summary, I connect the legitimacy principles with the 
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institutional design principles which follow from them, drawing particularly on 
Dryzek (1996b) and Goodin (1996b). 
1. The rightful source is those affected. 
I have taken the legitimate source of political authority to be "those affected", 
which may be a relatively small group in a particular locality, or may include 
people well beyond particular political or cultural boundaries. "Those affected" 
can be judged both objectively and subjectively: it is important that the 
managers of deliberative processes think about who a given proposal might 
affect and actively seek to involve them (which is one of the benefits of stratified 
random selection as currently practised), but it is also important that groups of 
people can nominate themselves, highlighting exclusion, inadvertent or 
otherwise. We can judge how closely a given practice matches the source ideal 
by assessing the degree to which it involves more people rather than fewer 
(Dryzek 1996a, 5); plus, as difference democrats might suggest, more kinds of 
people; plus, I would want to insist, the relevant kinds- it is no good involving 
a fixed set of traditionally-defined groups on every decision, as some corporatist 
systems do, if the various proposals impact significantly on groups which are not 
represented by those traditional categories (Lijphart 1984; Linder 1994). 
One-off micro deliberative processes can obviously be criticised on the basis of 
sheer numbers: the 16 jurors in Leicester were only 0.003% of the county's 
population; the deliberative poll's much larger group was an even smaller 
proportion -five times smaller- of the UK population; while only one in 59 
got the opportunity to participate at all in the NHS Plan process. 52 This is, of 
course, inevitable, but it highlights how far particular deliberative experiments 
are from the ideal expressed by Benhabib (1996), Cohen (1989) and others. 
52 Based on a Leicestershire population of 610,300 and a UK population of 58,789, 194 
according to the 2001 national census, available from http://www.statistics.gov.uk. 
206 
Institutions of deliberative democracy 
This problem is not so great if micro deliberative processes are on-going 
institutions rather than one-off moments. On this view, micro deliberative 
processes would be much more common than they are, and we should simply 
aim to ensure that every citizen gets the chance to participate directly in 
deliberative decision making regularly- even several chances a year as the 
Swiss get in regular referendums (Kobach 1993). Legitimacy would be created 
along more Athenian lines, because it is fair that everyone regularly governs and 
is governed in tum (Manin 1997). While this solution creates legitimacy for the 
system as a whole, it nonetheless leaves question marks over particular decisions, 
and it is in particular decision making moments that arguments over legitimacy 
become acute. 
A further counter-argument is to highlight one of the benefits of random 
selection: that it ensures participants of many different kinds, which is just as 
important as large numbers. This is one of the primary justifications of some 
deliberative designs, but I have argued that view is mistaken when it confuses 
representation with representativeness. For particular decision making moments, 
decision makers need to be authorised by and accountable to non-participants, 
not just descriptively representative of them, topics I take up again shortly. 
2. Decision making processes should meet the criteria for good deliberation. 
There are parallels between deliberative requirements and the appropriate 
procedural standard for legitimate decision making: inclusiveness to ensure that 
all relevant interests, values and information are brought to the table, including 
differing problem definitions; adequate time to hear all the arguments and debate 
a range of options without unreasonably tight agenda restrictions; communicative 
and cognitive competence, such that participants are able to engage with each 
other and sort through good arguments from bad, based on a range of evidence 
which may or may not have the status of accepted and final "truth"; and equality 
between participants and freedom from rhetorical manipulation (but not rhetoric 
per se) to ensure that the good argument dominates. All these elements go 
together to make up communicative rationality. Expert knowledge is an essential 
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ingredient in such reasoning, but it should not trump good democratic procedure; 
but nor does good procedure trump good substance. In a world where we cannot 
have perfect procedure, and cannot know all there is to know, procedure and 
substance should stand in tension with each other, each providing a critical 
benchmark. 
Given that, legitimate processes need to encourage participants to take each other 
seriously, to recognise a variety of entities as agents with legitimate claims 
(Dryzek 1996b, 109), what Gutmann and Thompson (1996) call reciprocity. In 
practice this means that different communicative styles and different kinds of 
knowledge and experience are respected, requiring participants to treat someone 
relating a personal story about their experiences as seriously as another person 
relating research results. This is not to say that different types of knowledge are 
treated the same way- "tacit knowledge" (Squires 2003) based on long, 
personal experience is best communicated through direct sharing of the 
experience or through story-telling, even encouraging people to get angry when 
necessary; while "codified knowledge" can and should be tested more rigorously 
against standards of evidence. Nonetheless, both experience and expertise are 
valuable. 
Clearly there were problems with achieving this ideal in the cases I surveyed: in 
the deliberative poll, for example, experts and lay people talked past each other 
for much of the event thanks to incompatible problem definitions, inadequate 
respect for others' agency, and a process which did not allow enough time and 
direct contact for those issues to be debated. I have argued that that was because 
of the way in which the experiments were embedded deep in a technocracy 
which privileges expertise ahead of communicative norms and lived experience 
(Fischer 1990). To redress the balance, several changes might be necessary. 
First, because the skills and orientation of a process's moderator are critical, they 
should be trained to be aware of the way technocratic power is deployed in such 
cases and seek to combat it at all the stages of decision making, from agenda 
setting to implementation and everything in between. Second, it would help 
technocrats take lay deliberation more seriously if micro deliberations were 
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actually making binding decisions, or were significant inputs into higher-level 
decision making moments, rather than being purely advisory as in the Belfast 
case, or just of academic interest alone as in the deliberative poll. Third, and 
perhaps most importantly, it would help if the decision to deliberate were not 
taken purely by public managers, as at present, but were somehow triggered 
either from within the informal public sphere, or from the formal public sphere, 
or by constitutional rules. All these changes would require some institutional 
change, the shape of which I will sketch in the next section, but all would be 
helped by the fact that there exist supportive elements within bureaucratic 
discourse, particularly under the influence of the Third Way, which preach 
recognition of lay knowledge- indeed, I argued in chapter three that while the 
history of public and patient involvement initiatives in the NHS since the 1970s 
is partly one of increasingly sophisticated means of central control, it is also one 
of increasing acceptance of the idea that "ordinary people" matter to public 
policy in ways they once did not. The presence of such discursive resources can 
make the difference between successful institutional change or failure for change 
to take root (Dryzek 1996b, 104). 
3. If not everyone can be "in", then we need to know if and how insiders speak 
for outsiders. 
The ideal remains the full involvement of every citizen in every collective 
decision that affects them, including the involvement of those who speak for the 
natural world (Eckersley 2000). In large-scale, complex societies, however, 
rarely will all (or even very many) of those affected be: (a) easily identifiable; (b) 
able or willing to give their attention to every issue that affects them; and (c) able 
to "fit" into one deliberative moment, actual or virtual. This is the scale problem 
of deliberative democracy. Therefore, we need some way of deciding who has a 
good claim to speak for, and decide for, others. 
Note the distinction between speaking and deciding in that formulation. In 
classic deliberative theory, there should be no such distinction: no-one can 
decide without having also been a speaker for or against certain positions and 
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having listened to counter-arguments, changing their minds in the face of the 
better arguments. However, as the case studies and other literature have shown, 
in real deliberation in the large scale there is frequently a distinction between 
audience, speakers and deciders. Even within micro deliberations, once the 
group size gets over about seven members the better orators start to take more 
time and those with less confidence are in the spotlight less often. But in the 
macro version, deliberation in a number of different sites or via numerous 
discursive threads may not- indeed, I suspect rarely will- result in a clear cut 
"decision" which is simply transmitted to the state for action. Rather, a final 
decision making process must take place to sort through competing proposals 
which have not perfectly engaged with each other, whose partisans have not had 
their preferences transformed by exposure to each others' arguments, and thus 
have not been able to reach even working agreements let alone consensus. 
The distinction is important because legitimate claims to "decide for" are distinct 
from legitimate claims to "speak for", and individual deliberators may not be 
able make both types of claim at once. Drawing on Mansbridge (1999), I have 
argued that it is at the decision making end of a deliberative system that the 
problem of legitimacy is most acute: it is there that binding collective decisions 
are made, and so at that point we want to be clear that there are strong bonds 
between the actual deciders and those on whose behalf they have decided, taking 
into account the wishes of those others. This requires formal bonds of 
accountablity and authorisation, but only some kinds of insiders can demonstrate 
such bonds to outsiders. At the same time, such bonds should not be tight at the 
informal end of the deliberative system, because those bonds would interrupt the 
free exchange of experience and the free participation in discourse, illegitimately 
clamping down on the creative aspects of the public sphere. This means that 
different kinds of "speakers" will be more important at the informal end. The 
next three points summarise those distinct roles and claims. 
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4. For binding collective decisions, the strongest way of ensuring insider-
outsider bonds is through elected, principal-agent representation. 
The most obvious solution to the scale problem is representation, and the 
strongest form of that is when representatives are electorally bound to their 
principals. This is because of the effective power this give the principals- it 
gives them the power to remove agents who do not perform, assuming that they 
have sufficient autonomy in terms of adequate information about past and likely 
performance, a reasonable range of choices and freedom from manipulation 
(chapter two, page 57).53 The strength of this norm was seen in effect in the two 
citizens' jury cases and in The NHS Plan where decision making power was 
restricted to those representatives who were accountable to the electorate, not 
given to unaccountable jurors or even bureaucrats working in the modernisation 
teams. 
Principal-agent relationships need not be established by election: they can also 
be established by appointment. This is what I have called the "champion" role, 
someone who possesses enough power to challenge powerful others by virtue of 
their specialist position in and knowledge of a field. Interest groups in particular 
have a role in monitoring the public sphere, highlighting both successes and 
failures, and using their power to open up deliberative space where debate has 
been foreclosed, although champions can and do come from all walks of life, 
from the formal public sphere, from the economic sphere, from the bureaucracy, 
as well as from grass-roots organisations. Being a self-appointed champion is 
not enough, however: that status must be confirmed through a public act of 
consent by the people on whose behalf the champion acts, perhaps by asking 
53 Plus an electoral system which adequately translates voter wishes into action. This, of 
course, is a vexed issue. The public choice orthodoxy holds that there is no electoral 
system which delivers results which are not simply artefacts of the process (Riker 1982), 
although Mackie (2003) provides a detailed refutation of Riker and the Rochester 
school, arguing that arbitrariness results only when certain simplifying assumptions are 
made which do not track normal real world conditions. For discussion of the strengths 
and weaknesses of different models, see Catt (1999) and Lijphart and Grofman (1984). 
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them to sign a petition. Even with that confirmation, they should have advisory 
power only, not decision making power. 
The ideal of tight bonds between principals and agents meets practical 
difficulties when applied to deliberative democracy. This is because 
representatives in deliberative democracy are expected to argue with each other 
to develop a common position (the trustee role); but if representatives have been 
instructed to take particular positions on issues (the delegate role), as opposed to 
simply re-presenting their principals' experience, they face difficult challenges 
explaining to people why it was that they changed their minds. To manage these 
inherent tensions, representatives at the formal end of the deliberative system 
should perform what Young (2000, 125) calls "representation as relationship". 
They should bring non-participants' values, wishes and experiences to the forum 
and transmit back to their principals the reasons for and against those points of 
view, in an on-going process of two-way communication. Performance, ideally, 
should be judged in terms of how well that relationship is functioning- is there 
goodwill between the parties, do they feel that they have clear, adequate and 
undistorted information (Mansbridge 1998), and that problems can be resolved 
-rather than just in terms of whether substantive goals were realised or not. 
The better that these relationship aspects function, the less acute Dryzek's (2001) 
objection to this solution becomes- while there is nothing terribly deliberative 
about mass elections right now, there may well be practical things that can be 
done to improve their deliberative qualities, and I will make some suggestions 
along those lines shortly. 
The problem is different at the informal end of the deliberative system. To 
impose strict rules of principal-agent accountability on the informal public sphere 
would be to impose crippling costs on anyone, or any small group, trying to have 
their voice heard, no matter how just their claims, while at the same time 
undermining the "playful", intuitive spirit of more informal communication 
which generates both creative solutions to political problems and helps challenge 
and reshape problem definitions in the first place (Dryzek 1990). Middle 
democracy presents a half-way case: it might be possible to insist, for example, 
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that interest groups demonstrate accountability linkages back to those they claim 
to represent if they want their proposals and arguments to have weight in a given 
forum, but accountablity between specific forums and the wider public might 
better be promoted through publicity mechanisms than by formal elections. If 
micro deliberative processes became common it would be hard to imagine "those 
affected" electing representatives to sit on citizens' juries, for example, not least 
because of the time and expense involved in setting up the different electorates 
relevant to every different topic. 
For those reasons I would recommend that strict principal-agent bonds only 
apply at the formal end of the deliberative system; and that communication 
between elected representatives and other citizens is of high enough quality to 
ensure that citizens can send clear instructions and make informed judgements 
about performance. The latter requirement, however, faces difficulties of its 
own, which I will come to at point six below. 
5. Legitimacy is boosted when insiders share descriptive features with outsiders. 
While descriptive representation cannot create accountability between 
deliberators and non-deliberators, and so cannot on its own solve the legitimacy 
problem, it is nonetheless better if agents have both direct principal-agent bonds 
and are descriptively representative of outsiders. This is not for essentialist 
reasons: rather, it is because those who share experiences with certain groups of 
outsiders are more likely to represent those outsiders' experience more accurately 
and, it is hoped although by no means certain, take their interests more into 
account in decision making; and for the practical reason that deliberating groups 
should be seen to be inclusive of a range of viewpoints. 
At the formal end of the deliberative system, if representatives are attending to 
their relationships, faithfully reporting the wishes of their principals as well as 
communicating the on-going debates back to them, then the quality of the 
relationship is more important than descriptive characteristics (Squires 1999). 
However, it is because such representative relationships cannot be performed 
213 
Chapter Seven 
perfectly that description is desirable: it adds another level of assurance that 
different voices get to make binding collective decisions. Where descriptive 
representation takes on more importance is in middle democracy, where 
principal-agent bonds cannot be so tight. The descriptive breadth of the 
deliberating body is one way of showing that the first "source" criterion is being 
met, that a variety of perspectives has been heard, and that the body is as neutral 
as can be, independant of any one group, or narrow coalition, in society - as 
was remarked on in the Leicester citizens' jury case. 
Descriptive ideals face significant practical challenges too. There is 
disagreement about which cleavages matter on any given topic, and so which 
differences need to be represented in any given forum, although most difference 
democrats might agree that differences of gender, ethnicity and socio-economic 
status matter no matter what the issue (Phillips 1995, 46-7). Also, the 
mathematics involved in creating a descriptively representative body on just a 
few dimensions means that size quickly gets out of hand, even if we make some 
fairly modest assumptions about the extent of diversity and speaking time 
(Goodin 2003). These facts speak in favour of some ad-hoc political institutions, 
with smaller-scale deliberative systems forming around a particular issue and 
then dissolving once the decision is made and implemented. This could clash 
with the stability requirement (number eight), however, and I will make some 
suggestions for managing that conflict shortly. 
6. Insider-outsiders links can also be established by means of publicity. 
The other way of establishing links with non-participants is through publicity 
(Gutmann and Thompson 1996). It has both prospective and retrospective 
features: the prospective is the idea that one must give an account of one's 
reasons before a proposal can be put into action; the retrospective is the idea that 
ones' actions are publicised so they can be scrutinised to ensure they match 
previous undertakings, and that they meet both procedural and substantive 
standards. Publicity helps establish "relationship" representation by sharing 
information, proposals and reasons throughout the deliberative system, not just 
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within a given forum. In this study I have concentrated on the way that is done 
through the news media, rather than other things like networks in the informal 
public sphere, because of the media's reach and central role in monitoring the 
public sphere and triggering debate (much like other "champions"). 
The big advantage of thinking of accountability as publicity is that we do not 
have to worry quite so much that few of those affected are in the room when a 
given issue is discussed, so long as people have taken part in the discursive 
threads which are brought to the table by the participants, to the extent that they 
are all "inside" the wider, macro deliberation. Some, of course, can afford to be 
more attentive than others, and this is where champions can play a part, 
monitoring the discussion and alerting others if something is amiss. 
Just like the other solutions to the scale problem, the publicity solution is not 
perfect either. First, like the descriptive solution, publicity lacks an effective, 
final sanction without some principal-agent bonds. Second, salience matters for 
generating public and media attention and motivating participation yet, in my 
cases, salience depended on whether or not the topic could be communicated 
using a few simple messages (even better, one simple message); whether it could 
be polarised, drarnatised and individualised; whether it connected with the 
identity, symbolism and concerns of the dominant consensus rather than minority 
interests (Hallet al. 1978, 56); and whether it was connected with major decision 
making moments (and thus the concerns of powerful decision makers) or not. 
This leaves out some of the most important features of many political issues. 
Third, media coverage of a given deliberative moment is usually one-way: the 
arguments made in a micro deliberative forum can reach outsiders but they have 
no means of arguing back within the confines of that micro deliberative event. In 
such cases, it may be valuable if those affected have the opportunity to grant or 
withhold consent once a decision has been reached, and I will suggest some 
mechanisms by which that can happen later on. Fourth, moving beyond the ideal 
of a self-contained forum in which all those affected are present introduces an 
important role distinction between orators and audiences, between those who are 
speaking and those the speakers are trying to persuade. When that happens, 
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speech tends to become oriented not to mutual understanding between orators, 
but to swaying an audience at the expense of one's interlocutors (Bessette 1994, 
221), using as many of the tools of rhetoric as one has mastered. Indeed, as I 
suggested in chapter five, it may well be good strategy to sling some mud first, 
splattering one's political opponents so that have to spend more energy fending 
off character attacks, trying to rebuild their ethos, before they can begin to be 
taken seriously in the public forum (Edelman 1988). Relying on public rhetoric 
to carry one's cause is a very dangerous strategy unless one is well resourced, 
and prepared to launch a few pre-emptive attacks. 
7. Decision making and implementation power have positive and negative 
impacts. 
I have argued that one aspect of the motivations problem is solved when more 
people have substantive control rather than merely symbolic involvement, and 
exercise that control over broad rather than narrow domains; this helps improve 
the quality of the recommendations as well. Participants in both citizens' juries 
started demanding binding decision making power because the limited agendas 
caused frustration; the lack of connection to a real decision making moment 
meant the recommendations of the Belfast jury and the deliberative poll were less 
detailed and less useful than those which emerged from the Leicester jury and the 
NHS Plan process. 
However, the more an issue matters in these ways, the more severe another 
aspect of the motivations problems becomes. In deliberation where there is a 
speaker-audience distinction, the pre-deliberative commitments problem 
becomes more acute because the pay-off is greater for successfully persuading 
one's audience rather than engaging constructively with one's fellow 
deliberators. Worse, there is evidence from other deliberative experiments, 
notably Hendriks (2002) and Niemeyer (2002), that in present institutional 
arrangements where power is unevenly distributed, power will simply speak to 
power: that is, powerful interests may well choose not to play the deliberative 
game at all, but apply pressure to decision makers using other channels. This 
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depends, however, on the audience not having the critical capacity to spot such 
things as attempted manipulation, or not having effective means of intervening, 
and from my cases there is some cause for optimism on both points. On the issue 
of lay participants' critical capacities, recall, for example, the deliberative poll 
participants who liked what the Liberal Democrats' Simon Hughes had to say but 
dismissed it because he was not in any danger of having to put his money where 
his mouth was; or the fact that the Leicester jurors did not allow the "sexy" 
nature of heart and breast services to overwhelm the less salient needs of kidney 
patients. However, deliberators' feelings against other individuals did lead them 
to discount those people's substantive contributions. On the second issue of 
having effective power to do something about attempted manipulation, this 
would depend on ultimate decision makers closing off other channels of 
influence, making the deliberative process the only game in town, as central and 
local government officers effectively did in the Leicester case, or by regulations 
restricting certain kinds of lobbying, or including deliberative specifications in 
"duty to consult" legislation, for example, or through the use of insurgent action 
to challenge such illegitimate outcomes. 
I have noted how it may be easier both to motivate participation and to raise 
deliberative quality by holding the deliberations in camera- this reduces the 
pressures created by previous commitments to peers and principals, lessening the 
likelihood that participants will play to the gallery instead of engaging honestly 
with each other. Such a move results in more substantive quality and more 
legitimacy between participants; but it lowers legitimacy for outsiders who have 
no access to the reasons for and against proposals. This weakness could be 
counteracted if deliberation is held in private but the reasons for and against 
proposals are publicised afterwards, but this does not solve the problem of pre-
deliberative commitments completely: deliberators in camera need to come back 
out again and face their peers who may not understand if their agents have given 
way on what they consider to be key grounds. I think that publicity is essential, 
most obviously because of the practical difficulties inherent in the principal-
agent ideal. It therefore must be used, but with awareness of its limitations. 
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8. Deliberative institutions need some stability if they are to empower those who 
do not already hold powerful positions. 
Democratic citizens need institutions and procedures to have a certain amount of 
stability: if the rules change all the time, only those who can bear the cost of re-
learning the rules will be enfranchised. There are two caveats to this principle. 
First, institutions themselves should result from the deliberation of those subject 
to them; and second, because the first kind of decision must itself be taken by 
fallible people using imperfect institutions, and because institutions can tend to 
lose touch with shifting social realities and power relations, all such institutional 
design decisions should be subject to periodic review (Goodin 1996b, 40-1). 
The concern with knowing how to access political institutions implies not just 
some amount of stability, but also requires that citizens be well-informed and 
educated about the institutions that are available to them so that they can, if they 
choose, take up an issue or engage in a discussion without facing too many 
barriers to participation. That is not to say that participation should be costless 
-in particular, the deliberative ideal implies that people do have to face some 
costs in terms of learning about issues and the effects on others before coming to 
a decision. 
Processes compared 
In table 7.1 below, I compare the strengths and weaknesses of the different 
processes covered in the thesis, both in their case-specific and more general 
forms, against the legitimacy criteria set out in the previous section: the numbers 
in brackets refer to the sub-sections above. 
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Table 7.1 Legitimacy pros and cons of deliberative processes and models 
Pro Con 
Citizens' Juries • Shoulder-tapping citizens who • Very small numbers with no 
would otherwise not get involved external accountability, so advisory 
(1) only- not much democracy (4,7) 
• Rationalises micro level debate • Only major cleavages represented 
through interest group (5) 
"quarantine", tight agenda, • Grandview problem: deliberative 
information and deliberation (2) transformation of representative 
• Deliberators descriptively sample into an unrepresentative 
representative in a limited way, one (5) 
with some openness of • Tight agenda requirement means it 
stratification process (5) is too "local" to have an impact on 
• Gives focal point for all sides of an broad issues - tool by which 
argument, leading to better quality centre controls local agencies, not 
media coverage of issue (2,6) for citizens to control the centre (8) 
• Can be applied on an ad-hoc basis • Does not necesssarily rationalise 
which increases flexibility in macro level debate if interest group 
descriptive and agenda terms (8) preferences left untransformed (2) 
• Because completely ad-hoc, 
impossible for citizens to access 
unless called upon by 
commissioners (8) 
Belfast Citizens' • as for juries generally, plus: • as for juries generally, plus: 
Jury • Lack of external accountability did • Salience undermined thanks to 
not cause a problem in practice - research orientation and lack of 
deliberative norms meant clear connection to a decision 
participants acted as if they were making moment, which led to 
held to account (4) media coverage for the process 
• Made institutional only, not for its substantive 
recommendations (8) recommendations (6) 
• Question too broad, therefore 
answers too broad to be useful (2) 
Leicester debate • as for Belfast jury, plus: • as for juries generally, plus: 
• Issues already salient- end point • Tiny number of jurors may have 
of a longer, public process driven been overwhelmed by large 
by interest groups and government number of petitioners and/or power 
allies, not by Health Authority - of interest groups if decision had 
leading to improved publicity, gone another way, regardless of 
accountability, and pressure on HA substantive considerations (1,2,7) 
to follow through ( 4,6,8) 
• Consent given to activists' 
champion role via petition (1) 
• Media presence on steering 
committee and during deliberation 
improves links with outsiders (6) 
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Deliberative polls • Shoulder-tapping citizens (1) • Small groups unlikely to include all 
• Rationalises same as citizens' but major cleavages thanks to 
juries, but to lesser degree (2) proportionality requirement (1,5) 
• Deliberators descriptively • TV creates grand-standing, a focus 
representative, much more than on celebrity, personalisation and 
citizens' jury (5) polarisation (2,6) 
• Media publicity an integral part of • Social scientific experiment drivers 
the process which guarantees some restrict agenda too much (2) 
wider attention (6) • Results no more nuanced than an 
• Can be applied on an ad-hoc basis ordinary opinion poll (2) 
which increases flexibility {8) • Does not necesssarily rationalise 
macro level debate if interest group 
preferences left untransformed (2) 
• No external accountability, so 
advisory only (4,7) 
• Grandview problem: deliberative 
transformation of representative 
sample into an unrepresentative 
one (5) 
• Unsuitable for television in the 
long-term- not easily 
transformed into narrative terms 
(6,8) 
• Because completely ad-hoc, 
impossible for citizens to access 
unless called upon by 
commissioners (8) 
NHS poll • as for deliberative polls generally • as for deliberative polls generally, 
plus: 
• No agenda control beyond a very 
small group (2) 
• Salience minimal thanks to lack of 
connection to a decision making 
moment, which leads to lack of 
publicity through other media (6) 
• Deliberatively poor- little 
bridging of problem-definition and 
values gap between experts and lay 
participants (2) 
NHS Plan process . • Broad involvement thanks to a • Public involvement may have been 
range of techniques, with some a legitimating mask for changes 
limited shoulder-tapping in the that would have happened anyway 
focus groups ( 1) (2,7) 
• Popular input into agenda through • Agenda too dominated by DoH {2) 
the postcards, public meetings and • Forgot to include all stakeholders, 
focus groups (2) especially the CHCs and the 
• Allowed range of interests to come Commons Health Committee (1) 
to working agreements (2) • Realities of electoral politics mean 
• Final decisions made by that representatives unlikely to be 
representatives with clear called to account specifically for 
principal-agent bonds (4) the successes and failures of the 
• Enormous government resources NHS Plan, although the NHS might 
put into publicising decisions and well be a salient issue (4) 
new institutions, with reasoning • Because completely ad-hoc, 
defended in parliament and in open impossible for citizens to access 
committee, proceedings of which unless called upon by 
available online (6) commissioners (8) 
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Disability • Participatory norms help create • Usually no representative link 
activism broader base of involvement (1) between activists and others so 
• Non-state actors set the agenda and should not be decisive (3) 
define problems themselves, • Not descriptively representative of 
challenging attempts to limit them non-members on features 
(2) correlated with the active/inactive 
• Descriptively representative, in variable (5) 
some respects, of all those who • Too dependent on rhetoric and 
suffer disability (5) dramaturgy to convey messages, at 
• Generate salience for issues which the cost of complexities - may 
might otherwise pass unnoticed (6) narrow agenda in unintended ways, 
• Alter decisions by changing and opens the door to strategic 
problem definitions on which manipulation (2,7) 
decisions depend (7) 
• Stability of groups helps citizens to 
find out how to join and how to 
have an impact on policy -
provides a relatively stable, non-
state channel for action (8) 
The micro deliberative processes share some advantages and disadvantages. On 
the plus side, they help address the motivations problem in various ways. The 
first is by shoulder-tapping citizens who might otherwise not have the efficacy 
needed to get involved in collective decision making; indeed, because 
participants are often actively recruited by market research firms to fit a given 
stratification profile, they work hard to persuade the reluctant to come on the 
grounds that "the whole thing would fail without them" (Deliberative poll 
manager, London; also NHS manager, Belfast). By confining those who have 
pre-deliberative commitments to a subservient role, such processes lower the 
chances that the deliberation will be manipulated for strategic ends, although that 
is by no means assured (Hendriks 2002). By giving various stakeholders a role 
in agenda setting on the steering group, the citizens' jury process handles this 
better by binding them more closely into the whole decision making process; a 
deliberative poll wheels experts in and out, giving them little stake and even less 
incentive to take the process seriously. So long as they are seen to be an 
important preliminary to some other major decision making event - as was the 
case in Leicester- such events provide a focal point in which the major 
arguments for and against a proposal can not only be tested against each other, 
but also transmitted more comprehensively and accurately through the media; 
without such a focal point, mediated public discourse is the stuff of symbol over 
substance, which I think is something we should regret for the most part. 
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They share significant downsides, however. The first is that another aspect of 
the motivational problem is made worse. Such processes work best with tightly 
defined problems and focused agendas, which may be fine if the issue is also 
tightly defined, but not if, as is most often the case, the issue is characterised by 
competing problem definitions and ill-defined impacts. This feature of micro 
deliberation explains in part why it has been used most often by local agencies 
rather than central ones: the techniques are simply not appropriate for use on 
highly complex, ill-defined issues. This is a concern for the legitimacy of 
deliberative democracy if citizens only get to deliberate on the small stuff, never 
on the big issues which frame the local ones - why put yourself out or go 
through such an intense process if it is not going to change things? The second 
major disadvantage is that the scale problem is most acute at this level: in 
practical politics there are few reasons why the deliberation of a dozen, or even a 
few hundred, people without representative bonds would weigh more heavily 
than the express preferences of hundreds of thousands, even millions. Where this 
may not be the case, I have argued, is where the micro deliberative event is held 
to break a deadlock which has arisen in mass politics; it should not be used to 
foreclose mass debate. 
The macro processes solve these problems in various ways, but introduce others. 
Among the positives, they bring many more people into any given deliberation 
which greatly reduces the scale problem, and they allow for a greater range of 
views and experience to shape the deliberative agenda, particularly if no one 
commissioning body can control that agenda. They create salience for an issue 
simply by choosing to focus on it and spreading communication about it 
throughout the deliberative system: government-led processes can wield 
significant resources to publicise events, while the mechanisms of parliament 
ensure that eventual decisions must be defended in public; activists in civil-
society can use dramaturgical means to create salience, attracting attention to 
exclusion and manipulation. Government-led processes have enhanced 
legitimacy if those making the decisions are subject to electoral sanction, 
although voting decisions are a great deal more complex than a simple indication 
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of policy preferences (Catt 1996; Rose and McAllister 1990). Perhaps a more 
certain way would be to subject particular decisions to a referendum once a 
macro deliberative process has run its course. Activist-led deliberation has the 
great advantage of challenging the agendas of the powerful. 
Among the negatives, not everyone is equally powerful in macro deliberation: 
some speak more than others, some can only be listeners and are not able to 
challenge the arguments of those privileged enough to get time on the podium or 
space in the media, which means that the uses and abuses of rhetoric become 
much more important in macro than micro deliberation. Furthermore, the 
reliance on the news media to transmit arguments around the deliberative system 
means that only certain arguments get through: what gets lost is the complexity, 
and the impersonal features of social and political issues. Finally, all the various 
inputs from the public sphere still have to be gathered and decisions made. This 
is the role of an elected assembly and its committees, perhaps a parliament 
reformed along deliberative lines (Bessette 1994; Uhr 1998), but still a body of 
decision makers effectively accountable to the people they represent. 
Thus, if there is one key lesson to be drawn from this study, it is that no one 
institution can be perfectly legitimate because not all the principles can be 
instantiated at once: we cannot have both ideal deliberative quality and full 
publicity as the conditions of the latter undermine the former; we cannot have 
tight principal-agent bonds and ideal deliberation because participants need to be 
free to change their minds; we cannot endow any one micro deliberative process 
with much power on its own without undermining the rights of outsiders to have 
a say on a particular political question. 
However, different types of institution can make different legitimate 
contributions to a wider deliberative system. We can think about this in two 
ways. The first is to adapt the social research idea of triangulation, using 
multiple methods to look at the same data. It is done because particular research 
tools are only good at answering particular kinds of questions and deliver 
particular kinds of results (Berg 2001, 4-6); in the same way, democratic 
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deliberation should be the result of several different processes, because different 
processes motivate different kinds of representative to take part, sharing different 
kinds of knowledge, creating inclusiveness and legitimacy for the deliberative 
system despite the individual peculiarities of its parts (Goodin 1996b, 41-2). The 
second approach is to use timing and sequencing, and the Leicester example 
helps us think about this (see Goodin forthcoming). It seems clear that the 
citizens' jury "worked" in part because of when it was held, not just because of 
internal qualities of the process itself. Recall how important it was for local 
people to wrest control of the decision making process back from the health 
authority. One can plausibly imagine that had the authority tried to run a jury 
right at the start of its decision making process in 1996, it might still have faced a 
revolt further down the track, for several reasons. At best it would only have 
generated publicity for the process (as in Belfast) and not the issue; therefore, 
there would still have been a lack of public visibility about the issue, the 
arguments and the recommendation; which means that non-participants would 
still not have possessed grounds for agreeing with the decision when it came to 
be announced, regardless of how well designed the micro process was. The 
corollary of those observations is that perhaps any reasonably deliberative 
process would have created a legitimate decision at the right point in time: that 
is, after a broad public debate outside the health authority's control. 
If we are going to think in sequence terms, then it is useful to think about the 
steps in a decision making process and how different institutions might make 
useful contributions to each of them. This is similar to Goodin's (forthcoming) 
approach but different in that I want to insist on the value of popular inclusion at 
more of the stages than he is willing to settle for: my democratic account of 
legitimacy, especially the source criterion, pushes my argument in that direction. 
So, what I do in the next section is to take those four decision making stages and 
see what kind of process is more likely to make a positive contribution at each 
stage, and where its negatives will be minimised. 
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Modelling a legitimate deliberative democracy 
To step from these principles to recommending specific practices within the 
boundaries of a thesis would strike some deliberative democrats as odd, to say 
the least. Gutmann and Thompson (1996, 358) argue, "The best forum for 
considering the design of deliberative institutions is likely to be one in which 
deliberation, however nascent, has a prominent place," not inside an academic's 
head, democratic deliberation within notwithstanding (Goodin 2000). I agree, 
but only in part. When it comes to deliberating about deliberative institutions, it 
would help greatly if the people had some ideas to work with, and if theses have 
any impact at all on wider public conversations, then this is one way that I, as a 
citizen who has thought about these things, can contribute. 
Among those deliberative democrats who have taken that next step, there are 
those who concentrate on the formal public sphere; those who stress the informal 
public sphere; those who recommend institutions of middle democracy; and a 
very small number who try to address the whole in some way. The former have 
focused on protecting the quality of deliberation within the formal public sphere, 
but they have tended to do so at the expense of the democratic character of that 
deliberation, ascribing either no role, or a very limited one, to other citizens 
(Bessette 1994; Rawls 1997). As Gutmann and Thompson (1996, 358-9) 
remark, "deliberative labor should not be divided so that representatives give 
reasons while citizens merely receive them." We can and should go further if we 
are to meet the legitimacy requirements, and we can do so, I think, without 
seriously undermining the deliberative benefits focused on by Bessette and 
Rawls. 
Concentrating on the informal end of the public sphere can lead to the opposite 
mistake, focusing too heavily on the democratic value of popular control as 
expressed by such things as grass-roots networks without taking seriously 
enough both the fragmented, multiple nature of the informal public sphere which 
results in disjuncture rather than communication across different experiences on 
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the one hand (Fraser 1992); and the distortions, manipulations, and sometimes 
sheer irrationality of mass communication and mass action on the other. 54 While 
some proponents of this kind of approach do use principles of communicative 
rationality to distinguish between what might be crudely called "good" networks 
and "bad" networks, I don't think they pay enough attention to the complexities 
of public communication processes which over-simplify, personalise, and 
polarise debates; that is, to the fact that while a network may be communicatively 
rational internally, it cannot be as communicatively rational as it would like 
externally if it is to have an effect on public action- Dryzek (2000, 167-8) and 
Young (2001, 676) are at least sensitive to this point. This is where the 
distinction between debate and decision may be useful -it may be essential that 
an active informal public sphere exists to challenge the status quo and bring new 
claims and new experiences to public attention, but decision making mechanisms 
should not be beholden to such processes without some kind of intervening 
institutions which bring all the various threads together. Otherwise we run the 
risk of what we might call "thorubocracy", 55 rule by those who can command 
public attention purely by shouting loudly enough. 
It is to intervening institutions in "middle democracy" that by far the most 
attention has been paid. For some this is because it is relatively easy to apply 
deliberative principles to a small, self-contained practice; for others because that 
is where attention should be focused. Among the latter, Fung (forthcoming) 
argues that, "given the fragmentation of cultural and political life, effective large-
scale public sphere reforms may consist largely in the proliferation of better 
minipublics rather than improving the one big public." However, I think this 
view is mistaken because, as we have seen with the experience of micro 
deliberation in the NHS, it gives away too much control of problem and scope 
definition to large government and non-government organisations, especially big 
54 With thanks to Graham Smith for the discussion on this point. 
55 A term coined for me by Elizabeth Minchin, Classics Program, Australian National 
University. It is based on thorubos, a word used by Plato (1997) to mean the din and 
racket made in the assembly in response to a speaker. 
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businesses and central "co-ordination" agencies who define the terms on which 
such deliberative events are held, if not directly commissioning them themselves. 
Instead, we need to take all three realms seriously: the informal for its creativity, 
proximity to the people and its (sometimes latent) power to challenge the status 
quo; the formal for its ability to collect together the results of various kinds of 
democratic deliberation, make legitimately binding collective decisions, and 
resist other sources of power; and the intermediate for its ability to connect the 
other two in rationalised ways. My suggestions encompass all three, making sure 
they are intricately connected with each other. However, I emphasise again that 
my proposals are about next steps on from current institutions, not ideal end 
points. 
First of all, it is important to recognise that the four decision making stages are 
only conceptually distinct; in practice, real political processes are much messier 
with some stages happening simultaneously or being widely separated in time; 
with some actors concentrating on an activity belonging to one stage while others 
concentrate on something quite different. Furthermore, discussion and decision 
define problems as much as they define implementation, while implementation 
itself creates new problems (Pressman and Wildavsky 1979). Nonetheless, I 
have argued that legitimacy problems arise in large measure because of the 
wrong techniques, even the wrong kinds of representative, being activated at the 
wrong times in a decision making process (see Squires 2003) and so such a 
scheme- highly stylised, I readily admit- helps us think about what the right 
process at the right moment might be. 
227 
Chapter Seven 
Table 7.2 A deliberative system: roles at different decision stages 
Decision staKeS 
Define Discuss Decide Implement 
Activist • raise issues and • research • monitor process • monitor results 
networks work to make impacts and and challenge if 
them salient offer solutions necessary 
• voice 
perspectives 
Experts • research and • conduct • monitor results 
raise issues research on and challenge if 
impacts necessary 
• offer solutions 
Bureaucracy • research and • manage macro • see note 56 • implement 
raise issues deliberative decisions 
processes 
• gather the 
arguments and 
supply to 
decision makers 
Micro • provide • recommend • evaluating 
techniques deliberative course of implemenation 
focal point for action, incl. 
arguments dissenting 
made by others opinions 
Media • research and • present the • report the • monitor results 
raise issues, arguments for decision and the and challenge if 
make them and against reasons for and necessary 
salient different against 
solutions from 
various sources 
Elected • instigate macro • debate the • make binding • monitor 
assembly deliberative arguments from collective implementation 
processes the broader decisions 
public sphere • communicate 
reasons for and 
against the 
decision 
Direct • instigate macro • make binding 
techniques deliberative collective 
(referenda, processes decisions 
_petitions) 
56 Note that here I follow Habermas (1996, 173) in confining the bureaucracy to an 
"executive assistant" role, informing decision makers and acting on their wishes, not as a 
decision maker in its own right. In Habermas's words, administration should "not be 
used to intervene in, or substitute for, processes of legislation and adjudication." 
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The whole scheme starts with the source norm: many different kinds of people 
can raise issues and put them up for public discussion through the media, through 
dramaturgical action, and through activist networks. I do not want to be too 
prescriptive at this point, because part of the value of such activity is that it is 
created by its members rather than parachuted in from above. However, grass-
roots democracy can be hard work (Cornforth et al. 1988; Freeman 1973). Given 
that, it helps if people can learn from the successes and failures of their peers, 
and in this regard Schlosberg (1999) commends the work of central information 
clearing houses who distribute ideas and issues to their members. Central and 
local government agencies can also help by sharing information and resources to 
help such networks set up - some government websites are making initial 
efforts to act as community information clearing houses in just this way, 57 while 
the simple provision of server space and information technology expertise would 
be a significant boost to local networks' capacity to organise and communicate. 
This should be in addition to providing access to research resources, either 
through public libraries with improved access to research databases, or perhaps 
allowing networks access to university library databases at substantially 
discounted rates, perhaps even subsidised salaries for research officers. 
However, only some of the things that need discussion can be handled at once, so 
there needs to be some way in which the "official" public agenda- that around 
which macro deliberative processes will be deliberately set up- can be 
established which is not simply the result of a small group's more-or-less-
arbitrary exercise of power. This could be done by allowing citizens' initiatives, 
but because it requires significant resources to qualify a proposition for the ballot 
they tend to be the tools of the already-powerful and well-organised, regardless 
of how low the qualifying signature threshhold might be (Parkinson 2001). It 
could be done by opening up the agenda setting processes of elected assemblies, 
putting a parliamentary committee in charge which gathers submissions from 
57 Albeit in nascent form only: for example, see Wellington City Council in New 
Zealand, www.wcc.govt.nz, or the CitizenSpace section of the UK government's central 
website, http://www. ukonline.gov. uk/CitizenSpace/CitizenSpace/fs/en, both accessed 10 
July 2003. 
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decision to change electoral system is an example of another type where four 
electoral options were presented, followed by a run-off vote between the existing 
system and the top-polling alternative in the previous round (Boston 1999). Of 
course, any voting procedure is theoretically open to strategic manipulation, with 
binary option and multi-stage processes dependent on how the options are carved 
up in the first place (McLean 1987); to deal with this, the advice emerging from 
the micro deliberations could include a recommendation on dividing up any 
subsequent referendum. If the referendum is not a substitute for deliberation but 
the final decision making event at the conclusion of a longer deliberative process 
which has been engaged in a variety of forums by different kinds of 
representatives and well-covered by the media, then the rationality issues will be 
less pressing. At the same time, legitimacy would be further enhanced by the 
opportunity for everyone to grant consent. 
The final stage is implementation and evaluation, and this is where the 
bureaucracy, interest groups, the media and experts come back into the equation, 
monitoring results and making challenges if necessary, which returns us to the 
start of the cycle once more. 
While the scheme I have sketched out does not solve the scale and motivations 
problems, it produces positive movement on all my legitimacy criteria, while 
reducing the impact of the dangers. It addresses the scale problem by taking a 
macro view of deliberative democracy, giving citizens a prominent, and 
sometimes decisive, role in the deliberative system, even though they do not all 
deliberate together at every stage on every issue. Yet it does so at the same time 
as limiting the risks of rhetorical manipulation by emphasising rhetoric's positive 
role in agenda setting but limiting its reach at the other stages. The limits are 
reinforced by giving micro processes a pivotal role, providing a focal point for 
media coverage and so improving the likelihood that the media will transmit the 
various arguments accurately. At the same time it gives representatives of all 
kinds a role, thus improving the inclusiveness of the system, but leaves practical 
decision making in the hands of those representatives over whom citizens retain 
electoral power, ensuring effective public accountability. It addresses the 
232 
Institutions of deliberative democracy 
motivational problems by featuring a broadly inclusive agenda setting process 
and because it is oriented to collective decision making which engages the whole 
public hierarchy, not mere advice at the local level. Decisions reached through 
such a process therefore matter in ways that local, micro deliberations do not, 
which means that those with specific goals to achieve have an incentive to pursue 
those goals through this public channel rather than standing aloof or doing end-
runs around the process. While the incentives for strategic manipulation are 
consequently greater, they are managed not only by the central role of micro 
deliberative processes in making recommendations, but also to the degree that 
interest groups, experts, bureaucrats and the media monitor the whole process on 
behalf of other citizens, publicising underhanded action and publicly shaming 
transgressors. Finally, while it has many ad hoc features which improve its 
ability to include relevant voices on different issues, it nonetheless retains some 
stability so that citizens can learn how to access it. 
It might be objected that the system appears quite inefficient: would it not be 
better simply for leaders and experts to decide things and then work to sell the 
new concepts to people, bringing them along rather than having a sceptical 
public hold progress back? It would certainly slow things down at the agenda 
setting , deliberation and decision stages, but that, to my mind, is no bad thing if 
it creates legitimacy for the resulting agreements and thus minimises the 
inefficiencies involved in having perpetually to fight fires after decisions have 
been announced, slowing down the implementation phase. This is an open 
empirical question, but the hope of an optimistic answer receives some anecdotal 
support from one of my Belfast interviewees who observed that while the highly 
consultative environment in place in Northern Ireland was resisted strongly by 
the local bureaucracy, on the grounds that "both the local civil society and the 
bureaucracy would grind to a halt under the pressure to participate," and that it 
would require too many resources, these fears have not been borne out in 
practice. Decision making was slower, but had by no means stopped and was, in 
her opinion, of better quality than before. 
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Finally, as Dryzek (1996b) argues, institutional arrangements are just the 
"hardware" for collective decision making- there also needs to be "software" 
in the form of supportive discourses which make the difference between new 
arrangements taking root or withering. To my knowledge there have been no 
comprehensive surveys of discourses of democracy in the United Kingdom, 58 but 
the brief survey in chapter three suggests that there may indeed be elements in 
UK political discourse which would support my scheme. Present discourse 
recognises, gives agency to, and ascribes positive motivations to "ordinary 
people", which would seem to encourage schemes for closer connection with 
them, although it would certainly be a challenge to have the championing role of 
interest groups more widely accepted. As for the role of the mediating and 
formal institutions, there is already evidence that some key decision makers 
would at least consider such a scheme, evidence in the shape of the raft of 
measures brought in following The NHS Plan, including the NICE citizens' 
council, patients' forums, and so forth. The challenge would be applying the 
model at the parliamentary level itself, not just imposing it on local government 
agencies. 
Questions and conclusions 
So, in this thesis I have pointed out that the classical deliberative account of 
legitimacy is incomplete, because it cannot account for why non-participants 
should grant legitimacy to the outcome of any deliberative moment. I have 
argued that attending to three critical aspects of legitimacy- representation, 
publicity and rationality -leads us to reconsider the very nature of deliberative 
democracy, moving away from the strict criteria of the micro conception towards 
a more macro or public sphere-oriented account. The re-think allows us to 
loosen the tight institutional restrictions some early theorists had inadvertently 
imposed on deliberative designs, allowing us to think about legitimacy as being 
58 A model for such a survey exists in the shape of a recent collection by Dryzek and 
Holmes (2002). 
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created across multiple deliberative moments in a wider deliberative system. 
This rethink helps with the scale problem by involving many more people in 
deliberative democracy than any one micro deliberative process could ever 
manage, even though not all of them can deliberate in the technical sense 
specified by Cohen, Walzer and others. Such a move opens the door to the risk 
of strategic manipulation of the deliberative democratic process, but it is a risk 
we can manage by thinking in sequential terms, separating out decision making 
from agenda setting , discussion and implementation, and giving different 
processes and participants different legitimate roles at different points of the 
decision making cycle. By being oriented nonetheless to making decisions, the 
scheme further addresses the motivational difficulties presented by having 
citizens participate in relatively local, unimportant, advisory deliberative events. 
Nonetheless, while we can imagine a deliberative system that is more legitimate 
than current arrangements, no one event can ever be fully legitimate and at the 
same time strictly deliberative, because not all the elements of legitimacy, 
democracy and deliberation can be present in one process. This is imposed on us 
by the fact of scale and the consequent requirement of salience: that which 
makes an issue salient and thus transmissable throughout the deliberative system 
is that which opens it to manipulation, undermining the substantive requirements 
of legitimacy. I have suggested some ways in which this tendency can be fought, 
but it will be, of necessity, a constant battle. 
There are numerous questions outstanding, and some objections to overcome. 
First, the whole edifice is built on a narrow empirical foundation. I have 
examined only four processes in any depth, and given another only cursory 
treatment, in one particular institutional setting on one kind of issue: in other 
countries, on other issues, or using different techniques, the outcomes may well 
have been different. However, as I set out in the methodology section in chapter 
one, such an approach was necessary given limited resources and the need to 
peer beneath the surface of political practices and look at the devil in the detail; 
and the questions I asked were well grounded in theory. The narrow empirical 
basis would be more of a problem if my aim had been to do a comprehensive 
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evaluation of the processes I looked at, but it was not: the aim was to mine 
others' experience with implementing deliberative principles to see what 
legitimacy issues actually arose and what their solutions might be. Nonetheless, 
it would be interesting to use my results to form the basis of research to assess 
how widespread the issues and attitudes uncovered here are, in the UK and 
elsewhere. Such a study could confirm the validity of my intuitions, or 
undermine them and force a rethink. 
Moreover, because the cases were embedded in a liberal, technocratic system, 
not a fully deliberative one, it is impossible to say how similar processes would 
have functioned under quite different institutional pressures, and so the cases 
may not have tested those processes under terribly fair circumstances. Still, even 
given those limitations, it was remarkable that the Leicester debate and the NHS 
Plan did produce something close to fully legitimate outcomes. I can only 
speculate on what might have happened had those circumstances been closer to 
the ideal. 
In the body of the thesis, there are three main gaps I would like to see filled. 
First of all, I have limited my consideration of representation to principal-agent 
and descriptive ideas, without taking the symbolic aspects more seriously, asking 
whether they can play a role in building links between insiders and outsiders 
(Edelman 1976). When it comes to decision making I can think of obvious 
problems with that, similar to those faced by the publicity solution - a lack of 
accountability and openness to manipulation - but perhaps the symbolic can 
make a contribution at the discussion stage which I have not considered here. 
The second gap concerns the issue I raised but was unable to answer about how 
participants feel themselves to be accountable to outsiders even though there are 
no formal mechanisms holding them to that. This is related to the third gap, to 
do with publicity in the public sphere. I confined my discussion of this to the 
news media, but the media is broader than news, and the public sphere broader 
than the media. Perhaps a broader examination of those alternatives may throw 
up more solutions to the problems which come with the media, particularly their 
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structural inability to transmit some kinds of arguments because of the need to 
narrate a story. 
In terms of my own model of a legitimate deliberative democracy, there is an 
enormous amount of technical detail of how the system would work which I have 
glided over, detail like the roles of existing institutions like parties, interest 
groups, cabinet, powerful central policy agencies, and so on. Just as important as 
doing the detailed design, however, is knowing whether any supportive 
discourses exist for all of this, or whether other preliminary work would need to 
be done before anything like my scheme, or even some of its elements, could be 
contemplated. Therefore a detailed study of discourses of democracy in Britain 
and elsewhere would be very useful, particularly if it paid attention to the 
discursive allegiances of politicians, public servants and other powerful public 
actors. 
* * * * * 
Finally, what about the questions I asked right at the beginning, on behalf of the 
protestors standing outside the Leicester City Football Club back in March 2000? 
What reasons did they have for conferring legitimacy on the process? On what 
grounds could they be persuaded to accept the outcome without being inside the 
room themselves, hearing the arguments and participating in the debate directly? 
From what I have argued, there were several. First, their own representatives 
were inside the jury room, making presentations to the jurors and arguing their 
case, and if they did a bad job, then those leaders could be replaced. Second, 
while the witnesses were not privy to the in camera deliberations and so could 
not transmit those arguments back to their members, the jury report was widely 
distributed so they could at least read through the jurors' reasoning and, 
presumably, consent to or challenge it later; local newspaper and television 
journalists covered the proceedings over the four days as well, ensuring that the 
wider population was able to follow the key arguments. Third, the jurors were at 
least broadly descriptively representative of the county population- more 
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representative than those who had taken part in the initial planning process at any 
rate - while the random selection process also ensured that no-one making the 
recommendations had more than an ordinary citizen's interest in the outcome. 
Fourth, the health authority agreed to be bound by the decision, a decisiveness 
which enhanced some measure of democratic control and undermined 
bureaucratic diktat. Fifth, it was agreed to be a more rational process than the 
polarised shouting which had prevailed up to that point, a rationality which 
increased the likelihood that the result would be legitimate on substantive 
grounds. Sixth, and perhaps most importantly, the citizens' jury was not the 
entire deliberative process, but just its focal point- up until then, the protestors 
and the wider population had taken part in a mass challenge to the health 
authority's decision, and mobilised support from elected representatives and 
other champions, which meant that participation in the public conversation 
surrounding the issue had been very much broader than just the 16 jurors. These 
five points mean that the protestors had good reason indeed to grant legitimacy to 
the process, reasons which were both internal to the jury process itself, and 
external, related to its role as the focus of a larger deliberative system. 
The most serious shortcoming was that this particular deliberative system was 
focused only on Leicestershire, while the issues which constrained both the scope 
of the deliberation and the available solutions were determined in Whitehall and 
by the myriad factors making up the political economy of the UK's health 
service. To be more fully legitimate, deliberative democracy needs to be much 
bigger than local consultations on local issues. It needs to be integrated into 
central government as well, even into the international system, and to engage 
with the power of large private interests. Otherwise political life will involve, 
perhaps as it already does, democratic deliberation on issues which do not matter 
very much, technocracy or thorubocracy on some of those which do, and 
plutocracy for everything else. 
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